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Abstract
In this thesis, we consider three different market impact models and
their regularity. Regularity of a market impact model is characterized
by properties of optimal liquidation strategies. Specifically, we discuss
absence of price manipulation and absence of transaction-triggered price
manipulation. Moreover, we introduce a new regularity condition called
positive expected liquidation costs.
The first market impact model under consideration allows for tran-
sient impact with a time-dependent liquidity parameter. This includes
time-dependent permanent impact as a special case. In this model, we
show an example for an arbitrage opportunity while the unaffected pri-
ce process is a martingale. Furthermore, we show that regularity may
depend strongly on the liquidation time horizon. We also find that de-
terministic strategies can be suboptimal for a risk-neutral investor even
if the liquidity parameter is a martingale.
Second, we extend an Almgren-Chriss model with the possibility to
trade in a dark pool. In particular, we model the cross impact of trading
in the exchange onto prices in the dark pool and vice versa. We find
that the model is regular if there is no temporary cross impact from the
exchange to the dark pool, full permanent cross impact from the dark
pool to the exchange, and an additional penalization of orders executed
in the dark pool. In other cases, we show by a number of examples how
the regularity depends on the interplay of all model parameters and on
the liquidation time constraint.
Third, we consider a linear transient impact model in discrete time
with the possibility to trade multiple assets including cross impact bet-
ween the different assets. The model is regular if the matrix-valued decay
kernel of market impact is a positive definite function. We characterize
both symmetric and non-symmetric matrix-valued positive definite func-
tions. We discuss nonnegative and nonincreasing decay kernels. If a decay
kernel is additionally symmetric and convex, it is positive definite. Mo-
reover, if it is also commuting, we show that the optimal discrete-time
strategies converge to an optimal continuous-time strategy. For matrix-
valued exponential functions, we provide explicit solutions.

Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir drei verschiedene Markteinflussmodelle
und deren Regularita¨t. Die Regularita¨t eines Markteinflussmodells be-
stimmt sich durch die Eigenschaften von optimalen Liquidationsstrategi-
en. Insbesondere untersuchen wir die Abwesenheit von Preismanipulatio-
nen und transaktionsinduzierten Preismanipulationen. Daru¨ber hinaus
fu¨hren wir eine neue Regularita¨tsbedingung ein, die positiven erwarte-
ten Liquidationskosten.
Das erste Markteinflussmodell, das wir betrachten, beinhaltet transi-
enten Preiseinfluss mit einem zeitabha¨ngigen Liquidita¨tsparameter. Dies
entha¨lt zeitabha¨ngigen permanenten Preiseinfluss als Spezialfall. Wir ge-
ben ein Beispiel fu¨r eine Arbitragegelegenheit an, wa¨hrend der unbeein-
flusste Preisprozess ein Martingal ist. Außerdem zeigen wir, dass die
Regularita¨t stark vom Liquidationszeithorizont abha¨ngen kann. Zudem
ko¨nnen deterministische Strategien suboptimal fu¨r einen risikoneutralen
Investor sein, auch wenn der Liquidita¨tsparameter ein Martingal ist.
Zweitens erweitern wir ein Almgren-Chriss Modell mit der Mo¨glich-
keit, in einem Dark Pool zu handeln. Insbesondere modellieren wir den
wechselseitigen Preiseinfluss des Handels an der Bo¨rse auf Preise im Dark
Pool und umgekehrt. Wir zeigen dass das Modell regula¨r ist, wenn es kei-
nen tempora¨ren Preiseinfluss der Bo¨rse auf den Dark Pool, vollen perma-
nenten Preiseinfluss vom Dark Pool auf die Bo¨rse und eine zusa¨tzliche
Penalisierung von im Dark Pool ausgefu¨hrten Orders gibt. Andernfalls
zeigen wir durch Beispiele, wie die Regularita¨t von dem Zusammenspiel
aller Modellparameter und von der Liquidationszeitbedingung abha¨ngt.
Drittens betrachten wir ein Modell linearen transienten Preiseinflus-
ses mit der Mo¨glichkeit verschiedene Wertpapiere zu handeln unter Be-
ru¨cksichtigung deren wechselseitigen Preiseinflusses. Das Modell ist re-
gula¨r wenn die matrixwertige Abklingfunktion des Preiseinflusses eine
positiv definite Funktion ist. Wir charakterisieren symmetrische und
nichtsymmetrische positiv definite Funktionen und diskutieren nicht-
negative und steigende Abklingfunktionen. Wenn eine Abklingfunktion
zusa¨tzlich symmetrisch und konvex ist, ist sie positiv definit. Wenn sie
außerdem kommutierend ist, zeigen wir dass die optimalen zeitdiskreten
Strategien gegen eine optimale zeitstetige Strategie konvergieren. Fu¨r
matrixwertige Exponentialfunktionen geben wir explizite Lo¨sungen an.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Optimal Liquidation Problem and
Literature Overview
Many models in mathematical finance assume that arbitrary amounts of an asset
can be traded at the current price either at no cost or with transaction costs that
are linear in the quantity traded. However, when trading large amounts investors
experience nonlinear adverse price effects of their own trading called market impact.
In former times, market makers stood ready to buy or sell large amounts of
securities at huge spreads, even as large as 1/4th of a dollar on NASDAQ before
1994 (Christie and Schultz (1994)). Now markets offer much lower spreads, for liquid
stocks often only one cent (Cont and de Larrard (2013)). This makes trading cheap
for small investors. On the other hand, a large part of this liquidity is provided by
high frequency traders who avoid to hold a large inventory, see Kirilenko et al. (2011)
and Menkveld (2011). That is, they are not willing to buy or sell large amounts of
securities at once. Therefore, large trades have to be split up over time.
With today’s “fully automated stock exchanges” (Black (1971)) the task of trad-
ing is increasingly performed by algorithms without human intervention. This be-
comes most noticeable when these algorithms fail, e.g. in the Flash Crash on May
6, 2010 (Kirilenko et al. (2011)) or the recent loss of $440 million for Knight Capital
Group in just 45 minutes on August 1, 2012 due to a software bug.
To automate the order splitting problem one needs a model for the market im-
pact incurred by a trade. Given this market impact model, the problem is then to
compute an optimal splitting strategy. This is called the optimal liquidation prob-
lem, because this problem can be thought of liquidating a position (a buy trade is
equivalent to liquidating a short position), or optimal order execution problem.
The first to set up such a model and solving for the optimal strategy that min-
imizes expected costs were Bertsimas and Lo (1998). However, the optimal liqui-
dation problem is often seen as a trade-off between trading slow in order to reduce
expected costs and trading fast in order to reduce volatility risk from the remaining
position. This trade-off was discussed in Almgren and Chriss (2001) by introducing
a mean-variance criterion for the cost of the trade. Moreover, they decomposed im-
pact into temporary impact, which vanishes instantly, and permanent impact, which
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affects all future trades equally. We call models of this type Almgren-Chriss models
although they were not the first to propose this decomposition. The continuous-time
version of this model was introduced in Almgren (2003).
Closer to reality is a model where impact decays over time, i.e. where impact is
transient. Such a model was introduced by Bouchaud et al. (2004). Obizhaeva and
Wang (2013) were the first to use a transient impact model for the computation of
optimal liquidation strategies.
For a market impact model, it is not only important to model the behavior
of real markets as close as possible, but also that optimal strategies exist and are
somehow reasonable, e.g. they should not switch between buying and selling large
amounts very fast. This is the regularity of a market impact model. The first to
analyze regularity of a market impact model were Huberman and Stanzl (2004).
They found that permanent impact has to be linear in the trade size to exclude
price manipulations, i.e. strategies that do neither buy nor sell shares in total
but have a strictly positive expected profit. Gatheral (2010) analyzed regularity
of transient impact models. In the case of linear transient impact, Alfonsi et al.
(2012) found that another irregularity might occur, so-called transaction-triggered
price manipulation. This occurs when an optimal strategy switches between buying
in selling. The continuous-time version of this model was treated in Gatheral et al.
(2012).
For the Almgren-Chriss model Schied and Scho¨neborn (2009) solved the utility
maximization problem, which was already proposed by Bertsimas and Lo (1998):
There an investor is considered who wants to maximize expected utility of the rev-
enues generated by trading. The original mean-variance approach of Almgren and
Chriss (2001) was confirmed by Schied et al. (2010) with showing that an investor
with CARA utility function has a deterministic optimal strategy, which can be found
using the mean-variance approach for Almgren-Chriss impact. Since mean-variance
optimization is not time-consistent, Lorenz and Almgren (2011) consider adaptive
mean-variance optimization.
The original Almgren-Chriss model assumes a Brownian motion as unaffected
price process, i.e. when there is no trading by the large investor. This may be seen
as a deficiency since it allows for negative prices in the model whereas the prices
of many securities are always nonnegative. The situation with geometric Brownian
motion was analyzed by Gatheral and Schied (2011). Furthermore, throughout this
thesis and in many market impact models, the unaffected price process is assumed
to be a martingale. This is necessary for studying the regularity of the model since
models with drift will usually be irregular with respect to the regularity conditions
we use. The martingale assumption is justified when the investor has no particular
opinion on the assets traded. In an application it may be natural to allow for a drift
in the unaffected price process. Such a model is considered in Lorenz and Schied
(2012).
An important decision in the trading process is the decision whether to use limit
orders or market orders. However, we adopt the view of Gatheral (2011), where the
trading process is separated into three layers. The first layer is called macrotrader.
This layer decides about the timing of trading and about the order sizes. Given
1.1. THE OPTIMAL LIQUIDATION PROBLEM 11
a slice of the order (a child order) by the macrotrader, the second layer called
microtrader decides whether to place market orders or limit orders and if so, at
which price. The third layer, the smart order router, then decides which venue to
send the orders to. The market impact models we consider are models for the first
layer of the trading process, i.e. we do not take into account the decision between
market and limit orders. Although it is desirable to have an integrated model for all
layers of the trading process, such a model might be overly complex. Furthermore,
improving the understanding of each single layer of the trading process seems to be
still a promising area for further research.
Biais and Weill (2009) analyze limit orders in an equilibrium model, Gue´ant
et al. (2012) are discussing the decision at which price to set limit orders, Guilbaud
and Pham (2012) consider the problem of trading with limit orders in the futures
market, i.e. in a pro-rata microstructure (that is, there is no priority for an earlier
order as it is usual in equity markets). Cont and Kukanov (2012) and Huitema
(2012) consider the decision on the usage of market orders versus limit orders.
Instead of assuming that impact is described by a function of the trading sizes,
one can also model the limit-order book directly (at least one side, if trading is
restricted to one side of the order book only). Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) assumed
a constant order book height and exponential resilience. More general order book
shapes were treated in Alfonsi et al. (2010), Alfonsi and Schied (2010) and Predoiu
et al. (2011). Other approaches to model order books directly include Bayraktar
and Ludkovski (2012), Cont et al. (2010), Osterrieder (2007) and Weiss (2010).
Since high-frequency traders are important liquidity providers in today’s elec-
tronic markets, research in this area is also relevant for market impact modeling,
as the implementors of market impact models consume liquidity provided by these
market participants. Research on high-frequency trading and high-frequency data
includes Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008), Brogaard (2010), Cartea and Jaimungal
(2012), Fodra and Labadie (2012), Hasbrouck and Saar (2010), Hautsch and Podol-
skij (2013), Hendershott and Riordan (2012) and Hendershott et al. (2011).
In a market impact model we usually regard the problem from the point of view of
a large trader. However, one can also consider the interaction of several traders. For
example, if there is a large trader and other agents know about his trading intents, it
is an interesting question whether it is more profitable for them to provide liquidity
or to frontrun the large trader, i.e. first trade in the same direction as the large
trader (and amplifying his impact), and unwind the position later when the price
recovered. This problem is studied for the Almgren-Chriss model in Scho¨neborn
and Schied (2009). Other publications concerned with multi-agent problems include
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), Carlin et al. (2007) and Moallemi et al. (2012).
Furthermore, survey papers and introductions include Bouchaud (2010), Bou-
chaud et al. (2008), Go¨kay et al. (2011) and Lehalle (2012). Empirical estimates of
market impact are performed in Almgren et al. (2005) and Gerig (2007). Stochas-
tic control problems in the context of market impact are considered by Bouchard
et al. (2011), Bouchard and Dang (2013), Kato (2012), Kharroubi and Pham (2010)
and Naujokat and Westray (2011). Risk measures for liquidity risk were studied by
Acerbi and Scandolo (2008).
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It can be argued there should be no price manipulation in market impact models
since executing such a strategy might be an illegal market manipulation in many
jurisdictions. Since it is not precisely defined what constitutes an illegal market
manipulation, Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) make suggestions concerning the dis-
tinction of illegal market manipulations from legal strategies.
Some models for illiquidity assume that there are no liquidity costs for strategies
of finite variation, e.g. C¸etin et al. (2004) and C¸etin et al. (2010). However, these
models can not be applied to the optimal liquidation problem, since a buy- or sell-
only strategy has finite variation, i.e. there is no cost associated to such a strategy.
In this thesis and almost all papers mentioned above it is assumed that the impact
function is exogenously given. That is, we take the viewpoint of a single trader
observing his impact on market prices. There is also a rich literature analyzing
equilibrium models to understand why there is such impact and which economic
factors are relevant for the magnitude of the impact, i.e. to understand impact
as an endogenous factor. Although there are many possibilities to explain impact,
one major insight is that some trading decisions carry more information (or a more
careful analysis of the information available) than others. Since almost every trader
has to assume that the trading counterparty may have more information, market
participants demand a premium for providing liquidity. One of the first formal
models for this line of thinking were Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
We refer to Vayanos and Wang (2012) for a recent survey over the available literature.
1.2 Summary of Results
In chapter 2 we introduce a market impact model with stochastic impact. Stochas-
tic impact is motivated by the fact that liquidity in real markets is not constant
but fluctuating. Furthermore we explain the impact of trading a listed derivative is
naturally modeled non-deterministically. The focus of our analysis concerns the reg-
ularity of such a model. The classical regularity condition for market impact models
is absence of price manipulation defined by Huberman and Stanzl (2004). Motivated
by the fact that a market impact model can be free of price manipulation but obvi-
ously irregular, Alfonsi et al. (2012) introduced the notion of transaction-triggered
price manipulation. We introduce a new regularity condition called positive ex-
pected liquidation costs that is between the two preceding conditions. The same
condition was introduced independently by Roch and Soner (2011). It states that
the expected revenues of a trading strategy should be at most the face value of the
initial position, i.e. impact should cause a cost on average for the large trader. This
condition has advantages compared to the condition of absence of price manipula-
tions and absence of transaction-triggered price manipulations that will be shown
throughout the thesis.
The first result in this chapter states that a model with stochastic permanent
impact is regular if and only if the permanent impact coefficient is a submartingale.
That is, such a model is clearly not suitable for market impact modeling with-
out further modifications. Therefore, we analyze a model with stochastic transient
impact. We give a necessary condition, and in special cases also sufficient condi-
1.2. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 13
tions for regularity. Furthermore we present a numerical example that shows that
transaction-triggered price manipulation might appear but the model and optimal
strategies seem to be reasonable otherwise. This shows that requiring every market
impact model to be free of transaction-triggered price manipulation could be a too
strong requirement. Furthermore, we provide an example where the trader is risk-
neutral and the liquidity parameter is a martingale, but contrary to the intuition
one might have the optimal strategy is not deterministic.
In chapter 3 we consider the extension of an Almgren-Chriss model with a dark
pool. We extend the model of Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010) with the possibility
of permanent impact. In contrast to Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010), who focus on
optimal liquidation strategies for risk-averse investors, we focus on the regularity
of the model. In this context, we consider risk-neutral investors only. Especially
with permanent impact it is not obvious how to model the interaction of exchange
and dark pool. In Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010) it was mostly assumed that there
is no impact from the exchange onto the dark pool. When allowing for such an
impact, it was observed that price manipulations may arise. Our model is flexible
in this regard. Additionally, it allows for permanent impact from dark pool trades
on exchange prices.
The main theorem, Theorem 3.4.1, states that a dark-pool extension is regular
for all Almgren-Chriss models if and only if there is no temporary impact from the
exchange to the dark pool, if there is permanent impact from the dark pool on the
exchange and if there is an additional cost term for dark pool trades. For a fixed
Almgren-Chriss model, we can only find weaker results. With different additional
assumptions we present subsequently more concrete results. Furthermore, we show
how to compute optimal liquidation strategies in the regular version of our model.
Finally, we show that there is transaction-triggered price manipulation in the model
which is an artifact from a too narrow set of admissible strategies.
In this regular version, dark pool prices and exchange prices are different and
there are additional costs in the dark pool. That other model versions are irregular
can have two interpretations: Either, dark pools allow for manipulations in reality,
or our model is not reflecting all economic costs of trading in the dark pool. Indepen-
dent of the reason, our results suggest that dark pools cannot be viewed simply as
additional source of liquidity for larger trades at random times. A possible economic
explanation could be adverse selection in the dark pool as explained in Kratz and
Scho¨neborn (2010). However, modeling adverse selection explicitly would increase
the complexity of the model considerably.
In the final chapter 4 we consider transient linear impact for multiple assets.
That is, we extend the analysis of Alfonsi et al. (2012) to the multivariate case. In
particular, we allow for cross impact between the assets traded. The model is regular
if the matrix-valued decay kernel is positive definite. First, we characterize positive
definite functions analogously to Bochner’s theorem. In the multivariate case, it is
important to differentiate between symmetric and nonsymmetric decay kernels. If
the decay kernel is symmetric, optimal strategies can be computed as solution of a
linear system of equations.
We explain that in the multivariate case the decay kernel should be nonincreas-
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ing and nonnegative, as in the one-dimensional setup. If it is additionally convex
and symmetric, it is positive definite. This follows from the corresponding results
in Alfonsi et al. (2012). Furthermore we consider transformations of the decay ker-
nel. These allow us in the case of commuting decay kernels to compute optimal
strategies via one-dimensional versions of the decay kernel. In contrast to the one-
dimensional result, convex decay kernels may also admit transaction-triggered price
manipulation in the multivariate case, but for commuting decay kernels we can
prove a similar generalized result. In particular, this leads to convergence of the
discrete-time optimal strategies to continuous time.
We illustrate our theoretical results with examples. First, we analyze component-
wise linear and exponential decay of impact. We study the dependence of the
properties discussed before on the model parameters. Then, we consider matrix
functions, i.e. one-dimensional functions applied to matrices. They are always
commuting and the other properties can be characterized via the generating one-
dimensional function. Finally we analyze the exponential matrix function. We
present a Hausdorff-Bernstein-Widder theorem for matrix-valued functions, i.e. ev-
ery completely monotone matrix function can be characterized as Laplace transform
of a nonnegative matrix-valued measure. We close by providing an explicit solution
for optimal strategies both in discrete and continuous time for the exponential ma-
trix function, i.e. for a generalized Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) model.
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Chapter 2
Time-Dependent Transient Impact
2.1 Introduction
Many market impact models assume that the impact of trades is constant and
deterministic, i.e. every trade has the same impact and the impact of every future
trade is known in advance. For several reasons it is interesting to consider impact
which is stochastic or at least not constant:
First, there are intra-day seasonalities of liquidity, i.e. average spreads and depth
of the order book depend on the time of day.
Second, liquidity also fluctuates randomly. Especially for less liquid assets this
effect is significant, according to Almgren (2012). An adaptive algorithm which
takes variable liquidity into account might perform better in practice.
Third, if we trade simultaneously in a derivative and its underlying, it is necessary
to consider stochastic impact and cross impact, as we will explain in section 2.3.3.
This might also be interesting for hedging derivatives under impact or for the study
of the impact induced on the underlying through trading derivatives.
Fourth, when investigating the regularity of market impact models we find new
effects with stochastic impact. So our model contributes to the question which
regularity conditions are appropriate for market impact models.
Models for deterministic time-varying impact are discussed in Fruth et al. (2011)
and Alfonsi and Infante Acevedo (2012). Stochastic impact is discussed in Almgren
(2012), Fruth (2011) and Roch and Soner (2011). Both Fruth et al. (2011) and
Fruth (2011) discuss exponential decay of market impact only, while Almgren (2012)
concentrates on purely temporary impact. In this chapter, we want to allow also for
non-exponential decay of market impact.
Transient impact was considered in Bouchaud et al. (2004), Gatheral (2010) and
Gatheral et al. (2012). In this chapter, we present a stochastic extension of such a
model.
We assume that impact is linear. Although Blais and Protter (2010) show empir-
ical evidence for linear impact, using their proprietary data To´th et al. (2011) argue
that impact is nonlinear and present a corresponding model. Since the regularity
of nonlinear transient impact models has not been treated systematically yet, we
restrict ourselves to linear impact to keep the focus on stochastic liquidity.
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As discussed in section 2.3.3, stochastic impact can also be motivated by deriva-
tives. We think that stochastic impact models are better suited for impact modeling
in the context of derivatives. Therefore, our model can probably serve as a basis for
an impact model including derivatives of an underlying. Hedging with price impact
and the impact of derivatives on the underlying are problems that attained signifi-
cant interest in the literature, see for example Bank and Baum (2004), C¸etin et al.
(2010), Frey (1998), Gruber (2004), Horst and Naujokat (2011), Kraft and Ku¨hn
(2011), Li and Almgren (2011), Rogers and Singh (2010) and references therein.
We assume a market model without spread. In this setup, we find that the
model is not regular for many parameters. Fruth et al. (2011) argue that in models
without spread it might appear that there are price manipulations while in practice
the spread precludes these price manipulations. However, Cont and de Larrard
(2013) show that the spread is nearly always very small for liquid stocks and if it is
not, then it recovers very fast. So the spread recovers much faster than the impact
of large trades. In particular, in a limit order book the spread recovers from both
sides of the order book and not only from the side where we are trading. Often,
irregularities in the model remain if a spread is included that is small enough. Since
the impact of trades cannot directly be estimated from anonymous trade and order
book data, the estimation of the quantitative magnitude of these effects requires
proprietary data. That is, although some irregularites in models without spread
may be weaker when considering spread, it is not clear how to include spread into
a market impact model exactly.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the market
model and all notions of regularity. In section 2.3, we will discuss the special case
of stochastic permanent impact, and we discuss briefly how to model the impact of
derivatives in such a model. In section 2.4, we give conditions for the regularity of
the market model, we discuss the case of a deterministic liquidity parameter, and
we present a numerical example for a stochastic liquidity parameter. All proofs are
presented in section 2.5.
2.2 Market model and regularity
2.2.1 Definitions
In this chapter, we consider a stochastic extension of Gatheral (2010) and Gatheral
et al. (2012). We assume a large investor who wants to liquidate a given number
X0 ∈ R shares until a given time T > 0. For any time t ∈ [0, T ], we denote the
number of shares held by the investor by Xt, the trading strategy chosen by the
investor.
When the large investor is not trading, we assume that the unaffected price
process is given by a continuous martingale (P 0t )t≥0 with respect to the filtration
(Ft)t≥0, where (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) is a filtered probability space satisfying the usual
conditions.
We impose the following requirements on the trading strategy X = (Xt)t≥0:
(a) The function t→ Xt is leftcontinuous and adapted,
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(b) the function t→ Xt has finite and uniformly bounded variation and
(c) Xt = 0 for all t > T .
We call a strategy admissible if it satisfies the preceding conditions. The set of all
admissible strategies is denoted by X (X0, T ).
For a comment on the preceding conditions we refer to Remark 2.1 in Gatheral
et al. (2012). Note that from the uniform boundedness of the variation of Xt it
follows that Xt itself is uniformly bounded.
If the large investor is using the strategy X, the price process is defined as
Pt = P
0
t +
∫
s<t
gsG(t− s) dXs,
where G : [0, T ] → [0,∞) is a continuous nonincreasing function, the decay kernel.
G describes the decay of the market impact of a trade. To allow for time-dependent
impact, we include the process (gt)t∈[0,T ] which is assumed to be a continuous non-
negative semimartingale.
The revenues of the investor from the trading strategy are given by
RXT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
∫ T
0
∫
s<t
gsG(t− s) dXsdXt − 1
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
gtG(0)(∆Xt)
2,
(2.1)
where ∆Xt denotes the jump size of X at time t. Starting from the definition
RT = −
∫ T
0
Pt dXt for continuous strategies X, we show in section 2.5.2 that this is
a natural definition for non-continuous strategies.
Usually we denoteRXT asRT if there is only one trading strategy in consideration.
Throughout the chapter, we will consider maximization of expected revenues E[RT ].
That is, we assume a risk-neutral investor. Since the risk tolerance of investors varies,
the regularity we analyze in the next section consider risk-neutral investors. Most
regularity conditions are also satisfied for risk-averse investors, if they are satisfied
for risk-neutral investors, as discussed in Remark 2.2.3.
Remark 2.2.1. To calibrate G, one could use statistical observations of the decay of
market impact. gt could be calibrated from the current state of the order book. Our
model does not have a stochastic decay of market impact, since this is difficult to
distinguish from random fluctuations of the price. That is, the fluctuations in the
decay speed are difficult to distinguish from the unaffected price process P 0. This
problem is discussed in more detail in chapter 4 of Fruth (2011).
2.2.2 Regularity of market impact models
We want to analyze our market model with respect to the following four regularity
conditions:
Definition 2.2.2 (Regularity conditions). (a) We say a market model has bounded
expected profits for a certain X0, if
sup
X∈X (X0,T )
E[RXT ] <∞.
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Otherwise, we say the model admits unbounded expected profits.
(b) A market model does not admit price manipulation, if
sup
X∈X (0,T )
E[RXT ] = 0.
(c) A market model has positive expected liquidation costs, if for every X0 ∈ R
sup
X∈X (X0,T )
E[RXT ] ≤ X0P 00 .
(d) A market model does not admit transaction-triggered price manipulation, if
sup
X∈X (X0,T )
E[RXT ] = sup
X∈Xmon(X0,T )
E[RXT ],
where Xmon ⊂ X are the monotone admissible trading strategies, i.e. with Xt
either nonincreasing or nondecreasing in t ∈ [0, T ].
Since an optimal liquidation strategy will aim at maximizing expected revenues, a
model with unbounded expected profits is not suitable for finding optimal strategies.
The notion of price manipulation is due to Huberman and Stanzl (2004). They
define a round trip as an admissible trading strategy with X0 = 0. Furthermore,
they define a price manipulation as a round trip X with E[RXT ] > 0.
The condition of positive expected liquidation costs states that the expected
revenues of a liquidation strategy should be at most the face value of the position at
time 0. Since we assume that P 0t is a martingale, assuming that there is no impact
would yield E[RT ] = X0P 00 . So the condition says that impact should be a cost
on average and not increase expected revenues. Roch and Soner (2011) also give in
their Theorem 4.2 a result on this regularity condition.
Transaction-triggered price manipulation was defined in Alfonsi et al. (2012). If
there is transaction-triggered price manipulation, it is possible to lower the costs of
a buy (resp. sell) program by intermediate sell (resp. buy) orders. Note that our
definition is equivalent with the original definition in Alfonsi et al. (2012), except
if the supremum is attained on the left-hand side of the equation, but not on the
right-hand side.
Remark 2.2.3. Consider a risk-averse investor, i.e. an investor who wishes to max-
imize E[u(RT )], where the utility function u : R → R is assumed to be concave
and strictly increasing. The regularity conditions generalize as follows: The market
model has bounded expected profits if
sup
X∈X (X0,T )
E[u(RXT )] < lim
r→∞
u(r),
no price manipulation if
sup
X∈X (0,T )
E[u(RXT )] = u(0),
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positive expected liquidation costs if for every X0 ∈ R we have
sup
X∈X (X0,T )
E[u(RXT )] ≤ u(X0P 00 )
and no transaction-triggered price manipulation if
sup
X∈X (X0,T )
E[u(RXT )] = sup
X∈Xmon(X0,T )
E[u(RXT )].
Taking u(r) = r yields again definition 2.2.2. Now, for the first three regularity
criteria Jensen’s inequality yields that the model is regular for the risk-averse in-
vestor, if it is regular in the risk-neutral case. However, there is no such result for
transaction-triggered price manipulation.
Remark 2.2.4. Consider a lager set of admissible strategies X˜ ⊃ X . The first three
regularity conditions are stable against enlargement of the set of admissible strategies
in the following sense: If a regularity criterion fails for X , the regularity criterion
will also fail for X˜ . However, there may be transaction-triggered price manipulation
for X , but not for X˜ , since also X˜mon ⊇ Xmon. For an example, see section 3.4.4.
We also want to compare these regularity criteria to the classical regularity cri-
terion in mathematical finance, no arbitrage. In our setup, we need first to define
an arbitrage opportunity:
Definition 2.2.5. An arbitrage opportunity is an admissible trading strategy with
(a) P(RT ≥ X0P 00 ) = 1 and
(b) P(RT > X0P 00 ) > 0.
The regularity conditions in Definition 2.2.2 form a hierarchy, i.e. bounded ex-
pected profits is the weakest condition, and absence of transaction-triggered price
manipulation is the strongest condition, as stated in the following proposition. Note
that Roch (2011) and Roch and Soner (2011) stated before that no arbitrage follows
from positive expected liquidation costs.
Proposition 2.2.6 (Hierarchy of regularity conditions). (a) If there is no transac-
tion-triggered price manipulation, then we have positive expected liquidation
costs.
(b) If we have positive expected liquidation costs, then there is no price manipulation,
the market model has bounded expected profits for each X0 and there are no
arbitrage opportunities.
(c) If there is no price manipulation, then the market model has bounded expected
profits for X0 = 0.
For a moment, drop the condition that P 0 is a martingale. In the classical
theory without impact, no-arbitrage is ensured by the existence of an equivalent
martingale measure, i.e. the existence of a probability measure Q ∼ P such that
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P 0 is a Q-martingale. However, as already noted by Roch and Soner (2011), this
is not sufficient in our setup with impact, as will be shown in example 2.3.2. A
sufficient condition for ensuring no-arbitrage is the condition of positive expected
liquidation costs under the martingale measure, i.e. supX∈X (X0,T ) E
Q[RXT ] ≤ X0P 00
for all X0 ∈ R.
2.3 Stochastic permanent impact
2.3.1 Regularity of permanent impact
Our market model contains permanent impact as a special case. Permanent impact
corresponds to G(t) ≡ const. In this case, let γt := G(0) gt. Then we can write
Pt = P
0
t +
∫ t
0
γs dXs.
For such a stochastic permanent impact, Roch (2011) has shown that there is
no arbitrage if (γt)t≥0 is a submartingale, see Theorem 2.6 in Roch (2011). Indeed,
the model is regular with respect to any of our regularity conditions if and only if
(γt)t≥0 is a submartingale:
Proposition 2.3.1 (Regularity of permanent impact). If G is constant and γt =
G(0) gt, all the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) There is no transaction-triggered price manipulation.
(b) We have positive expected liquidation costs.
(c) There is no price manipulation.
(d) For each X0, the market model does not admit unbounded profits.
(e) The market model does not admit unbounded profits for any X0 ∈ R.
(f) (γt)t≥0 is a submartingale.
Furthermore, if any of these conditions holds, an optimal strategy is given by Xt = 0
for t ∈ (0, T ], i.e. an immediate liquidation of the complete position at time 0.
So mean-reverting processes, or processes that model an intraday U-shape of
liquidity should not be used in a model with permanent impact, since they violate the
submartingale condition. If (γt)t≥0 is not a submartingale the model is completely
irregular and typically there do not exist optimal strategies. If one restricts strategies
to be monotone, the model becomes more regular, but the optimal strategies in this
class can have undesirable properties like a clustering of orders during a short time
span as can be seen in Mo¨nch (2009).
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Example 2.3.2. We give an example for an arbitrage opportunity in the sense of
Definition 2.2.5. Let γt = 4 − t. Clearly, this is not a submartingale, so we cannot
apply Proposition 2.3.1. Let now T = 3, X0 = 0, P
0
0 = 1 and assume P
0
t ≥ 0
for every t ∈ [0, T ] almost surely. Consider the strategy Xt = +1(0,3](t). Then
RT = P 03 − P 00 + 32 = P 03 + 12 ≥ 12 almost surely, so this strategy is an arbitrage
opportunity.
2.3.2 Additional temporary impact
The model in the previous section is regular only if (γt)t≥0 is a submartingale.
But in this case, an optimal strategy is the complete liquidation of the position at
t = 0. To penalize such large trades, we can add temporary impact to the model
as in Almgren and Chriss (2001). Temporary impact can also regularize models, so
we want to discuss whether the regularity of this model improves with additional
temporary impact. In the case of temporary impact, trading strategies have to be
absolutely continuous so as to admit a derivative X˙t almost everywhere.
So in this section, let the price process be given by
P˜t = P
0
t +
∫ t
0
γt dXt + ηX˙t,
with η > 0. If (γt)t≥0 is a submartingale, then there is still no transaction-triggered
price manipulation. On the other hand, if (γt)t≥0 is not a submartingale, the regular-
ity of the model may improve for small T , what we show by the following example:
Proposition 2.3.3. Let γt = C − βt with constants β > 0 and C ≥ βT :
(a) If T is small enough, for each X0 there is no transaction-triggered price manip-
ulation.
(b) If T >
√
24 η
β
, for each X0 there are unbounded expected profits.
2.3.3 Permanent impact and derivatives
Assume we can trade in a derivative and in the underlying continuously at the same
time. For example, plain vanilla options are listed on exchanges, so their liquidity
can in principle be modeled the same way as for stocks. An interesting question in
this context is how trading in the underlying impacts the derivative and vice versa.
In this section, we want to derive heuristically, why the impact of derivative
trading should be stochastic. Assume an underlying with purely constant permanent
impact, i.e. Pt = P
0
t + γ(Xt − X0). In this section, we assume that all trading
strategies are continuous to simplify the expressions. Assume that a derivative’s
price is given by
Dt = D0 +
∫ t
0
δ(s, Ps) dPs −
∫ t
0
θ(s, Ps) ds,
with the greeks δ, θ : [0, T ]× [0,∞)→ R, e.g. from a Black-Scholes model. We will
use the short-hand notation δt = δ(t, Pt) and θt = θ(t, Pt).
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Now we add the possibility for the investor to trade in the derivative. Let the
number of derivatives held by the investor at time t be denoted as XDt . Let us
assume XD0 = 0 and that the seller of the derivatives hedges the derivative position
in the underlying at time t with δtX
D
t shares. This hedge causes an impact on the
underlying of γδtX
D
t . So the resulting price process for the underlying is
Pt = P
0
t + γ(Xt −X0) + γδtXDt . (2.2)
Thus, we find
dDt = δt dPt − θt dt
= δt dP
0
t + γδ
2
t dX
D
t + γX
D
t δt dδt + δtγ dXt − θt dt.
Here, the impact has a stochastic component via δt, although the impact in the
underlying without trading in the derivative is not stochastic.
So there is a clear need for stochastic impact models. Permanent impact is not
suited well for this purpose since the permanent impact parameter has to be a sub-
martingale by Proposition 2.3.1. However, e.g. in (2.2) γ δt would be the permanent
impact parameter which is typically not a submartingale. Even with temporary
impact there may be problems as shown in Proposition 2.3.3. This motivates to
consider stochastic transient impact as we will do in the next section.
2.4 Stochastic transient impact
2.4.1 A necessary condition for regularity
After analyzing permanent impact, we discuss the more general model presented in
section 2.2.1. If g is constant and G is convex, then Theorem 1 in Alfonsi et al.
(2012) guarantees the absence of transaction-triggered price manipulation. If g is
not constant, in general convexity of G is not sufficient to guarantee regularity.
First, we present a necessary condition for the regularity of the model:
Proposition 2.4.1. If there are bounded profits for any X0, then for every s, t ∈
[0, T ] with s ≤ t
E[gt|Fs] ≥ gs
(
2
G(t− s)
G(0)
− 1
)
. (2.3)
The intuitive meaning of the inequality is that g may not decrease more than
twice as fast as G. If G is constant, (2.3) simplifies to
E[gt|Fs] ≥ gs,
i.e. we recover the submartingale condition from Proposition 2.3.1. Proposition 2.4.5
shows that (2.3) is a sufficient condition in a special case. But in general, even the
stronger condition
E[gt|Fs] ≥ gsG(t− s)
G(0)
. (2.4)
is not sufficient. This can be seen in section 2.4.4 where we discuss an example with
a strict submartingale g and strictly convex G with unbounded expected profits if
T is large enough.
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2.4.2 A sufficient condition for exponential G
If G is exponential, we can also find a sufficient condition for regularity. In this
case, our model is a special case of the model in Roch and Soner (2011). A direct
application of Theorem 4.2 in Roch and Soner (2011) yields the following result.
Proposition 2.4.2. Let G(t) = exp(−βt) with β ≥ 0. If the process φt := exp(−2βt)gt
is a supermartingale, we have positive expected liquidation costs.
Remark 2.4.3. If β = 0 and φt is a supermartingale, then gt is a submartingale
due to Jensen’s inequality and we can conclude by Proposition 2.3.1 that there are
positive expected liquidation costs. On the other hand, if gt is a submartingale,
1
gt
is not necessarily a supermartingale. So the above condition is not a necessary
condition on regularity since Proposition 2.3.1 states that gt being a submartingale
is a sufficient condition in the case β = 0.
Example 2.4.4. If gt is geometric Brownian motion, then Proposition 2.4.2 is par-
ticularly easy to apply. Let
gt = g0 exp
((
µ− σ
2
2
)
t+ σBt
)
with a standard Brownian motion Bt and µ ∈ R, σ > 0. That is, gt satisfies the
stochastic differential equation
dgt = µgt dt+ σgt dBt.
In this case, we find that φt is a supermartingale if and only if
β ≥ σ
2 − µ
2
, (2.5)
compare also Remark 4.3 in Roch and Soner (2011). On the other hand, if β = 0,
gt is a submartingale if and only if µ ≥ 0, while (2.5) would require µ ≥ σ2, so (2.5)
is not a necessary condition.
However, Theorem 4.2 in Roch and Soner (2011) cannot be applied to our setting
if G is not exponential, as we discuss in Remark 2.5.3.
2.4.3 Deterministic liquidity parameter g
In the following, we discuss the special case of deterministic g. First, we characterize
regularity if both g and G are exponential functions.
Proposition 2.4.5. Let G(t) = e−βt and gt = e−αt with α, β ≥ 0. The following
conditions are equivalent:
(a) There is an X0 ∈ R such that there are bounded expected profits.
(b) There is no price manipulation.
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(c) There are positive expected liquidation costs.
(d) Condition (2.3) is fulfilled.
(e) The process φt defined in Proposition 2.4.2 is a supermartingale, i.e. it is non-
increasing.
(f) α ≤ 2β.
The condition for the absence of transaction-triggered price manipulation is given
in Proposition 2.4.8.
For the remainder of this section, we want to discuss trading in discrete time, i.e.
the investor may only trade on a finite set of deterministic times T = {t0, t1, . . . tN}
withN ∈ N and 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < . . . tN ≤ T . Furthermore, we denote by ξti = ∆Xti the
jump size of the strategy X at time ti. ξ is also called strategy, since the strategy X
can be reconstructed from ξ by Xt = X0 +
∑
ti<t
ξti . Thus, the liquidation condition
is given by X0 +
∑N
i=0 ξti = 0 and the expected revenues of a trading strategy are
E[RT ] = X0P 00 − E
[
1
2
N∑
n=0
N∑
m=0
ξtnξtmgtn∧tmG(|tn − tm|)
]
. (2.6)
If g is deterministic and there is a unique optimal strategy, the optimal strategy is
deterministic and consequently we can restrict ourselves to the class of deterministic
strategies. For a deterministic strategy, the expected revenues are given by
E[RT ] = X0P 00 −
1
2
ξ>Mξ,
with ξ = (ξt0 , ξt1 , . . . , ξtN ) ∈ RN+1 and the symmetric matrix M ∈ R(N+1)×(N+1)
given by (M)i,j = gti∧tjG(|ti − tj|). In this case, we have the following regularity
result:
Proposition 2.4.6. (a) We have positive expected liquidation costs if and only if
M is a positive semidefinite matrix.
(b) There is no price manipulation if and only if there exists an X0 ∈ R such that
there are bounded expected profits.
However, if M is not positive semidefinite, there may be or may not be price
manipulation or unbounded expected profits. See also Example 2.4.7 below.
If M is even strictly positive definite, there is a unique optimal strategy. In this
case, the optimal strategy ξ∗ is given by
ξ∗ =
X0
1>M−11
M−11,
with 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)> ∈ RN+1, as in Alfonsi et al. (2012).
The next example shows that it can be the case that there is no price manipu-
lation even though M is not positive definite.
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Example 2.4.7. Let gt =
1
(1+t)2
and G(t) = 1
1+t
. Note that both functions are
convex. Furthermore, condition (2.3) is fulfilled since for tj ≥ ti ≥ 0
gtj
gti
− 2G(tj − ti)
G(0)
+ 1 =
(tj − ti)(tj + t2j + ti + t2i )
(1 + tj)2(1 + tj − ti) ≥ 0.
Let T = {0, 1, 2}. Then detM = − 1
576
and thus, M is not positive semidefinite.
However, we find that the expected revenues of the optimal strategy are given by
E[RT ] = X0P 00 + 115X20 , so there is no price manipulation and there are bounded
expected profits, but the condition of positive expected liquidation costs is not
satisfied. Consequently, there is also transaction-triggered price manipulation.
In discrete time, transaction-triggered price manipulation can be characterized
using Lemma 1 from Alfonsi et al. (2012). In the following proposition, we use it to
analyze exponential impact like in Proposition 2.4.5.
Proposition 2.4.8. Let G(t) = e−βt and gt = e−αt with α, β ≥ 0. In the discrete-
time setup, there is no transaction-triggered price manipulation if and only if α ≤ β.
2.4.4 Numerical example: geometric Brownian motion
In the following, we discuss the example of g being geometric Brownian motion. As
in Example 2.4.4, let
gt = g0 exp
((
µ− σ
2
2
)
t+ σBt
)
.
Furthermore, we assume that we are in the discrete-time setting as in the previous
section. In the remainder of the section, we show numerical results for the optimal
strategy.
For geometric Brownian motion, a straightforward application of dynamic pro-
gramming yields the optimal strategy. Using the software Mathematica we obtained
explicit expressions for the optimal strategy dependent on g(ω) evaluated on the
time grid.
We have chosen geometric Brownian motion since the computation of optimal
strategies by dynamic programming is easy in this case, while having a mean-
reverting property might be more realistic, it is also more complicated.
In the following, we will use these concrete parameters, if not otherwise stated:
Let σ = 1, µ = 1
4
, g0 = 1, G(t) =
1
1+t
, X0 = 1, T = 3 be given. Furthermore, we will
use equidistant trading points, i.e. T = { i
N
T |i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}} for N ∈ N, where
we use N = 3.
In Figure 2.1, we show the dependence of the optimal ξt1 on gt1 . We see, that if
liquidity increases strongly (that is, gt1 being small), the optimal strategy will buy
shares instead of selling. That is, there is transaction-triggered price manipulation.
The rationale behind that is to profit of the (relatively) large impact generated at t0,
since with very high probability the position can be sold off again with (relatively)
few costs. Since this occurs only with a small probability and the size of the buy
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Figure 2.1: ξt1 , the optimal trade size at time t1, in dependence of gt1
order is not large (if gt is not very small), one can still consider the model regular,
although it admits transaction-triggered price manipulation.
In Figure 2.2, we show how the expected revenues of the optimal strategy E[RT ]−
X0P
0
0 depend on T . We see that for T ≤ 18.1, there are positive expected liquidation
costs, and for larger T this regularity condition is not fulfilled any longer. At T ∗ ≈
23.8, we observe a peak. That is, there are unbounded expected profits for T ≥ T ∗.
If we compute the optimal strategy for X0 = 0, we see that there is no price
manipulation for T < T ∗ and unbounded expected profits for larger T . But we
see, if X0 6= 0 and T approaches T ∗, the expected revenues of the optimal strategy
get arbritrary large. So the model cannot be considered regular for these values,
although there is no price manipulation.
So for this simple stochastic impact model we find that the regularity depends
strongly on the time horizon T . Also, we find that there is transaction-triggered
price manipulation but here it is not necessary to reject the model for that reason.
We observe that the optimal strategy is not bounded uniformly, since |Xt| → ∞
for gt → 0 and formally, it is not admissible. However, in practice gt is bounded
below since there is only a finite amount of shares or money available.
2.4.5 Adaptive strategies versus deterministic strategies
Now consider the model from the previous section with µ = 0. In this case, (gt)t≥0
is a martingale. If the strategy ξ is deterministic, we could compute (because of the
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Figure 2.2: Expected revenues of the optimal strategy in dependence of the time
horizon T
martingale property of g)
E[RT ] = X0P 00 − E
[
1
2
N∑
n,m=0
ξtnξtmgtn∧tmG(|tn − tm|)
]
= X0P
0
0 −
1
2
N∑
n,m=0
ξtnξtmG(|tn − tm|).
With this expression, we can compute the optimal deterministic strategy like in
section 2.4.3 and obtain E[RT ] − X0P 00 ≈ −0.272 for the optimal deterministic
strategy, while the optimal adaptive strategy yields E[RT ]−X0P 00 ≈ −0.265. This
shows that there can be an improvement by adaptive strategies, even if the liquidity
parameter (gt)t≥0 is a martingale, contrary to the intuitive expectation one might
have from investment strategies without impact: There the revenues are linear in ξ
and do not depend on ξ at all if the price process is a martingale, i.e. there is also
a deterministic optimal strategy.
2.5 Proofs and derivation of the revenues
2.5.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.2.6. (a): Let a monotone strategyX ∈ Xmon(X0, T ) be given.
Since gsG(t − s) ≥ 0 for all s, t ∈ [0, T ], it is
∫ T
0
∫
s<t
gsG(t − s) dXsdXt ≥ 0.
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Furthermore we have for all strategies 1
2
∑
t gtG(0)(∆Xt)
2 ≥ 0. Thus,
RXT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
∫ T
0
∫
s<t
gsG(t− s) dXsdXt − 1
2
∑
t
gtG(0)(∆Xt)
2
≤ X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t .
So for any montone strategy we find E[RXT ] ≤ X0P 00 and therefore,
sup
X∈Xmon(X0,T )
E[RXT ] ≤ X0P 00 .
By absence of transaction-triggered price manipulation, we obtain
sup
X∈X (X0,T )
E[RXT ] ≤ X0P 00 .
(b): Inserting X0 = 0, the condition of positive expected liquidation costs yields
supX∈X (0,T ) E[RXT ] ≤ 0. Since the strategy Xt ≡ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] yields E[RT ] = 0,
we find supX∈X (0,T ) E[RXT ] = 0, which is absence of price manipulation.
Furthermore, bounded expected profits trivially follow from positive expected
liquidation costs, since X0P
0
0 <∞.
To see that there is no arbitrage, note that for any arbitrage opportunity X we
have E[RT ] > X0P 00 .
(c): This is trivial, since 0 <∞.
Remark 2.5.1. Note that Proposition 2.2.6 holds in a quite general setting: Let the
unaffected price process be given as Pt = P
0
t +It, where the unaffected price process
(P 0t )t≥0 is a martingale and It is the impact of the trading strategy, and let the
revenues be given by RT = −
∫ T
0
Pt dXt for continuous strategies. If the impact is
always positive for nondecreasing strategies and always negative for nonincreasing
strategies, then (a) holds. (b) and (c) hold even without this condition.
For the proof of Proposition 2.3.1, we need the following Lemma:
Lemma 2.5.2. In the case of permanent impact, i.e. G(t) ≡ const with γt = G(0)gt,
the revenues of a trading strategy are given by
RT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ0X
2
0 −
1
2
∫ T
0
X2t dγt.
Proof.
RT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
∫ T
0
∫
s<t
γs dXsdXt − 1
2
∑
t
γt(∆Xt)
2
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
∫ T
0
Xtγt dXt +
1
2
∑
t
γt(∆Xt)
2
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t +
1
2
∫ T
0
γt dX
2
t
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ0X
2
0 −
1
2
∫ T
0
X2t dγt,
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where we used integration by parts two times.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. We will prove first, that if (γt) is not a submartingale,
then there are unbounded profits for each X0 (and by Proposition 2.2.6 there is price
manipulation, transaction-triggered price manipulation and not positive expected
liquidation costs). Second, we will prove, that if (γt) is a submartingale, then there
is no transaction-triggered price manipulation (and by Proposition 2.2.6, there are
positive expected liquidation costs, no price manipulation and bounded profits for
each X0).
Assume that (γt) is not a submartingale, i.e. there exist t1, t2 such that 0 < t1 ≤
t2 ≤ T and A ∈ Ft1 with P(A) > 0 such that
E[γt2 |Ft1 ] < γt1 on A.
Consider the trading strategy
Xs =

x, t1 ≤ s < t2 and ω ∈ A
X0, s = 0
0, else.
Note that the trading strategy is admissible. With Lemma 2.5.2 we find that the
expected revenues of this strategy are
E[RT ] = X0P 00 −
1
2
γ0X
2
0 −
1
2
x2E[γt2 − γt1 ;A].
Since E[γt2 − γt1 ;A] < 0, sending x → ∞ shows, that there are unbounded profits
for each X0.
Conversely, assume that (γt) is a submartingale. Then for each strategy X
E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 −
1
2
γ0X
2
0 ,
by Lemma 2.5.2 since E[
∫ T
0
X2t dγt] ≤ 0. Furthermore, for the monotone strategy
Xt = 0 for all t ∈ (0, T ] we have E[RT ] = X0P 00 − 12γ0X20 . This proves the absence of
transaction-triggered price manipulation and the optimality of this trading strategy.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3. The revenues are given here by
R˜T = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
CX20 +
1
2
β
∫ T
0
X2t dt− η
∫ T
0
X˙2t dt.
Proof of (a): We prove that for T ≤
√
2 η
β
, there is no transaction-triggered price
manipulation. First, we proof that in this case, there are bounded expected profits.
Let X0 ∈ R and (Xt)t≥0 an admissible trading strategy. Define x := supt∈[0,T ] |Xt|.
Then
1
2
β
∫ T
0
X2t dt− η
∫ T
0
X˙2t dt ≤
1
2
βTx2 − ηx
2
T
= x2(
1
2
βT − η
T
). (2.7)
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Due to our assumption on T , the latter expression is nonpositive and thus, E[R˜T ] ≤
X0P
0
0 .
Observe that if there is a unique optimal deterministic strategy maximizing
1
2
β
∫ T
0
X2t dt − η
∫ T
0
X˙2t dt, this strategy will be optimal in the class of all strate-
gies. Since the optimal strategy is bounded due to (2.7), using calculus of variations
(cf. Cesari (1983) Theorems 2.6.i-iii and 2.20.i) we find that there is a unique opti-
mal deterministic strategy X, it is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies the
following ordinary differential equation (Euler-Lagrange equation)
βXt + 2ηX¨t = 0
with boundary conditions X0 and XT = 0. The unique solution of this equation is
given by
Xt = X0 cos
(
t
√
β
2η
)
−X0 cot
(
T
√
β
2η
)
sin
(
t
√
β
2η
)
.
Due to our assumption on T , cot(·) is positive and cos(·) and − sin(·) are decreasing
for t ∈ [0, T ], and thus, the optimal strategy Xt is decreasing for X0 > 0 and
increasing for X0 < 0, so there is no transaction-triggered price manipulation.
Proof of (b): Consider the trading strategy
Xt =
{
X0 +
2t
T
x, for t ≤ T
2
,
(X0 + x)
2(T−t)
T
, for T
2
≤ t ≤ T
with x ∈ R such that xX0 ≥ 0. The expected revenues of this strategies can be
estimated by
E[R˜T ] ≥ X0P 00 −
1
2
CX20 + βx
2T
6
− 4η (X0 + x)
2
T
,
and if T >
√
24 η
β
this expression converges to +∞ for |x| → ∞.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1. Consider a trading strategy which is only trading at ti
and tj. With (2.6) we find that the expected revenues of this strategy are
E[RT ] = X0P 00 − E[ξtiξtjgtiG(tj − ti)]−
1
2
G(0)E[gtiξ2ti + gtjξ
2
tj
].
Using ξtj = −X0 − ξti and the tower property of conditional expectation we find
E[RT ] = X0P 00 + E
[
ξ2ti
(
gtiG(tj − ti)−
1
2
gtiG(0)−
1
2
E[gtj |Fti ]G(0)
)]
+E
[
ξtiX0
(
gtiG(tj − ti)− gtjG(0)
)− 1
2
X20E[g2tj ]G(0)
]
.
Assume that (2.3) does not hold, i.e. there exists A ∈ Fti with P(A) > 0 such that
E[gtj |Fti ] < gti
(
2
G(tj − ti)
G(0)
− 1
)
on A,
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i.e. C := E[gtiG(tj − ti)− 12gtiG(0)− 12E[gtj |Fti ]G(0);A] > 0. Consider the trading
strategy
ξti =
{
x, if ω ∈ A
0, otherwise.
with x ∈ R. The trading strategy is admissible. The expected revenues of this
strategy are
E[RT ] = X0P 00 + x2C + xX0E[gtiG(tj − ti)− gtjG(0);A]−
1
2
X20E[g2tj ]G(0),
so we find limx→∞ E[RT ] =∞, a contradiction to the condition of bounded expected
profits. Thus, (2.3) holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2. We use Theorem 4.2 in Roch and Soner (2011). Let
lt = Pt − P 0t =
∫
s<t
gsG(t− s) dXs
and
κt = −
∫
s<t
gsG
′(t− s) dXs
lt
if lt 6= 0.
Since −G′(t)
G(t)
is the relative speed of the decay of market impact at time t by an
order at time 0, κt can be seen as the cumulative relative speed of the decay of
market impact of all past orders. Due to our assumption that G(t) = e−βt we find
that κt ≡ β for all t with lt 6= 0. However, Roch and Soner (2011) only rely on the
representation
dlt = −κtlt dt
in the absence of trading, and this holds also if we take κt = β in case lt = 0.
Furthermore, let
mt =
1
2
G(0)gt,
zt = Xt −X0,
Rt = X0P 00 +
∫ t
0
Xs dP
0
s −
∫ t
0
∫
r<s
gsG(s− r) dXrdXs − 1
2
∑
s∈[0,t]
gsG(0)(∆Xs)
2,
Lt = Rt −X0P 00 −
∫ t
0
Xs dP
0
s .
Then we are in the setup of Roch and Soner (2011) and if φt is a supermartingale
we can conclude by Theorem 4.2 that E[LT ] ≥ 0, which is equivalent to positive
expected liquidation costs since E[
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t ] = 0.
Remark 2.5.3. If G is not exponential, then κt is typically not bounded and can
increase or decrease arbitrary fast. Thus, for any reasonable g the process φt will
not be a supermartingale. To show that κt is not bounded it is sufficient to show
that it can be that
∫
s<t
gsG
′(t− s) dXs 6= 0 while lt = 0. That is, if Pt = P 0t , there
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can be a nonzero difference between these two price process short after t even in the
absence of trading.
To show this, assume G is not exponential. Furthermore assume g is strictly
positive, assume G(t) > 0 for all t and G is C1. In this case, we know that there is
a t ∈ [0, T ) such that
G′(0)
G(0)
6= G
′(t)
G(t)
.
Then we choose a strategy that trades at 0 and t, but not in (0, t). Take an arbitrary
∆X0 6= 0. Furthermore, let ∆Xt = −g0G(0)gtG(t) ∆X0. Then lt+ = 0, but g0G′(0)∆X0 +
gtG
′(t)∆Xt = g0∆X0
(
G′(0)−G(0)G′(t)
G(t)
)
6= 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.5. The equivalence of (f) and (e) is obvious. From (e) fol-
lows (c) by Proposition 2.4.2, and from (c) follow (a) and (b) by Proposition 2.2.6.
Furthermore from (b) follows (a) obviously. By Proposition 2.4.1, from (a) follows
(d). If we show that from (d) follows (f), the equivalence of (a)-(f) is shown.
To this end, note that (d) is equivalent to
fs(t) := e
−α(t−s) − 2e−β(t−s) + 1 ≥ 0
for all s, t ∈ [0, T ] with s ≤ t. Note that fs(s) = 0 and the derivative of f is given
by f ′s(t) = −αe−α(t−s) + 2βe−β(t−s). Now assume that (f) does not hold, i.e. a > 2β.
Then f ′s(s) = −α+ 2β < 0, so fs(t) < 0 for t− s small enough, so (d) does not hold.
This finishes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.6. (a): Let M be a positive semidefinite matrix. Then
ξ>Mξ ≥ 0 for all ξ, so E[RT ] = X0P 00 − 12ξ>Mξ ≤ X0P 00 . That is, the condition of
positive expected liquidation costs holds.
Assume conversely that M is not positive semidefinite, i.e. there exists a negative
eigenvalue λ < 0 and an eigenvector ξ ∈ RN+1 with Mξ = λξ. Let X0 =
∑N
n=0 ξn.
Then for the strategy ξ we have E[RT ] = X0P 00 − 12ξ>Mξ = X0P 00 − 12λξ>ξ > X0P 00 ,
i.e. the condition of positive expected liquidation costs is not satisfied.
(b): Assume that there is no price manipulation. Obviously, for X0 = 0 there
are bounded expected profits.
Conversely, assume that there exists X0 ∈ R such that there are bounded ex-
pected profits. We have to show, that there is no price manipulation. Assume there
is price manipulation, to arrive at a contradiction.
In this case, let ξ be a price manipulation. Let ξˆ := ( X0
N+1
, . . . , X0
N+1
)>. Define a
sequence of trading strategies by ξ(n) := n · ξ + ξˆ. The expected revenues of these
trading strategies are given by
E[Rξ(n)T ] = X0P 00 −
1
2
(ξ(n))>Mξ(n)
= X0P
0
0 −
1
2
n2ξ>Mξ − n ξ>Mξˆ − ξˆ>Mξˆ.
Since ξ is a price manipulation it is ξ>Mξ < 0. Thus, E[RξnT ] converges to +∞
for n → ∞, i.e. a X0 such that there are bounded profits cannot exist. This a
contradiction.
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For the proof of Proposition 2.4.8, we use Lemma 1 from Alfonsi et al. (2012):
Lemma 2.5.4. Let M be an invertible symmetric matrix. We have M−11 ≥ 0 or
M−11 ≤ 0 if and only if there is no vector z such that
z>1 = 0,Mz > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.8. In the following, we will assume that we have given
t1 < t2 < . . . < tN and the matrix M is given by (M)i,j = e
−α(ti∧tj)e−β|ti−tj | =
e−(α−β)(ti∧tj)−β(ti∨ tj) for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} in contrast to using t0 for the first trad-
ing time before. We change the notation to avoid confusion about the 0th row or
column of a matrix.
For α > 2β, Proposition 2.4.5 provides the existence of transaction-triggered
price manipulation. Then consider the special case α = 2β. In this case, for the
vector
ξ˜ := − X0
1− e−β(tN−t1) (−e
−β(tN−t1), 0, 0, . . . , 0, 1)
we have Mξ˜ = 0. Therefore, for this strategy we have E[Rξ˜T ] = X0P0. On the
other hand, if X0 6= 0, then for every admissible strategy ξ with ξ ≥ 0 or ξ ≤ 0,
obviously ξ>Mξ > ε for some ε > 0 since all entries of M are strictly positive, and
therefore, E[RξT ] < X0P0 − ε. This proves the existence of transaction-triggered
price manipulation.
We are left with the case α < 2β. We will first show that M is invertible in this
case. To this end, we show show that the determinant of M is given by
detM = exp
(
−2β
N∑
i=2
ti − 2α
N∑
i=1
ti + αtN
)
N−1∏
i=1
(
eαti+2βti+1 − e2βti+αti+1) (2.8)
We prove this by induction: Suppose (2.8) is shown for N − 1. We define MN,i to
be the (N − 1)× (N − 1) matrix that is obtained by removing the Nth row and ith
column of M . The Laplace expansion along the Nth row yields
detM =
N∑
i=1
(−1)N+imN,i det(MN,i).
Next we observe that det(MN,i) = 0 for i ≤ N − 2 since for these i the vector
(0, 0, . . . 0,− exp(−β(tN − tN−1)), 1)>
is in the null space of MN,i. Furthermore, we have det(MN,N−1) = exp(−β(tN −
tN−1)) det(MN,N), because MN,N−1 can be obtained from MN,N by multiplying the
last column with exp(−β(tN−tN−1)). But det(MN,N) is known due to the induction
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hypothesis. Thus, we have
detM = −e−αtN−1−β(tN−tN−1) det(MN,N−1) + e−αtN det(MN,N)
=
(−e−αtN−1−2β(tN−tN−1) + e−αtN) det(MN,N)
=
(−e−αtN−1−2β(tN−tN−1) + e−αtN) ·
(−1)N exp
(
−2β
N−1∑
i=2
ti − 2α
N−1∑
i=1
ti + αtN−1
)
·
N−2∏
i=1
(
e2βti+αti+1 − eαti+2βti+1)
= (−1)N+1 exp
(
−2β
N∑
i=2
ti − 2α
N∑
i=1
ti + αtN
)
·
N−1∏
i=1
(
e2βti+αti+1 − eαti+2βti+1)
= exp
(
−2β
N∑
i=2
ti − 2α
N∑
i=1
ti + αtN
)
N−1∏
i=1
(
eαti+2βti+1 − e2βti+αti+1)
so (2.8) is proven. Now, if
αti + 2βti+1 > 2βti + αti+1,
then the determinant is strictly positive. Since this is equivalent to α(ti+1 − ti) <
2β(ti+1 − ti), in the case of α < 2β the determinant is strictly positive.
So we know that for α < 2β the matrix M is invertible. Thus, we can apply
Lemma 2.5.4 and have to show, that there exists a vector z such that
z>1 = 0,Mz > 0 (2.9)
if and only if 2β > α > β. Consider first the case 2β > α > β. In this case,
we find that (M)i,j is strictly decreasing in j. Therefore, e.g. by using the vector
z = (1,−1, 0, . . . , 0), Lemma 2.5.4 yields the existence of transaction-triggered price
manipulation.
Let now α ≤ β. The proof, that there exists no vector z such that (2.9) is
satisfied, follows the lines of the proof of Theorem 1 in Alfonsi et al. (2012). The
result is shown by induction over N . For N = 1 the result is obvious. Suppose
now the assertion has already be proven for N − 1 and let us assume that there is
a vector z ∈ RN that satisfies (2.9). Since Mz > 0, there exists a k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
such that zk > 0. Let 1N−1 denote the vector in RN−1 whose components are all
equal to 1.
If k = N we have that
mm,NzN ≤ mm,N−1zN for m = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1.
Hence, the N − 1-dimensional vector z˜ := (z1, z2, . . . , zN−1 + zN)> satisfies both
z˜>1N−1 = 0 and M˜z˜ > 0, with M˜ being the matrix corresponding to the time grid
{t1, t2, . . . , tN−1}. But this is a contradiction to the induction hypothesis.
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If k = 1, the assumption that α ≤ β yields
mm,1z0 ≤ mm,2z0 for m = 2, 3, . . . , N.
Hence, the vector zˆ := (z1 + z2, z3, . . . , zN)
> satisfies both zˆ>1N−1 = 0 and Mˆzˆ > 0,
with Mˆ corresponding to the time grid {t2, t3, . . . , tN}. This is again a contradiction
to the induction hypothesis.
Finally, consider 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1. Let α ∈ [0, 1] be such that tk = αtk−1 + (1 −
α)tk+1. We then have
mk,lzk ≤ mk−1,lαzk +mk+1,l(1− α)zk for l 6= k,
since the function t 7→ e−α(t∧tl)e−β|t−tl| is convex in t. Hence, the vector
z¯ := (z1, z2, . . . , zk−2, zk−1 + αzk, zk+1 + (1− α)zk, zk+2, . . . , zN)>
satisfies both z¯>1N−1 = 0 and M¯z¯ > 0, with M¯ corresponding to the time grid
{t1, . . . , tN} \ {tk}. Since this is again impossible due to the induction hypothesis,
the proof is finished.
Remark 2.5.5. From (2.8) it follows, that detM > 0 for α < 2β. Since M is positive
definite for α = 0 (since in this case, G is a positive definite function) and the
eigenvalues depend continuously on α, we know that M is strictly positive definite
for α < 2β. So there are positive expected liquidation costs for α ≤ 2β, what was
also shown in Proposition 2.4.5.
2.5.2 Derivation of the revenues
For continuous strategies (Xt)t≥0, it is natural to define the revenues of the investor
by RT = −
∫ T
0
Pt dXt, since at time t the investor buys dXt shares at price Pt.
There are three methods for deriving the revenues from non-continuous strate-
gies, all leading to the same result. First, one may approximate a non-continuous
strategy by suitable continuous strategies and take the limit of their revenues.
Second, linear impact corresponds to an order book with constant height. Calcu-
lating the revenues of a market order in such a limit order book yields the revenues
of a jump in the trading strategy. This approach is presented in more detail in
Alfonsi et al. (2012).
Third, observe that a trade of ∆Xt shares at time t moves the price from Pt−
to Pt− + gtG(0)∆Xt, where Pt− = lims↑t Ps. It is natural to assume that this trade
takes place at the mid-price, i.e. Pt− + 12gtG(0)∆Xt. In the following, we show how
the revenues (2.1) can be derived from this assumption.
The continuous part of the trading strategy is given by XCt = Xt −
∑
s<t ∆Xs.
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The revenues are then given by
RT = −
∫ T
0
Pt dX
C
t −
∑
t
∆Xt
(
Pt− +
1
2
gtG(0)∆Xt
)
= −
∫ T
0
P 0t dX
C
t −
∫ T
0
∫
s<t
gsG(t− s) dXs dXCt
−
∑
t
∆Xt
(
P 0t +
∫
s<t
gsG(t− s) dXs
)
− 1
2
∑
t
gtG(0)(∆Xt)
2
= −
∫ T
0
P 0t dXt −
∫ T
0
∫
s<t
gsG(t− s) dXs dXt − 1
2
∑
t
gtG(0)(∆Xt)
2
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
∫ T
0
∫
s<t
gsG(t− s) dXs dXt − 1
2
∑
t
gtG(0)(∆Xt)
2.
Chapter 3
A Market Impact Model with
Dark Pool
3.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a mushrooming of alternative trading platforms called dark
pools. Orders placed in a dark pool are not visible to other market participants
(hence the name) and thus do not influence the publicly quoted price of the asset.
Thus, when dark-pool orders are executed against a matching order, no direct price
impact is generated, although there may be certain indirect effects. Dark pools
therefore promise a reduction of market impact and of the resulting liquidation
costs. They are hence a popular platform for the execution of large orders.
Dark pools differ from standard limit order books in that they do not have an
intrinsic price finding mechanism. Instead, the price at which orders are executed
is derived from the publicly quoted prices at an exchange. Thus, by manipulating
the price at the exchange through placing suitable buy or sell orders, the value of
a possibly large amount of “dark liquidity” in the dark pool can be altered. For
this reason, dark pools have drawn significant attention by regulators; see IOSCO
(2011). We refer to Mittal (2008) for a practical overview on dark pools and some
related issues of market manipulation. Dark pools were also considered by Altunata
et al. (2010), Buti et al. (2010), Comerton-Forde and Putnin¸sˇ (2012), Degryse et al.
(2009), Ganchev et al. (2010), Preece (2012), Ray (2010), Ready (2012), Ye (2010)
and Zhu (2012)
In this chapter, we consider a stochastic model for order execution at two possible
venues: a dark pool and an exchange. This model is a continuous-time variant of
the one proposed by Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010). It is a natural model, because it
extends the standard Almgren–Chriss market impact model for exchange prices by
a dark pool, where incoming matching orders are described by a compound Poisson
process. We refer to Almgren (2003) for details on the Almgren–Chriss model and
also to Bertsimas and Lo (1998) for a discrete-time precursor. A different approach
to modeling and analyzing dark pools was proposed by Laruelle et al. (2011).
Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010) mainly investigate optimal order execution strate-
gies for an investor who can trade at the exchange and in the dark pool. But they are
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also interested in price manipulation strategies in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl
(2004). Their Propositions 7.1 and 7.2 provide some first results on the existence
and the absence of such strategies, and they propose the further investigation of this
problem. We refer to Huberman and Stanzl (2004), Gatheral (2010), Alfonsi et al.
(2012), and our Section 3.3 for discussions on the importance of the absence of price
manipulation strategies. In Section 3.3 we will argue in particular that the absence
of price manipulation and related concepts can be regarded as a regularity condition
that plays a similar role for a market impact model as the absence of arbitrage for
a derivatives pricing model.
Our main goal in this chapter is to investigate in a systematic manner the exis-
tence and absence of price manipulation with dark pools and related topics. To this
end, we modify the setup of Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010) in several ways. On the
one hand, we simplify their setup by using the concrete continuous-time, single-asset
Almgren–Chriss model to describe market impact at the exchange and by restricting
the possibilities for adjusting the sizes of orders in the dark pool1. On the other
hand, we allow for additional possibilities of cross impact between the two venues
and for additional “slippage” in dark-pool execution.
In Section 3.4.1, our first main result characterizes completely those models from
our class that are sufficiently regular for all underlying Almgren–Chriss models,
either in the sense of the absence of price manipulation or in terms of the new
condition of “positive expected liquidation costs”. The critical quantities will be the
size of “slippage” and the degrees of permanent and temporary cross-venue impact.
In Section 3.4.2, we then investigate the existence of model irregularities for special
model characteristics. It will turn out that generation of such irregularities hinges
in a subtle way on the interplay of all model parameters and on the liquidation time
constraint. In Section 3.4.3 we illustrate in a simplified setting that our regularity
condition guarantees the existence of optimal order execution strategies, and we
show how such strategies can be computed.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the subsequent Section 3.2 we introduce
the model and formulate our standing assumptions. In Section 3.3 we review and
discuss several notions for the regularity of a market impact model, namely the ab-
sence of standard and transaction-triggered price manipulation and a new condition
of positive expected liquidation costs. Our main results are stated in Section 3.4
and proved in Section 3.5.
1Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010) allow for arbitrary adaptive adjustment of the sizes of orders
in the dark pool. In our model, these orders can only be placed at the beginning of the trading
period, and their remainder can be cancelled at a later time. The possibility of arbitrary adaptive
adjustment of dark-pool orders influences the particular form of optimal order execution strategies,
but it does not have a significant impact on the existence and absence of price manipulation in
comparison to our setting, at least if we exclude so-called ‘fishing’ strategies (see Remark 3.3.5).
Most dark pools operating in practice will probably have order placement and cancellation policies
which lie in between these two possibilities.
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3.2 Model setup
We will analyze a continuous-time variant of the market impact model with dark pool
that was proposed in Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010). This model is natural since it
extends the continuous-time version of the standard Almgren–Chriss market impact
model for an investor who can generate price impact by trading at an exchange;
see Almgren (2003) for details on this model and also Bertsimas and Lo (1998)
for a discrete-time precursor. The Almgren–Chriss model has been the basis of
many academic studies pertaining to market impact and is also common in industry
application.
In the Almgren–Chriss market impact model, it is assumed that the number of
shares in the trader’s portfolio is described by an absolutely continuous trajectory
t 7→ Xt, the trading strategy. Given this trading trajectory, the price at which
transactions occur is
Pt = P
0
t + γ(Xt −X0) + h(X˙t). (3.1)
Here, P 0t is the unaffected stock price process. The term h(X˙t) describes the tem-
porary or instantaneous impact of trading X˙t dt shares at time t and only affects
this current order. The term γ(Xt−X0) corresponds to the permanent price impact
that has been accumulated by all transactions until time t. It is usually assumed
to be linear in Xt − X0 with γ denoting a positive constant, because linearity is
also needed so as to exclude price manipulation; see Huberman and Stanzl (2004)
or Gatheral (2010), see also Almgren et al. (2005) for empirical justification.
Assumption 3.2.1. We assume that the unaffected stock price process (P 0t )t≥0 is
a ca`dla`g martingale on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P) for which F0 is P-
trivial. The permanent-impact parameter γ is assumed to be strictly positive. The
temporary-impact function h : R → R is assumed to have the following properties:
h is continuous, strictly increasing, and satisfies h(0) = 0 and |h(x)| → ∞ for
|x| → ∞. Moreover, the function f(x) := xh(x) is assumed to be convex.
The condition that P 0 is a martingale is a standard assumption in the market
impact literature. One reason is that drift effects can be ignored due to the usually
short trading horizons. In addition, we are interested here in the qualitative effects
of price impact on the stability of the model. A nonzero drift would lead to the
existence of profitable “round trips” that would have to be distinguished from price
manipulation strategies in the sense of Definition 3.3.1. Our assumptions on h are
satisfied for the popular choices of linear temporary impact, h(x) = ηx, or more
generally for power-law impact,
h(x) = η sgn(x)|x|ν (3.2)
where η and ν are positive constants and, typically, ν ≤ 1; see Almgren et al.
(2005) for a discussion. An Almgren–Chriss model is thus defined in terms of the
parameters
(γ, h, P 0). (3.3)
The Almgren–Chriss model is a market impact model for exchange-traded orders.
We will now extend this model by allowing the additional execution of orders in a
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dark pool. A dark pool is an alternative trading venue in which unexecuted orders
are invisible to all other market participants. In this dark pool, buy and sell orders
are matched and executed at the current price at which the asset is traded at the
exchange.
In addition to a trading strategy executed at the exchange, investors can place
an order of Xˆ shares into the dark pool at time t = 0. This order will be matched
with incoming orders of the opposite side. These orders arrive at random times 0 <
τ1 < τ2 < . . . and we denote the size of incoming matching orders by Y˜1, Y˜2, . . . > 0.
We consider only those orders that are a possible match. That is, the Y˜i will describe
sell orders when Xˆ > 0 is a buy order and buy orders when Xˆ < 0 is a sell order.
These incoming orders will then be matched piece by piece with the order Xˆ until
it is cancelled or completely filled. That is,
Yi :=

sgn(Xˆ)Y˜i, if
∑i
j=1 Y˜j ≤ |Xˆ|,
Xˆ − sgn(Xˆ)∑i−1j=1 Y˜j, if ∑i−1j=1 Y˜j ≤ |Xˆ| and ∑ij=1 Y˜j > |Xˆ|,
0, if
∑i−1
j=1 Y˜j > |Xˆ|,
is the part of the incoming order that is actually executed against the remainder of
Xˆ. By defining the counting process associated with the arrival times (τk),
Nt := max{k ∈ N | τk ≤ t}, (3.4)
the amount of shares that have been executed in the dark pool until time t can be
conveniently denoted by
Zt :=
Nt∑
i=1
Yi.
By (Gt) we denote the rightcontinuous filtration generated by (Ft) and Z.
In the first part of the chapter, we make some very mild assumptions on the laws
and interdependence of the random variables (τi), (Y˜i), and P
0:
Assumption 3.2.2. We assume the following conditions:
0 < τ1 <∞ P-a.s. and λ0 := inf
0<δ≤1
1
δ
P[ τ1 ≤ δ ] > 0; (3.5)
there exists x0 > 0 such that λ1 := inf
δ>0
P[ Y˜1 ≥ x0 | τ1 ≤ δ ] > 0. (3.6)
We furthermore assume that P 0 does not jump in τ1, τ2, . . . and that P
0 is a mar-
tingale also under the filtration (Gt) generated by (Ft) and Z.
Condition (3.5) means that the intensity for the arrival of the first matching order
is bounded away from zero. Condition (3.6) states that there is a positive probability
that the first incoming matching order has at least size x0, conditional on the event
that {τ1 ≤ δ}. Clearly, these assumptions are very mild. The requirement that P 0 is
a (Gt)-martingale allows (τi) and (Y˜i) to depend on P 0 in an arbitrary manner but,
conversely, limits the dependence of P 0 on these random variables. This limitation is
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entirely natural since we will explicitly model the possible dependence of exchange-
quoted prices on dark-pool executions via (3.9). Note that Assumption 3.2.2 is
satisfied in particular when τ1 has an exponential distribution and (τi), (Y˜i), and
P 0 are independent random variables, as we will assume in the second part of the
chapter.
Now we consider an investor who must liquidate an initial asset position of
X0 ∈ R shares during the time interval [0, T ]. The problem of how to do this
in an optimal fashion is known as the optimal order execution problem; see, e.g.,
Go¨kay et al. (2011), Scho¨neborn (2008), Schied and Slynko (2011), and the references
therein.
In the extended dark pool model, the investor will first place an order of Xˆ ∈ R
shares in the dark pool2 and then choose a liquidation strategy of Almgren–Chriss-
type for the execution of the remaining assets at the exchange. This latter strategy
must be absolutely continuous in time. It will thus be described by a process (ξt)
that parameterizes the speed by which shares are sold at the exchange. Moreover,
until fully executed, the remaining part of the order Xˆ can be cancelled at a (possibly
random) time ρ < T . Hence, the number of shares held by the investor at time t is
Xt := X0 +
∫ t
0
ξs ds+ Z
ρ
t−, (3.7)
where Zρt− denotes the left-hand limit of Z
ρ
t = Zρ∧t.
Definition 3.2.3. Let an initial position X0 ∈ R and a liquidation horizon T > 0
be given. An admissible trading strategy is a triple χ := (Xˆ, ξ, ρ) where Xˆ ∈ R, ρ is
a (Gt)-stopping time such that ρ < T P-a.s., and ξ is a (Gt)-predictable process that
is P-a.s. bounded uniformly in t and ω. In addition, the liquidation constraint
X0 +
∫ T
0
ξt dt+ Zρ = 0 (3.8)
must be P-a.s. satisfied. The set of all admissible strategies for given X0 and T is
denoted by X (X0, T ).
Due to (3.7) and (3.8), the terminal asset position of any admissible strategy is
XT = 0, since our requirement ρ < T implies that Z
ρ
T− = Zρ.
Now we turn to the definition of the prices at which the orders at the exchange
and in the dark pool are executed. In particular, we will specify the cross impacts
of order execution in the dark pool on the exchange price and vice versa. Here, our
approach is to introduce a model that is flexible enough to allow for a wide range of
2If at time t = 0 the dark pool contains an order Y˜0 of the opposite side, then the investor could
fill this order immediately and then start liquidating the remaining asset position X0− Y˜0, maybe
by resizing the dark-pool order. Therefore we can assume that the dark pool does not contain a
matching order at t = 0. Moreover, restricting the placement of dark-pool orders to t = 0 lets us
exclude so-called ‘fishing’ strategies; see Remark 3.3.5 below.
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possible mutual influences of orders executed on both venues. Extending (3.1), the
price at which assets can be traded at the exchange is defined as
Pt = P
0
t + γ
(∫ t
0
ξs ds+ αZ
ρ
t−
)
+ h(ξt). (3.9)
Here α ∈ [0, 1] describes the intensity of the possible permanent impact of an exe-
cution in the dark pool on the price quoted at the exchange. The existence of such
a cross-venue impact can be made plausible by noting that without the dark pool
the matching order would have been executed at the exchange and there would have
generated permanent price impact in a favorable direction. Thus, the price impact
generated by the execution of a dark-pool order can be understood in terms of a
deficiency in opposite price impact.
The price at which the ith incoming order is executed in the dark pool will be
Pˆτi = P
0
τi
+ γ
(∫ τi
0
ξs ds+ αZτi− + βYi
)
+ g(ξτi)
= Pτi + βγYi + (g(ξτi)− h(ξτi)).
(3.10)
In this price, orders executed at the exchange have full permanent impact, but their
possible temporary impact is described by a function g : R → R. The parameter
β ≥ 0 in (3.10) describes additional “slippage” related to the dark-pool execution,
which will result in transaction costs of the size βγY 2i . It may also be used to account
for hidden costs, which relate to dark pools but which are extremely difficult to model
explicitly. For instance, one can think of costs arising from the phenomena of adverse
selection or ‘fishing’; see Mittal (2008) and Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010). Moreover,
due to the very nature of dark pools, data may be sparse so that there will be a high
degree of model uncertainty. The parameter β can thus also serve as a penalization
of dark-pool orders in view of adverse selection, model misspecification, fishing (see
Remark 3.3.5), and other hidden costs that are difficult to model explicitly. In this
case, Pˆτi in (3.10) is not the actual price at which the dark-pool order is executed,
but it is a virtual adjusted price that includes hidden costs and penalties.
Assumption 3.2.4. We assume that α ∈ [0, 1], β ≥ 0, and that g either is identi-
cally zero or satisfies the conditions on h in Assumption 3.2.1.
Definition 3.2.5. The dark-pool extension of a given Almgren–Chriss model is
defined in terms of the new parameters
(α, β, g, (τi), (Y˜i)) (3.11)
satisfying Assumptions 3.2.2 and 3.2.4.
Our main goal in this chapter is to study the influence of these parameters on
the stability and regularity of the model and, in particular, on the optimal execution
problem. Our investigation will be based on an analysis of the revenues generated
by a trading strategy. In such a strategy, ξt dt shares are bought at price Pt at each
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time t. In addition, Yi shares are bought at price Pˆτi at each time τi. The revenues
generated by the strategy until time T are thus given by
RT = −
∫ T
0
ξsPs ds−
NT∧ρ∑
i=1
YiPˆτi . (3.12)
To emphasize the dependence of RT on the strategy χ = (Xˆ, ξ, ρ) we will sometimes
also write RχT .
3.3 Price manipulation
Our main concern in this chapter is to investigate the stability and regularity of the
dark-pool extension in dependence on the parameters (γ, h, P 0) and (α, β, g, (τi), (Y˜i)).
This question is analogous to establishing the absence of arbitrage in a derivatives
pricing model, where absence of arbitrage is a necessary condition for the existence
of replicating strategies of a given contingent claim.
But there must also be a difference in the notions of regularity of a derivatives
pricing model and of a market impact model. In a derivatives pricing model, one is
interested in constructing strategies that almost surely replicate a given contingent
claim, and this is the reason why one must exclude the existence of arbitrage oppor-
tunities defined in the usual almost-sure sense. In a market impact model, one is
interested in constructing optimal order execution strategies. These strategies are
not defined in terms of an almost-sure criterion but as minimizers of a cost func-
tional of a risk averse investor. Commonly used cost functionals involve expected
value as in Bertsimas and Lo (1998) and Gatheral (2010), mean-variance criteria as
in Almgren and Chriss (2001), expected utility as in Schied and Scho¨neborn (2009)
and Scho¨neborn (2008), or alternative risk criteria as in Forsyth et al. (2012) and
Gatheral and Schied (2011). Therefore, also the regularity conditions to be imposed
on a market impact model need to be formulated in a similar manner. To make such
regularity conditions independent of particular investors preferences, it is reasonable
to formulate them in a risk-neutral manner:
Definition 3.3.1 (Huberman and Stanzl (2004)). A round trip is an admissible
trading strategy with X0 = 0. A price manipulation strategy is a round trip that
has strictly positive expected revenues, E[RT ] > 0.
When the revenues are a concave functional of an order execution strategy, as
it is often the case, the existence of price manipulation precludes the existence of
optimal execution strategies for risk-neutral investors, because one can generate
arbitrarily large expected revenues by adding a multiple of a price manipulation
strategy. In most cases, the same argument also works for risk-averse investors
provided that risk aversion is small enough. The problem of characterizing the
absence of price manipulation in a dark-pool model was formulated in Kratz and
Scho¨neborn (2010), along with some first results in that direction. Analyses of the
absence of price manipulation in various other market impact models were given,
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e.g., by Huberman and Stanzl (2004), Gatheral (2010), Alfonsi and Schied (2010),
Alfonsi et al. (2012), and Gatheral et al. (2012).
It was observed in Alfonsi et al. (2012) that the absence of price manipulation
may not be sufficient to guarantee the stability of the model, because optimal order
execution strategies can still oscillate strongly between alternating buy and sell
trades, a property one should exclude for various reasons: They seem not to be
optimal in real markets, or when a spread between bid and ask prices are included
in the model (which we omit for simplicity of the model). Furthermore, such trading
strategies may be considered illegal market manipulation in many jurisdictions. This
was the reason for introducing the following notion, where execution costs are defined
as minus expected revenues.
Definition 3.3.2 (Alfonsi et al. (2012)). A market impact model admits transaction-
triggered price manipulation if the expected execution costs of a sell (buy) program
can be decreased by intermediate buy (sell) trades.
Equivalently, there is transaction-triggered price manipulation if there is a strat-
egy where Xt is not monotone that has strictly higher expected revenues than all
strategies where Xt is monotone a.s.
In our situation there would be transaction-triggered price manipulation if there
exists X0 ∈ R and a strategy (Xˆ, ξ, ρ) for which either Xˆ or some ξt have the
same sign as X0 and that has strictly higher expected revenues than all strategies
(Xˆ ′, ξ′, ρ′) for which both Xˆ ′ and ξ′t have always the opposite sign of X0. We will
also consider the following notion:
Definition 3.3.3. The model has positive expected liquidation costs if for all X0 ∈ R,
T > 0, and every corresponding order execution strategy
E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 . (3.13)
Condition (3.13) states that on average it is not possible to make a profit beyond
the face value of a position out of the market impact generated by one’s own trades.
We have the following hierarchy of regularity conditions in our model.
Proposition 3.3.4. (a) If there is no transaction-triggered price manipulation,
we have positive expected liquidation costs.
(b) If we have positive expected liquidation costs, then there is no price manipula-
tion.
Implication (a) holds for every market impact model in which buy orders increase
the price and sell orders decrease the price. This implication is particularly useful
in models where the condition of positive expected liquidation costs is violated,
since it immediately yields the existence of transaction-triggered price manipulation.
Implication (b) clearly holds for every market impact model.
Remark 3.3.5. A common price manipulation strategy is the so-called ‘fishing’ strat-
egy in dark pools; see Mittal (2008). In a fishing strategy, agents first send small
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orders to dark pools so as to detect dark liquidity. Once a dark-pool order is de-
tected, the visible price at the exchange is manipulated for a short period in a
direction that is unfavorable for that order. Finally, a large order is sent to the dark
pool so as to be executed against the dark liquidity at the manipulated price.
Here, we are not interested in the profitability of such predatory fishing strategies
but primarily in the stability and regularity of optimal order execution algorithms
in dark pool and exchange. We therefore exclude fishing strategies by allowing
the placement of orders in the dark pool only at time t = 0. Allowing for the
placement of dark-pool orders at times t > 0 will increase the class of admissible
strategies, i.e. we would consider a class of admissible strategies X˜ ⊃ X . Since
supχ∈X˜ E[RχT ] ≥ supχ∈X E[RχT ], in such an extended setting, the conditions of no-
price manipulation or of positive expected liquidation costs will be violated as soon
as they are violated in our present setting.
3.4 Results
An Almgren–Chriss model is specified by the parameters (γ, h, P 0) satisfying As-
sumption 3.2.1. Its extension incorporating a dark pool is based on the additional
parameter set (α, β, g, (τi), (Y˜i)), which will always be assumed to satisfy Assump-
tions 3.2.2 and 3.2.4. We are interested in the conditions we need to impose on
these parameters such that the extended market model is regular. Here, regularity
refers to the absence of price manipulation and related notions as explained in the
preceding section.
3.4.1 General regularity results
Our first result characterizes completely those parameters (α, β, g, (τi), (Y˜i)) for
which the dark-pool extension of every Almgren–Chriss model is sufficiently reg-
ular for all time horizons.
Theorem 3.4.1. For given (α, β, g, (τi), (Y˜i)), the following conditions are equiva-
lent.
(a) For any Almgren–Chriss model, the dark-pool extension has positive expected
liquidation costs.
(b) For any Almgren–Chriss model, the dark-pool extension does not admit price
manipulation for every time horizon T > 0.
(c) We have α = 1, β ≥ 1
2
and g = 0.
Remark 3.4.2. Let us comment on the three conditions in part 3 of the preceding
theorem.
(i) The requirement α = 1 means that an execution of a dark-pool order must
generate the same permanent impact on the exchange-quoted price as a similar
order that is executed at the exchange. At first sight, this requirement might
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seem artificial. At second thought, however, one realizes that price impact
generated by the execution of a dark-pool order can be understood in terms
of a deficiency in opposite-price impact; see the discussion following (3.9).
(ii) The condition β ≥ 1
2
means that the execution of a dark-pool order of size Yi
needs to generate “slippage” of at least γ
2
Y 2i . This latter amount is just equal
to the costs from permanent impact one would have incurred by executing the
order at the exchange. With this amount of slippage, the savings by executing
an order not at the exchange but at a dark pool would thus be equal to
the costs generated by permanent impact. It seems that dark pools that are
currently operative do not charge transaction costs or taxes of this magnitude.
Nevertheless, our theorem states that a penalization with a factor β ≥ 1
2
is
needed for a robust stabilization of the model against irregularities.
(iii) The requirement g = 0 means that temporary impact from trades executed at
the exchange must not affect the price at which dark-pool orders are executed.
This requirement may not be surprising, although the (Gt)-predictability of
the exchange-traded part (ξt) of an admissible strategy excludes short-term
manipulation in immediate response of the arrival of a matching order in the
dark pool.
In Theorem 3.4.1, it is crucial that we may vary at least the parameter h of the
underlying Almgren-Chriss model. If all parameters are fixed, we can only obtain
the following implication instead of an equivalent characterization of regular models.
Theorem 3.4.3. Suppose an Almgren–Chriss model with parameters (γ, h, P 0) has
been fixed. When a dark-pool extension (α, β, g, (τi), (Y˜i)) of this model does not
admit price manipulation for all T > 0, then
β ≥ α− 1
2
. (3.14)
If, in addition, there is equality in (3.14) and g(x) = κh(x) for some constant κ ≥ 0,
then κ = 0 and α = 1.
In the next section, we will analyze several concrete situations in which some of
the model parameters are chosen in a particular way. Our corresponding results will
first illustrate that (3.14) cannot be improved to a result as strong as in part (c) in
the previous Theorem 3.4.1. For instance, it will follow from Corollary 3.4.11 that
even in the case α = β = 0 it may happen that there is no price manipulation for
all T > 0, but this situation is then characterized in terms of relations between γ,
h, and the law of τ1.
3.4.2 Regularity and irregularity for special model charac-
teristics
In this section, we will investigate in more detail the regularity and irregularity of a
dark-pool extension of a fixed Almgren–Chriss model. To this end, we will assume
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throughout this section that slippage is zero, β = 0, which is the natural (naive)
first guess in setting up a dark-pool extension of an Almgren–Chriss model. We
know from Theorem 3.4.1, though, that there must be some Almgren–Chriss model
such that there is price manipulation for sufficiently large time horizon T .
First, we will look into the role played by T in the existence of price manipula-
tion. We show there exists a critical threshold T ∗ ≥ 0 such that there is no price
manipulation for T < T ∗ but price manipulation does exist for T > T ∗. We will
show that all three cases T ∗ = ∞, 0 < T ∗ < ∞, and T ∗ = 0 can occur. Second,
we will analyze the stronger requirements of absence of transaction-triggered price
manipulation and of positive expected liquidation costs. We will find situations in
which there is no price manipulation for all T > 0 but where the condition of pos-
itive expected liquidation costs fails and where there is transaction-triggered price
manipulation for sufficiently large T .
We will make the following simplifying but natural assumption on the dark-pool
extension defined through (α, β, g, (τi), (Y˜i)).
Assumption 3.4.4. We assume the following conditions throughout Section 3.4.2.
(a) Slippage is zero: β = 0.
(b) The process (Nt), as defined in (3.4), is a standard Poisson process with pa-
rameter θ > 0 and (Y˜i) are i.i.d. random variables with common distribution
µ on (0,∞]. We also assume that the stochastic processes (P 0t ), (Nt), and (Y˜i)
are independent.
Note that Assumption 3.4.4 (b) implies that
lim
t↑∞
Nt∑
i=1
Yi = Xˆ P-a.s. (3.15)
Note also that we do not exclude the possibility that Y˜i takes the value +∞ with
positive probability. The particular case Y˜i = +∞ P-a.s., corresponding to µ = δ∞,
can be regarded as the limiting case of infinite liquidity in the dark pool. It results
in Y1 = Xˆ and hence in an immediate execution of the entire order Xˆ. In fact, many
dark pools allow the specification of lower limits on the size of matching orders, for
instance to avoid the effects of ‘fishing’. So, in principle, it should be possible to set
this lower limit equal to Xˆ. Unless µ = δ∞, setting such a limit will however lower
the arrival rate θ of matching orders.
In Propositions 3.4.5 and 3.4.7, we will consider the situation in which the exe-
cution of a dark-pool order has full permanent impact on the price at the exchange,
i.e., α = 1. In view of our assumption β = 0, Theorem 3.4.3 implies that there
will be price manipulation for sufficiently large T . The following proposition shows
that one then can also generate arbitrarily large expected revenues. In contrast to
the situation in many other market impact models, this conclusion is not obvious
in our case, because the expected revenues are typically not a concave functional of
admissible strategies.
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Proposition 3.4.5. Suppose that an Almgren–Chriss model has been fixed and that
α = 1. Then, for any X0 ∈ R,
lim
T↑∞
sup
χ∈X (X0,T )
E[RχT ] = +∞.
In particular, the condition of positive expected liquidation costs is violated.
Now we examine in more detail the role played by T in the existence of price
manipulation. First, we show that for a certain class of models there is no price
manipulation for small T .
Proposition 3.4.6. Let g = 0 and h(x) = ηx. If T ≤ 2η
γ
, then there is no price
manipulation. If moreover α = 1, then there is no price manipulation if and only if
T ≤ 2η
γ
.
Since the class X (X0, T ) of admissible strategies increases with T , the existence
of price manipulation for one T implies the existence of price manipulation for
any T ′ ≥ T . Hence there exists a critical value T ∗ such that there is no price
manipulation for T < T ∗ but price manipulation does exist for T > T ∗. For α = 1
we have that T ∗ = 2η
γ
. In the next proposition, we show that T ∗ = 0 for sublinear
impact and µ = δ∞ (which can be interpreted as setting the minimum execution
size in the dark pool to Xˆ).
Proposition 3.4.7. Suppose that an Almgren–Chriss model has been fixed and that
α = 1. If µ = δ∞ and h has sublinear growth, i.e.,
lim
|x|→∞
h(x)
x
= 0,
then there is price manipulation for every T > 0.
After considering the case α = 1, we will assume in the following that
α = 0, g = 0 and h(x) = ηx, (3.16)
in addition to Assumption 3.4.4. Note that we assume g = 0 since this is required
by Theorems 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 for regularity. Other choices for g will usually make the
model less regular. By Theorem 3.4.1, we know that there exists an Almgren–Chriss
model for which there is price manipulation and for which the condition of positive
expected liquidation costs is violated for sufficiently large T . Our aim is to give a
refined analysis for the class of Almgren–Chriss models with linear temporary price
impact. We first take a look at the condition of positive expected liquidation costs.
Proposition 3.4.8. Consider a fixed Almgren–Chriss model and suppose that con-
dition (3.16) holds.
(a) If γ
η
< 2θ, we have for any X0 ∈ R \ {0},
lim
T↑∞
sup
χ∈X (X0,T )
E[RχT ] ≥ X0P 00 +
1
2
γ2X20
1
2ηθ − γ > X0P
0
0 . (3.17)
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(b) If either γ
η
= 2θ and X0 6= 0 or γη > 2θ, then
lim
T↑∞
sup
χ∈X (X0,T )
E[RχT ] = +∞.
In particular, the condition of positive expected liquidation costs is violated in both
cases.
Proposition 3.3.4 immediately yields that there is transaction-triggered price
manipulation in the situations considered in Proposition 3.4.8. We are interested in
the form of these manipulations.
Proposition 3.4.9. Consider a fixed Almgren–Chriss model and suppose that con-
dition (3.16) holds. If X0 ≥ 0 and ξt ≤ 0 for all t (or X0 ≤ 0 and ξt ≥ 0 for
all t), then E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 , i.e. the violation of positive expected liquidation costs
in Proposition 3.4.8 can only be obtained by intermediate buy (sell) trades at the
exchange during an overall sell (buy) program.
Therefore, if T is large enough, only a strategy that manipulates the exchange-
quoted price can be more profitable than other strategies.
Some of the preceding results can be strengthened in the infinite-liquidity limit
µ = δ∞. We refer to the paragraph after Assumption 3.4.4 for a discussion of this
condition. We first show that (3.17) actually becomes an equality.
Proposition 3.4.10. Consider a fixed Almgren–Chriss model. Suppose moreover
that condition (3.16) holds and that µ = δ∞. Then, for X0 ∈ R and γη < 2θ,
lim
T↑∞
sup
χ∈X (X0,T )
E[RχT ] = X0P 00 +
1
2
γ2X20
1
2ηθ − γ . (3.18)
Equation (3.18) is remarkable, because it implies on the one hand that the con-
dition of positive expected liquidation costs is violated. By taking X0 = 0 we see,
on the other hand, that there is no price manipulation and T ∗ = ∞. In fact, we
have the following result.
Corollary 3.4.11. Consider a fixed Almgren–Chriss model. Suppose moreover that
condition (3.16) holds and that µ = δ∞. Then there is no price manipulation for
every T > 0 if and only if γ
η
≤ 2θ.
By comparing the preceding result with Propositions 3.3.4 and 3.4.10, we arrive
at the following statement.
Corollary 3.4.12. Under the assumptions of Corollary 3.4.11 there is always trans-
action-triggered price manipulation for sufficiently large T . Standard price manipu-
lation, however, exists only for γ
η
> 2θ.
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3.4.3 Optimal order execution strategies
In this section, we illustrate some of our results by determining an optimal strat-
egy for selling X0 > 0 shares. To this end, we will make a number of simplifying
assumptions, because our main goal is to analyze the regularity of the model. In
particular, for us, optimality of a strategies refers to the maximization of the ex-
pected revenues. For a detailed analysis of optimal order execution strategies in a
discrete-time model with dark pool we refer to Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010).
We fix an Almgren–Chriss model and assume that Assumption 3.4.4 (b) holds
and that
α = 1, β =
1
2
, g = 0. (3.19)
Then Theorem 3.4.1 guarantees that there is no price manipulation. For simplicity,
we will also assume that there is infinite liquidity in the dark pool in the sense that
µ = δ∞. (3.20)
Then the entirety of the dark-pool order Xˆ will either be filled when τ1 ≤ ρ or
it will be cancelled when τ1 > ρ. In this setting, an admissible strategy (Xˆ, ξ, ρ)
will be called a single-update strategy if ρ is a deterministic time in [0, T ) and ξ is
predictable with respect to the filtration generated by the stochastic process 1{τ1≤t},
t ≥ 0.
Note that the process ξ of a single-update strategy evolves deterministically until
there is an execution in the dark pool, i.e., until time τ1. At that time, ξ can be
updated. But the update will only depend on the time τ1 and not on any other
random quantities. In particular, ξ can be written as
ξt =
{
ξ0t , if t ≤ τ1 or τ1 > ρ,
ξ1t , if t > τ1 and τ1 ≤ ρ,
(3.21)
where ξ0 is deterministic and ξ1 depends on τ1.
Proposition 3.4.13. Suppose that Assumption 3.4.4 (b), (3.19), and (3.20) hold.
For any X0 ∈ R and T > 0 there exists a single-update strategy that maximizes the
expected revenues E[RT ] in the class of all admissible strategies.
Now we show how an optimal single-update strategy can be computed. To this
end, we make the additional simplifying assumption that temporary impact is linear,
h(x) = ηx. It will follow from Equation (3.39) in the proof of Proposition 3.4.13
that the expected revenues of a single-update strategy are given by
E[RT ] = X0P 00 −
1
2
γX20 −
∫ ρ
0
η(ξ0s )
2e−θs ds− ηe−θρ (X0 +
∫ ρ
0
ξ0s ds)
2
T − ρ
−
∫ ρ
0
ηθe−θt
(X0 +
∫ t
0
ξ0s ds+ Xˆ)
2
T − t dt.
(3.22)
A standard calculation shows that the strategy X0t := X0 −
∫ t
0
ξ0s ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ ρ,
minimizing this expression is the solution of the Euler–Lagrange equation
−X¨0t + θX˙0t + θ
X0t + Xˆ
T − t = 0 (3.23)
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with initial condition X00 = X0 and a terminal condition X
0
ρ that will be determined
later. By using the computer algebra software Mathematica, we found the analytic
solution
X0t = −Xˆ+(
θTeθT (T − ρ)(Ei(−Tθ)− Ei(θ(ρ− T )))− ρ+ T (1− eθρ)
)−1{
− eθtρX0
+(t− T )(X0eθρ −X0ρ − Xˆ)+ θ(T − t)eθT[Ei((t− T )θ)(T (X0 −X0ρ − Xˆ)
−ρX0) +X0(ρ− T )Ei(θ(ρ− T )) + T (X0ρ + Xˆ)Ei(−Tθ)
]
+eθtT (X0 −X0ρ − Xˆ)
}
,
where Ei(t) =
∫ t
−∞ s
−1es ds is the exponential integral function. The constants ρ,
Xˆ and X0ρ can then be determined by optimizing the expression (3.22) numerically.
Finally, the part ξ1 of the strategy, which describes the trades to be executed at the
exchange after time ρ ∧ τ1 is given by
ξ1t =

−Xτ1 − Xˆ
T − τ1 on {τ1 ≤ ρ},
−Xρ
T − ρ on {ρ < τ1};
see (3.38) in the proof of Proposition 3.4.13.
3.4.4 Existence of transaction-triggered price manipulation
and adaptive dark pool strategies
In this section, we show that there is transaction-triggered price manipulation in the
model considered in the previous section. Furthermore, we show that transaction-
triggered price manipulation disappears if we allow for an adaptive adjustment of the
order in the dark pool, i.e. transaction-triggered price manipulation is an artifact
from choosing the class of admissible strategies too restrictive.
Proposition 3.4.14. Suppose that Assumption 3.4.4 (b), (3.19), and (3.20) hold.
If X0 > 0, for the optimal strategy (Xˆ
∗, ξ∗, ρ∗) we have that
(i) Xˆ∗ < 0 and
(ii) if τ1 ≥ ρ∗: X∗ρ∗ + Xˆ∗ < 0.
If we are in a sell program, (i) says that there the optimal order in the dark pool
is always a sell order, while (ii) leads to the existence of transaction-triggered price
manipulation:
Corollary 3.4.15. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.4.14, there is transac-
tion-triggered price manipulation.
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The intuition is the following: If we may not adjust the position in the dark pool,
we would have to cancel the dark pool order as soon as we sold X0 +X
∗ shares on
the exchange to avoid a short position in the shares. However, it is better to wait
with the cancellation at least a little bit longer: In this case, we risk a very small
short position that has to be liquidated subsequently, but we save a larger amount
on temporary impact in the exchange by the dark pool execution. But this means
there is transaction-triggered price manipulation, although it might exist only with
low probability (if the execution in the dark pool happens short before cancellation)
and with a low number of shares bought during a sell program, depending on the
parameters used.
Next, we show that there is no transaction-triggered price manipulation if we
allow for adaptive strategies in the dark pool. To this end, let Xˆ = (Xˆt)t≥0 be an
adapted process. We assume again µ = δ∞. Then the number of shares executed in
the dark pool up to time t is given by Zt = 1{{τ1≤t}}Xˆτ1 . Based on the observation
that the optimal strategy in this setup is to place all remaining shares in the dark
pool (i.e. Xˆt = −Xt) as in Kratz and Scho¨neborn (2010), we have the following
result.
Proposition 3.4.16. Suppose that Assumption 3.4.4 (b), (3.19), (3.20) hold and
assume that f is C2. Furthermore allow for adaptive strategies in the dark pool, i.e.
let Xˆ = (Xˆ)t be an adapted process. Then there is no transaction-triggered price
manipulation.
Given the assumptions of the preceding proposition, we find in the proof that
the strategy X0 (before the dark-pool execution) satisfies f ′(X˙0t ) = C exp(θt) with
a constant C ∈ R which can be determined from the constraint ∫ T
0
X˙0t dt = −X0.
Thus, for linear impact corresponding to f(x) = ηx2 with η > 0, we find that
X˙0t = −X0 θeθT−1 exp(θt) and X0t = X0 e
θT−eθt
eθT−1 . Note that the optimal strategy does
not depend on η.
3.5 Proofs
Recall from Assumption 3.2.2 that the martingale property of (P 0t ) is retained by
passing to the enlarged filtration (Gt). Next, for an admissible strategy, the asset
position process X defined in (3.7) is an admissible integrand for P 0 since it is
leftcontinuous, (Gt)-adapted, and hence (Gt)-predictable. Recall also that f(x) =
xh(x).
Lemma 3.5.1. The terminal revenues of an admissible strategy for given X0 and
T are given by
RT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
−
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
−
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds− αγXτi+ + βγYi + g(ξτi)
)
.
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Proof. First we prove that − ∫ T
0
ξtP
0
t dt−
∑Nρ
i=1 YiP
0
τi
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t .
To this end, we first define X˜t :=
∫ t
0
ξs ds and note that P-a.s. X˜T = −X0−ZρT− =
−X0 − ZρT . Since P 0 does not jump in τi, we have that P-a.s. P 0τi− = P 0τi . In
particular, the quadratic co-variations [P 0, N ] and [P 0, Z] vanish P-a.s. It follows
that P-a.s.
X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t = X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
(
X0 +
∫ t
0
ξs ds+ Z
ρ
t−
)
dP 0t
= X0P
0
0 +X0(P
0
T − P 00 ) +
∫ T
0
X˜t dP
0
t +
∫ T
0
Zρt− dP
0
t
= −P 0TZρT− −
∫ T
0
ξtP
0
t dt+ Z
ρ
TP
0
T −
∫ T
0
P 0t− dZ
ρ
t
= −
∫ T
0
ξtP
0
t dt−
Nρ∑
i=1
YiP
0
τi−
= −
∫ T
0
ξtP
0
t dt−
Nρ∑
i=1
YiP
0
τi
.
Thus, P-a.s.,
RT = −
∫ T
0
ξtPt dt−
Nρ∑
i=1
YiPˆτi
= −
∫ T
0
ξt
(
P 0t + γ
(∫ t
0
ξs ds+ αZ
ρ
t−
)
+ h(ξt)
)
dt
−
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
P 0τi + γ
(∫ τi
0
ξs ds+ α
i−1∑
j=1
Yj
)
+ βγYi + g(ξτi)
)
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t − γ
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
ξs ds ξt dt−
∫ T
0
ξtγαZ
ρ
t− dt−
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
−
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds+ αγ
Nρ∑
j=i+1
Yj + βγYi + g(ξτi)
)
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ
(∫ T
0
ξt dt
)2
− γα
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
∫ T
τi
ξt dt−
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
−
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds+ αγ
Nρ∑
j=i+1
Yj + βγYi + g(ξτi)
)
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
−
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
−
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds− αγXτi+ + βγYi + g(ξτi)
)
.
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In the last step, we have again used the fact that XT = XT+ = 0 P-a.s.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4. (a): Assume X0 ≥ 0, and let the trading strategy be
selling only, i.e. ξt ≤ 0 for all t and Yi ≤ 0 for all i. Then Pt ≤ P 0t for all t and
Pˆτi ≤ P 0τi for all i. Using integration by parts, we find that
RT ≤ −
∫ T
0
ξsP
0
s ds−
NT∧ρ∑
i=1
YiP
0
τi
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t .
Since (P 0) is a martingale, E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 for such a trading strategy. Absence of
transaction-triggered price manipulation implies that the expected revenues cannot
be increased by intermediate sell trades and therefore, we have E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 for
all trading strategies. The case X0 ≤ 0 works analogously.
(b): By setting X0 = 0 in (3.13) we find that E[RT ] ≤ 0 for round trips.
In the following, we will consider round trips which cancel the order in the dark
pool after the first execution, i.e. X0 = 0 and ρ = τ1 ∧ r with some r < T . With
Lemma 3.5.1 we find that the revenues of such a round trip are
RT =
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
γ
2
1{τ1≤r}Y
2
1 −
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
−1{τ1≤r}Y1 (γXτ1− − αγ(Xτ1− + Y1) + βγY1 + g(ξτi)) .
Furthermore, we will consider strategies that do not depend on P 0, i.e. they only
depend on τ1 and Y1. In particular, these strategies can be written as
ξt =
{
ξ0t , if t ≤ τ1 or τ1 > r,
ξ1t , if t > τ1 and τ1 ≤ r,
(3.24)
where ξ0 is deterministic and ξ1 depends on τ1 and Y1. As in Section 3.4.3, we will
call these strategies single-update round trips. We define further X0t =
∫ t
0
ξ0s ds.
The expected revenues of a single-update round trip are
E[RT ] = −
∫ r
0
f(ξ0t )P[ t ≤ τ1 ] dt− P[ τ1 > r ]
∫ T
r
f(ξ0t ) dt
−E
[∫ T
τ1
f(ξ1t ) dt; τ1 ≤ r
]
−E
[
γφY 21 + γ(1− α)X0τ1Y1 + g(ξ0τ1)Y1 ; τ1 ≤ r
]
(3.25)
where
φ := −α + 1
2
+ β. (3.26)
We will next prove Theorem 3.4.3. The proof of Theorem 3.4.1 will be based on
Theorem 3.4.3.
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Proof of Theorem 3.4.3. We first show that we must have that φ ≥ 0 when there is
no price manipulation. To this end, we assume by way of contradiction that φ < 0
but that there is no price manipulation for all T . Consider the single-update round
trip with r = T/2, Xˆ > 0, and
ξt =
{
−2Y1
T
if t > r and τ1 ≤ r
0 otherwise.
The expected revenues of this strategy satisfy
E[RT ] = −E
[
T
2
f
(
−2Y1
T
)
+ γφY 21 ; τ1 ≤
T
2
]
= E
[
Y1h
(
−2Y1
T
)
− γφY 21 ; τ1 ≤
T
2
]
.
The continuity of h(x) at x = 0 yields that h(−2Y1/T )↗ 0 for T ↑ ∞. Dominated
convergence and our assumption φ < 0 hence imply that
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] = −γφE [Y 21 ] > 0.
It follows that for sufficiently large T the expected revenues are strictly positive,
and so there is price manipulation. But this contradicts our assumption.
We now consider the special case in which φ = 0 and g(x) = κh(x) for some
κ ≥ 0 and deduce κ = 0. By way of contradiction, we will show that there is price
manipulation for sufficiently large T when κ > 0. Consider any single-update round
trip. Assume that r is fixed and both ξ0 and ξ1 are fixed on [0, r). When taking T
arbitrarily large, we can liquidate the asset position Xτ1∧r arbitrarily slowly during
[r, T ] and thus achieve that both ξ0t ↘ 0 and ξ1t ↘ 0 for t ≥ r as T ↑ ∞. By sending
T to infinity in (3.25), it follows that we can achieve via monotone convergence that
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] = −E
[ ∫ r
0
f(ξ0t )1{t≤τ1} dt
+
(
γφY 21 + γ(1− α)X0τ1Y1 + g(ξ0τ1)Y1
)
1{τ1≤r}
]
, (3.27)
where we keep the term with φ for the moment, although φ = 0 here, because this
and the subsequent formulas will also be used later on. Now we take some δ ∈ (0, 1),
which will be specified later, and let r = δ and ξ0t = −δ for 0 ≤ t ≤ δ. We also
suppose that Xˆ > 0. Then
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] = −E
[
f(−δ)
∫ δ
0
1{t≤τ1} dt
+
(
γφY 21 + Y1
(
γ(1− α)X0τ1 + g(−δ)
))
1{τ1≤δ}
]
(3.28)
≥ −δf(−δ)− E
[(
γφY 21 + Y1g(−δ)
)
1{τ1≤δ}
]
(3.29)
= −κh(−δ)
( δf(−δ)
κh(−δ) + E[Y1 | τ1 ≤ δ ]P[ τ1 ≤ δ ]
)
≥ −κh(−δ)δ
(
− δ
κ
+ λ0λ1(x0 ∧ Xˆ)
)
,
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where we have used (3.5) and (3.6) in the last step. Due to the assumption λ0λ1x0 >
0, this expression is strictly positive as soon as δ > 0 is small enough. This implies
the desired existence of price manipulation for sufficiently large T .
We now show that we must have α = 1 when φ = 0 and g = 0. To this end, we
assume by way of contradiction that α < 1. As before, we may assume that (3.27)
holds. When taking r = 1 and ξ0t := −δ1[0,1] for δ ∈ (0, 1), we have X0τ1 = −δτ1 on
{τ1 ≤ r}, and (3.27) yields that
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] = −E
[ ∫ 1
0
f(−δ)1{t≤τ1} dt+ γ(1− α)X0τ1Y11{τ1≤r}
]
≥ δ
[
h(−δ) + γ(1− α)E[ τ1Y11{τ1≤r} ]].
But the latter expression is strictly positive as soon as δ is small enough, because
E[ τ1Y11{τ1≤r} ] is strictly positive by (3.5) and (3.6). Hence, α < 1 implies the
existence of price manipulation for sufficiently large T .
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. The implication (a)⇒(b) follows immediately by taking
X0 = 0.
(b)⇒(c): We already know from Theorem 3.4.3 that we must have φ ≥ 0, where
φ is as in (3.26). Thus, it remains to show that g = 0 and α = 1.
We start by showing that g = 0. To this end, we assume by way of contradiction
that there is no price manipulation but g 6= 0. Then g must satisfy the conditions
on a temporary-impact function in Assumption 3.2.1. When φ = 0, we can take
h := g and get the desired contradiction from the second part of Theorem 3.4.3. So
let us now consider the case φ > 0. To this end, we consider again the situation in
the proof of Theorem 3.4.3 in which (3.27) holds and where r = δ, δ ∈ (0, 1), and
ξ0t = −δ for 0 ≤ t ≤ δ. Then we have from (3.29) that
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] ≥ −δf(−δ)− γφE
[
Y 21 1{τ1≤δ}
]− g(−δ)E[Y11{τ1≤δ} ].
On the one hand, we have 0 < Y1 = Y˜1 ∧ Xˆ ≤ Xˆ and hence
E
[
Y 21 1{τ1≤δ}
] ≤ Xˆ2P[ τ1 ≤ δ ].
On the other hand, our assumption (3.6) implies that for all Xˆ such that 0 < Xˆ ≤ x0
we have E[Y1 | τ1 ≤ δ ] ≥ λ1Xˆ. Thus, for 0 < Xˆ ≤ x0 we have
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] ≥ −δf(−δ)−
(
γφXˆ2 + g(−δ)λ1Xˆ
)
P[ τ1 ≤ δ ].
Choosing Xˆ = −g(−δ)λ1/(2γφ) yields
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] ≥ −δf(−δ) + g(−δ)
2λ21
4φγ
P[ τ1 ≤ δ ] ≥ δg(−δ)2
(δh(−δ)
g(−δ)2 +
λ21
4φγ
λ0
)
, (3.30)
where we have used (3.5) in the last step. One can check that the function h(x) :=
xg(x)2 satisfies Assumption 3.2.1. But with this choice, the right-hand side of (3.30)
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becomes strictly positive for sufficiently small δ > 0, and we obtain price manipula-
tion for sufficiently large T . This completes the proof of g = 0.
Now we show that we must have α = 1. To this end, we assume by way of
contradiction that α < 1 and start from the identity (3.28), which holds for r = δ,
Xˆ > 0, ξ0t = −δ for 0 ≤ t ≤ δ, and a suitable choice for ξ1 and ξ0t (t > δ), depending
on T . We take δ = 1 and hence have X0τ1 = −τ1 on {τ1 ≤ 1}. Since g = 0, (3.28)
implies that
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] = −E
[
f(−1)
∫ 1
0
1{t≤τ1} dt+
(
γφY 21 − γ(1− α)Y1τ1
)
1{τ1≤1}
]
dt
≥ −f(−1) + E
[ (
− γφY 21 + γ(1− α)Y1τ1
)
1{τ1≤1}
]
. (3.31)
Next we consider Almgren–Chriss models with fixed permanent-impact param-
eter γ > 0 and with temporary impact function εh, where h is fixed and ε > 0.
Suppose first that φ = 0. Then we get in the limit ε ↓ 0,
lim
ε↓0
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] ≥ γ(1− α)E
[
Y1τ11{τ1≤1}
]
> 0,
which implies that there is price manipulation for small enough ε and large enough
T .
For φ > 0, we get
lim
ε↓0
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] ≥ E
[ (
− γφY 21 + γ(1− α)Y1τ1
)
1{τ1≤1}
]
= γφXˆE
[ (
− (Y˜1 ∧ Xˆ)
2
Xˆ
+
1− α
φ
· Y1 ∧ Xˆ
Xˆ
τ1
)
1{τ1≤1}
]
.
But it is easy to see that the expectation on the right will be strictly positive as
soon as Xˆ is sufficiently small, since
(Y1 ∧ Xˆ)2
Xˆ
−→ 0 and Y1 ∧ Xˆ
Xˆ
−→ 1 as Xˆ ↓ 0.
This shows that there is price manipulation for small enough ε and large enough T
when α < 1.
(c)⇒(a): Assume that α = 1, β ≥ 1
2
, g ≡ 0. Note that∫ τi
0
ξs ds−Xτi+ = −
i∑
j=1
Yi −X0. (3.32)
With Lemma 3.5.1 we get for the revenues of an admissible strategy (Xˆ, ρ, ξ)
RT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
−
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
i∑
j=1
Yi + γX0 − βγYi
)
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γX20 −
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt−
(
β − 1
2
)
γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i .
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Therefore,
E[RT ] = X0P 00 −
1
2
γX20 − E
[∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
]
− (β − 1
2
)
γE
[
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i
]
≤ X0P 00 .
This establishes (a).
Proof of Proposition 3.4.5. Let X0 ∈ R and α = 1, β = 0. The revenues for a
strategy are given by
RT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γX20 −
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
+
1
2
γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i −
Nρ∑
i=1
Yig(ξτi).
Consider the following trading strategy with ρ = T
2
and given Xˆ 6= 0,
ξt =
{
0, if 0 ≤ t ≤ ρ,
−2X0+Zρ
T
, if ρ < t ≤ T.
The expected revenues of this strategy are
E[RT ] = X0P 00 −
1
2
γX20 − E
[
T
2
f
(
−2X0 + ZT/2
T
)]
+
1
2
γE
NT/2∑
i=1
Y 2i

= X0P
0
0 −
1
2
γX20 + E
[(
X0 + ZT/2
)
h
(
−2X0 + ZT/2
T
)]
+
1
2
γE
NT/2∑
i=1
Y 2i
 .
Recall that |ZT/2| is bounded by |Xˆ| for all T and that Yi is nonzero only as long
as |∑i−1j=1 Y˜j| < |Xˆ|. Hence, with probability one, only finitely many Yi are nonzero.
Therefore, and by dominated convergence,
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] = X0P 00 −
1
2
γX20 +
1
2
γE
[ ∞∑
i=1
Y 2i
]
.
When sending |Xˆ| to infinity, ∑∞i=1 Y 2i tends to infinity with probability one. Hence,
we can make limT↑∞ E[RT ] arbitrarily large. So we can find a sequence of strategies
χn ∈ X (X0, Tn) such that E[RχnTn ] ≥ n which implies the assertion.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.6. (a): Lemma 3.5.1 and (3.32) yield
RT =
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ
(
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
− η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt
−γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
(1− α)
∫ τi
0
ξs ds− α
i∑
j=1
Yj
)
=
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t + α
(
1
2
γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i − η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt
)
+(1− α)
−η ∫ T
0
ξ2t dt− γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
∫ τi
0
ξs ds− 1
2
γ
(
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2 .
Note that
η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt ≥
η
T
(∫ T
0
ξt dt
)2
=
η
T
( Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
≥ η
T
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i ,
where we have used Jensen’s inequality in the first step. Thus,
1
2
γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i − η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt ≤
(γ
2
− η
T
) Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i . (3.33)
Furthermore, let Ξ := supt∈[0,T ] |
∫ t
0
ξs ds|. Then, by Jensen’s inequality,∫ T
0
ξ2t dt ≥ T
( 1
T
∫ T
0
|ξt| dt
)2
≥ Ξ
2
T
.
We can estimate
−η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt− γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
∫ τi
0
ξs ds ≤ −ηΞ
2
T
+
Nρ∑
i=1
|Yi|γΞ.
The right-hand side is maximized by
Ξ =
γT
2η
Nρ∑
i=1
|Yi|.
Therefore,
−η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt− γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
∫ τi
0
ξs ds− 1
2
γ
(
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
≤ γ
2
(
Nρ∑
i=1
|Yi|
)2(
γT
2η
− 1
)
. (3.34)
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Combining (3.33) and (3.34) yields
RT ≤
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t + α
(γ
2
− η
T
) Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i + (1− α)
γ
2
(
Nρ∑
i=1
|Yi|
)2(
γT
2η
− 1
)
≤
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t
for T ≤ 2η/γ and we find E[RT ] ≤ 0.
(b): Let now α = 1. Necessity follows from part (a). For the proof of sufficiency,
let us assume that T > 2η/γ. Then there exists ε ∈ (0, T ) such that
1
2
γ − η
T − ε > 0.
Consider the round trip with ρ = τ1 ∧ ε, arbitrary Xˆ 6= 0, and
ξt =
{
− Y1
T−ε , if t > ε and τ1 ≤ ε,
0, otherwise.
The expected revenues of this strategy are
E[RT ] =
(
1
2
γ − η
T − ε
)
E[Y 21 ; τ1 ≤ ε] > 0.
Hence, there is price manipulation for T > 2η/γ.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.7. Let T > 0 and fix Xˆ such that
γ
2
Xˆ2 − T
2
f
(
2
Xˆ
T
)
=
Xˆ2
2
(
γ − h(2Xˆ/T )
Xˆ
)
> 0,
which is possible due to the sublinearity of h. Now we take ρ = T/2 and
ξt :=

0, t ≤ ρ,
0, t > ρ and τ > ρ,
−2Xˆ/T, t > ρ and τ ≤ ρ.
The expected revenues of this strategy are
E[RT ] = −E
[∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
]
+
∫ ρ
0
θe−θt
(
1
2
γXˆ2 + Xˆg(0)
)
dt
= (1− e−θρ)
(
1
2
γXˆ2 − T
2
f
(
2
Xˆ
T
))
> 0.
So there is price manipulation.
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Now we prove the results pertaining to the assumptions that α = β = 0, g ≡ 0,
and h(ξ) = ηξ. Under this conditions, Lemma 3.5.1 yields
RT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
−η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt−
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
(
γ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds
)
.
(3.35)
Proof of Proposition 3.4.8. Proof of (a): Take ρ = T
2
and
ξt =

− γ
2η
Xˆ, if t ≤ τ1, t ≤ ρ,
0, if t > τ1, t ≤ ρ
−Xρ+
ρ
, if t > ρ,
where Xˆ will be specified later. By (3.35), we find that
RT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
−η(ρ∧τ1) γ
2
4η2
Xˆ2−ηX
2
ρ+
ρ
+
Nρ∑
i=1
Yiτ1
γ2
2η
Xˆ.
In the limit T ↑ ∞ we will have
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi =
NT/2∑
i=1
Yi −→ Xˆ.
Hence, using the fact that E[τ1] = 1θ ,
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] = X0P 00 −
1
2
γ(X0 + Xˆ)
2 +
1
θ
γ2
4η
Xˆ2. (3.36)
Choosing
Xˆ = − 2X0ηθ
γ − 2ηθ
yields
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] = X0P 00 +
1
2
γ2X20
1
2ηθ − γ > X0P
0
0 .
This concludes the proof of part (a).
Proof of (b): We first consider the case in which γ
ηθ
= 2 and X0 6= 0. With the
same strategy as in part (a) we find with (3.36) that
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] = X0P 00 −
1
2
γX20 − γX0Xˆ.
For X0 6= 0, the right-hand side can be made arbitrarily large by taking Xˆ with the
opposite sign of X0 and making |Xˆ| large.
Now we consider the case in which γ
ηθ
> 2. With (3.36) we find
lim
T↑∞
E[RT ] = X0P 00 −
1
2
γX20 − γX0Xˆ + εXˆ2,
where ε > 0. Again, the right-hand side can be made arbitrarily large by sending
Xˆ to infinity.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.9. In view of Proposition 3.4.8, the assertion will be implied
by the following claim: If, for 0 ≤ t < ρ, we have ξt ≤ 0 when X0 > 0 or ξt ≥ 0
when X0 < 0, then
E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 .
In proving this claim, we will consider the case X0 > 0. The case X0 < 0 is
analogous. With Lemma 3.5.1 we find that
RT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ
(
X0 +
Nρ∑
i=1
Yi
)2
−
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt−
Nρ∑
i=1
Yiγ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds.
Consider first the case Xˆ ≤ 0. Then
−
Nρ∑
i=1
Yiγ
∫ τi
0
ξs ds ≤ 0
and E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 follows.
Consider next the case Xˆ > 0. Since ξt ≤ 0 this implies Xt ≥ 0 for all t.
Especially, Xτi− ≥ 0, or equivalently∫ τi
0
ξs ds ≥ −X0 −
i−1∑
j=1
Yi.
Therefore, we find that
RT ≤ X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γX20 −
1
2
γ
Nρ∑
i=1
Y 2i −
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
and E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.10. The revenues in this case are
RT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ(X0 + 1{τ1≤ρ}Xˆ)
2
−η
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt− 1{τ1≤ρ}γXˆ(Xτ1− −X0)
≤ X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t
+1{τ1≤ρ}
(
−1
2
γ(X0 + Xˆ)
2 − η (Xτ1− −X0)
2
τ1
− γXˆ(Xτ1− −X0)
)
.
The rightmost expression is maximized by
Xτ1− = X0 −
γ
2η
τ1Xˆ
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and we find
RT ≤ X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t + 1{τ1<ρ}
(
−1
2
γ(X0 + Xˆ)
2 +
γ2
4η
τ1Xˆ
2
)
(3.37)
and thus
E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 + E[f(ρ, Xˆ)],
where
f(ρ, Xˆ) :=
∫ ρ
0
θe−θt
(
−1
2
γ(X0 + Xˆ)
2 +
γ2
4η
tXˆ2
)
dt.
We see that f(0, Xˆ) = 0 and the term in parenthesis is increasing in t. Therefore, if
Xˆ is such that f(∞, Xˆ) > 0, then we have f(ρ, Xˆ) ≤ f(∞, Xˆ) for all ρ < ∞. For
Xˆ with f(∞, Xˆ) ≤ 0 we have f(ρ, Xˆ) ≤ 0 for all ρ <∞. Thus,
E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 + 0 ∨ f(∞, Xˆ) = X0P 00 +
(
− 1
2
γ(X0 + Xˆ)
2 +
γ2
4ηθ
Xˆ2
)+
.
The right-hand side is maximized by taking
Xˆ = 2X0
ηθ
γ − 2ηθ ,
and so
E[RT ] ≤ X0P 00 +
1
2
γ2X20
1
2ηθ − γ .
The statement now follows with Proposition 3.4.8.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.11. We already know from Proposition 3.4.8 (b) that there is
price manipulation for γ
η
> 2θ. On the other hand, Proposition 3.4.10 implies that
is no price manipulation for γ
η
< 2θ. Hence, it remains to analyze the case γ
η
= 2θ.
For a round trip with X0 = 0, our estimate (3.37) yields that in this case
RT ≤
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t + 1{τ1<ρ}γ
(
γ
4η
τ1 − 1
2
)
Xˆ2.
Hence,
E[RT ] ≤ γXˆ2E[g(ρ)]
where
g(ρ) :=
∫ ρ
0
θe−θt
(
γ
4η
t− 1
2
)
dt
=
γ
4ηθ
(
1− e−θρ(1 + θρ)
)
− 1
2
(1− e−θρ)
= −1
2
θρe−θρ
≤ 0.
This gives E[RT ] ≤ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.13. Under the assumptions α = 1, β = 1
2
, and g = 0, the
revenues of an admissible strategy are given by
RT = X0P 00 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γ
(
X0 + 1{τ1≤ρ}Xˆ
)2
−
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt
+γXˆ
(
1
2
Xˆ +X0
)
1{τ1≤ρ}
= X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t −
1
2
γX20 −
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt.
Taking the conditional expectation with respect to Fτ1∧ρ and using optional sampling
yields
E[RT | Fτ1∧ρ ] = X0P 00 +
∫ τ1∧ρ
0
Xt dP
0
t −
γ
2
X20 −
∫ τ1∧ρ
0
f(ξt) dt
−E
[ ∫ T
τ1∧ρ
f(ξt) dt
∣∣Fτ1∧ρ ].
Due to the liquidation constraint, we must have
∫ T
τ1∧ρ ξt dt = −Xτ1∧ρ − 1{τ1<ρ}Xˆ,
and so the convexity of f and Jensen’s inequality yield that∫ T
τ1∧ρ
f(ξt) dt ≥ (T − τ1 ∧ ρ)f
(−Xτ1∧ρ − 1{τ1<ρ}Xˆ
T − τ1 ∧ ρ
)
with equality if, for τ1 ∧ ρ ≤ t ≤ T ,
ξt =

−Xτ1 − Xˆ
T − τ1 on {τ1 ≤ ρ}
−Xρ
T − ρ on {ρ < τ1}.
(3.38)
These two possibilities will correspond to the single update of the optimal strategy
at τ1.
Note next that, due to the (Gt)-predictability of the processes (ξt) and (ρ∧ t)t≥0,
(ξs)s≤t and ρ ∧ t are independent of τ1, conditional on {t ≤ τ1}. It follows that
E[RT ] = E[E[RT | Fτ1∧ρ ] ]
≤ X0P 00 −
γ
2
X20 − E
[ ∫ τ1∧ρ
0
f(ξt) dt+ (T − τ1 ∧ ρ)f
(−Xτ1∧ρ − 1{τ1≤ρ}Xˆ
T − τ1 ∧ ρ
)]
= X0P
0
0 −
γ
2
X20 − E
[
F (Xˆ, ξ, ρ)
]
, (3.39)
where the functional F maps Xˆ ∈ R, ξ ∈ L1[0, T ], and r ∈ [0, T ] to
F (Xˆ, ξ, r)
=
∫ ∞
0
du θe−θu
{∫ u∧r
0
f(ξt) dt+ (T − u ∧ r)f
(−X0 − ∫ u∧r0 ξt dt− 1{u≤r}Xˆ
T − u ∧ r
)}
.
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When F admits a minimizer (Xˆ∗, ξ∗, r∗), then concatenating ξ∗ with (3.38) in r∗∧τ1
yields an optimal strategy that is a single-update strategy.
To show the existence of a minimizer of F , take any triple (X˜, ξ˜, r˜) for which
C := F (X˜, ξ˜, r˜) < ∞. We then only need to look into those triples (Xˆ, ξ, r) for
which F (Xˆ, ξ, r) ≤ C. Without loss of generality, we can pick the component ξ
from the set
KC :=
{
ξ ∈ L1[0, T ]
∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt ≤ CeθT
}
,
because we clearly have
F (Xˆ, ξ, r) ≥
∫ ∞
T
du θe−θu
∫ u∧r
0
f(ξt) dt = e
−θT
∫ r
0
f(ξt) dt
and we can set ξt := 0 for t > r.
The set KC is a closed convex subset of L
1[0, T ]. Hence it is also weakly closed
in L1[0, T ]. It is also uniformly integrable according to the criterion of de la Valle´e
Poussin and our assumption that f has superlinear growth. Hence, the Dunford–
Pettis theorem (Dunford and Schwartz, 1958, Corollary IV.8.11) implies that KC is
weakly sequentially compact in L1[0, T ]. From now on we will endow KC with the
weak topology.
It follows in particular that
sup
ξ∈KC
∫ T
0
|ξt| dt <∞. (3.40)
Since
F (Xˆ, ξ, r) ≥
∫ r
0
du θe−θu(T − u)f
(−X0 − ∫ u0 ξt dt− Xˆ
T − u
)
,
the superlinear growth of f and (3.40) imply that there is a constant C1 ≥ 0 such
that |Xˆ| ≤ C1 when F (Xˆ, ξ, r) ≤ C. Hence we can restrict our search of a minimizer
to the sequentially compact set
K := [−C1, C1]×KC × [0, T ].
Next,
[0, T ]×KC 3 (r, ξ) −→
∫ r
0
ξt dt =
∫ T
0
ξt1[0,r](t) dt
is a continuous map. Moreover, denoting by f ∗ the Fenchel-Legendre transform of
the convex function f , we have f ∗∗ = f due to the biduality theorem, and so
[0, T ]×KC 3 (r, ξ) 7−→
∫ r
0
f(ξt) dt = sup
ϕ∈L∞
[ ∫ T
0
1[0,r](t)ξtϕt dt−
∫ r
0
f ∗(ϕt) dt
]
;
see, e.g., Theorem 2 in Rockafellar (1968). It follows that this map is lower semi-
continuous as the supremum of continuous maps.
Altogether, it follows that F is lower semicontinuous on the sequentially compact
set K and so admits a minimizer.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.14. We denote Xˆ = Xˆ∗, ξ = ξ∗, ρ = ρ∗. Recall that RT =
X0P
0
0 +
∫ T
0
Xt dP
0
t − 12γX20 −
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt, so for fixed X0 and γ we have E[RT ] =
C − E[∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt] with a constant C.
(i): Assume Xˆ ≥ 0. Since 0 = XT = X0 + Xˆ1{τ1≤ρ} +
∫ T
0
ξt dt ≥ X0 +
∫ T
0
ξt dt,
it follows that
∫ T
0
ξt dt ≤ −X0. By Jensen’s inequality,∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt ≥ Tf
(
−X0
T
)
.
On the other hand, consider the single-update strategy (X˜, ξ˜, ρ˜) with ρ˜ ∈ (0, T ), X˜ ∈
(X0(
ρ˜
T
− 1), 0) and
ξ˜t =
{
−X0
T
if τ1 > ρ˜ ∧ t,
−X0+X˜−τ1
X0
T
T−τ1 if τ1 ≤ ρ˜ ∧ t.
We have that∫ T
0
f(ξ˜t) dt =
∫ T
0
1{τ1≥ρ˜∧t}f
(
−X0
T
)
dt+
∫ T
0
1{τ1<ρ˜∧t}f
(
−X0 + X˜ − τ1
X0
T
T − τ1
)
dt.
Since f is strictly decreasing on (−∞, 0] we have that f
(
−X0+X˜−τ1
X0
T
T−τ1
)
< f
(−X0
T
)
.
Subsequently
∫ T
0
f(ξ˜t) dt ≤ Tf
(−X0
T
)
and
∫ T
0
f(ξ˜t) dt < Tf
(−X0
T
)
for τ1 ≤ ρ˜. Since
P(τ1 ≤ ρ˜) > 0, we have that E[R˜T ] > E[RT ], so Xˆ ≥ 0 cannot be optimal. Hence
Xˆ < 0.
(ii): Assume Xρ ≥ −Xˆ. Consider a strategy (X˜, ξ˜, ρ˜) with X˜ = Xˆ. For ε > 0,
let ρ˜ = ρ + ε. Let furthermore ξ˜ = ξ for τ1 /∈ (ρ, ρ˜]. For τ1 ∈ (ρ, ρ˜], let ξ˜t = ξt on
[0, ρ˜] and ξ˜t = −Xρ˜+XˆT−ρ˜ = −
Xρ(1− εT−ρ )+Xˆ
T−ρ˜ on (ρ˜, T ]. Then
E[RT ]− E[R˜T ] = E
[∫ T
ρ˜
f(ξ˜t)− f(ξt) dt; τ1 ∈ (ρ, ρ˜]
]
= E
[∫ T
ρ˜
f
(
−Xρ(1−
ε
T−ρ) + Xˆ
T − ρ˜
)
− f
(
− Xρ
T − ρ
)
dt; τ1 ∈ (ρ, ρ˜]
]
We have that −Xρ(1−
ε
T−ρ )+Xˆ
T−ρ˜ → −Xρ+XˆT−ρ as ε → 0. By (i) and by assumption, we
have furthermore that − Xρ
T−ρ < −Xρ+XˆT−ρ ≤ 0. Since f is continuous everywhere and
decreasing on (−∞, 0], we conclude that f
(
−Xρ(1−
ε
T−ρ )+Xˆ
T−ρ˜
)
< f
(
− Xρ
T−ρ
)
if ε > 0
is small enough. Thus, E[R˜T ] > E[RT ], contradicting the optimality of ξt. Thus,
Xρ < −Xˆ.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.15. By Proposition 3.4.14, (ii) we have that X∗ρ∗ + Xˆ
∗ < 0
given τ1 ≥ ρ∗. Since X∗t is continuous for t 6= τ1, there is an ε > 0 such that
X∗τ1+ = X
∗
τ1− + Xˆ
∗ < 0 for τ1 ∈ [ρ∗ − ε, ρ∗]. Since X0 > 0 and XT = 0, there is
transaction-triggered price manipulation in this case.
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Proof of Prop. 3.4.16. Xˆt = −Xt and ρ = T is the unique strategy3 such that
E[RT ] = X0P 00 − 12γX20 −E[
∫ τ1∧T
0
f(ξt) dt]. Since f(x) > 0 for all x 6= 0, for all other
dark-pool strategies Xˆt we have that E[RT ] = X0P 00 − 12γX20 − E[
∫ T
0
f(ξt) dt] <
X0P
0
0 − 12γX20 − E[
∫ τ1∧T
0
f(ξt) dt], so the choice Xˆt = −Xt, ρ = T is optimal.
As in Theorem 3.4.13 one can show that the optimal strategy is a single-update
strategy. Thus,
E
[∫ τ1∧T
0
f(ξt) dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
1{τ1>t}f(ξ
0
t ) dt
]
=
∫ T
0
P(τ1 > t)f(ξ0t ) dt
=
∫ T
0
e−θtf(ξ0t ) dt.
By calculus of variations (cf. Cesari (1983) Theorems 2.6.i-iii and 2.20.i) an
optimal strategy X0t := X0+
∫ t
0
ξ0s ds exists and satisfies the Euler-Lagrange equation
θf ′(X˙0t )− f ′′(X˙0t )X¨0t = 0,
i.e. d
dt
f ′(X˙0t ) = θf
′(X˙0t ). The unique solution of this equation is f
′(X˙0t ) = C exp(θt)
with a constant C ∈ R. It follows that sgn(X˙0t ) = sgn(f ′(X˙0t )) = sgn(C exp(θt)) =
sgn(C), i.e. it is constant. That is, there is no transaction-triggered price manipu-
lation.
3Note that we required ρ < T a.s. before. However, this is to ensure that XT+ = 0, which
implies for a non-adaptive Xˆ 6= 0 that ρ < T a.s. However, when Xˆt → 0 for t → T , we can also
allow for ρ = T .
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Chapter 4
Transient Impact for Multiple
Assets
4.1 Introduction
In a market impact model for trading with multiple assets it is important to take
into account the cross impact of the assets, i.e. the impact of trading in one asset
to the other assets. Risk-averse investors will also consider correlation of the assets,
but we restrict ourselves to risk-neutral investors throughout the chapter.
We consider a transient impact model, i.e. a model where a decay kernel describes
the decay of market impact over time. Transient impact was first discussed within
the market impact literature in Bouchaud et al. (2004) and Obizhaeva and Wang
(2013). Gatheral (2010) analyzed different decay kernels and their regularity, in
particular the absence of price manipulation in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl
(2004). In the case of linear transient impact, Alfonsi et al. (2012) analyzed the
regularity of the market impact model in discrete time, whereas Gatheral et al.
(2012) discussed the same setup in continuous time, including the analysis whether
optimal strategies exist in continuous time.
The optimal liquidation problem for multiple assets was analyzed be Konishiy
and Makimoto (2001) in the Almgren-Chriss model (see Almgren and Chriss (2001)).
Furthermore, Scho¨neborn (2011) solved the problem of maximizing expected utility
of the revenues generated by an investor with an Almgren-Chriss impact model for
infinite time horizons using adaptive, i.e. in general non-deterministic strategies. In
case the utility function of the investor has constant absolute risk aversion, Schied
et al. (2010) showed that the optimal strategy is deterministic.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2 the market impact model
and the cost function is presented. Furthermore, we define optimal strategies and
positive definiteness of the decay kernel. In section 4.3 we present our results. At
first, we characterize matrix-valued positive definite functions as Fourier transforms
of nonnegative matrix-valued measures. Then we show that optimal strategies for
symmetric decay kernels are solutions of a linear system of equations. We explain
that the decay kernel should be nonincreasing and nonnegative. In case it is ad-
ditionally symmetric, convex and all one-dimensional versions are nonconstant, it
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follows from the corresponding one-dimensional result that it is strictly positive def-
inite. If every entry of the decay kernel, i.e. every impact and cross impact, decays
at the same speed, we show that the optimal strategy is independent of the impact
structure. That is, in this case the optimal strategy can be computed separately
for each asset. Finally, if the decay kernel is in particular convex and commuting,
we discuss the convergence to continuous time. In section 4.4, we present exam-
ples. First, we treat general linear and exponential decay kernels for two assets. We
study for which parameters they are suitable decay kernels. Then we discuss matrix
functions, i.e. one-dimensional functions applied to matrices. We give an explicit
solution for exponential functions, i.e. a generalized Obizhaeva and Wang (2013)
model for multiple assets. All proofs are presented in the final section 4.5.
4.2 Cost function and positive definiteness
4.2.1 Market impact model
Assume an investor is trading in K assets. At time 0, the investor holds X0 ∈ RK
shares in these assets. In absence of trading of the large investor, the unaffected
price process of these assets is given by a continuous martingale (P 0t )t∈[0,T ] defined
on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) satisfying the usual conditions.
Until a time horizon T > 0, the shares have to be liquidated. To accomplish
this, the investor may trade on a finite set of given deterministic trading times
0 = t1 < t2 < . . . < tN ≤ T with N ∈ N. The size of the trade at time tk is denoted
by ξtk : Ω → RK , where positive values denote buys and negative values denote
sells. We abbreviate ξtk by ξk. We assume ξk to be Ftk-measurable and uniformly
bounded. For t ∈ [0, T ], the number of shares held by the investor is given by
Xt = X0 +
∑
tk<t
ξtk ,
where we require XT+ = 0, or equivalently,
∑N
k=1 ξk = −X0. We call ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN)
the trading strategy of the investor; if ξ is deterministic, we can identify ξ with a
K ×N -real matrix putting ξi in the i-th column of the matrix.
Including the impact of the investor, let the price process be given by
Pt = P
0
t +
∑
tk<t
G(t− tk) ξtk , (4.1)
where the matrix-valued function G : [0,∞) → RK×K , the decay kernel, describes
the decay of the impact. The diagonal of G quantifies the impact of trading an asset
on the price of the same asset, the off-diagonal elements represent the cross impact
on other assets.
4.2.2 Cost function and optimal strategies
Now, we define the cost function of a trading strategy. The definition will be moti-
vated in the sequel by approximation with continuous-time strategies.
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Definition 4.2.1. The cost function C : RK×N → R is given by
C(ξ) =
1
2
N∑
k=1
ξ>k G(0)ξk +
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ>k G(tk − tl)ξl.
Let a discrete-time strategy ξ1, . . . ξN be given. For ε > 0, define its continuous-
time approximation by Xεt = X0+
∑N
n=0 ξtnf
ε
tn(t) where f
ε
s (t) =
1
ε
((t−s)+∧ε). Since
f εs (t) → 1{(s,∞)}(t) for ε ↓ 0, we have limε↓0Xεt = Xt a.s., so the continuous-time
approximation converges to the discrete-time strategy as ε ↓ 0.
For such a trading strategy (Xεt )t∈[0,T+ε] that is absolutely continuous on [0, T+ε]
it is natural to define the revenues of this trading strategy byRε = − ∫ T+ε
0
(P εt )
> dXεt ,
since during an interval [t, t + dt] we buy dXεt shares at a price of P
ε
t . There the
price process P ε is given analogously to (4.1) by P εt = P
0
t +
∫ t
0
G(t− s) dXεs , i.e. we
have limε↓0 P εt = Pt a.s. The costs Cε are given by Rε = X>0 P 00 − Cε, i.e. revenues
of trading are face value X>0 P
0
0 minus costs (note that E[Rε] = X>0 P 00 if there is no
impact, i.e. if G ≡ 0). Thus we have Cε = X>0 P 00 −Rε.
We have the following result, which justifies our definition of the cost function.
Proposition 4.2.2. Let ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN) be a trading strategy. Then
lim
ε↓0
E[Cε] = E[C(ξ)].
Alternatively, the cost function can be derived by assuming that trading at time
tk takes place at the midprice, i.e. at
1
2
(Ptk + Ptk+). That is, the revenues would
by given by R = −∑Nk=1 ξ>k 12(Ptk + Ptk+). With this definition, a direct calculation
yields E[R] = X>0 P 00 − E[C(ξ)].
Finally, we need to define optimal strategies for the investor. If there is a (proba-
bly non-deterministic) strategy ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN) that minimizes E[C(ξ)] in the class
of all strategies such that
∑N
k=1 ξk = X0 for some X0 ∈ RK , then there is also a
minimizer in the class of deterministic strategies. We will assume the investor to be
risk-neutral in the sequel, i.e. the investor aims at minimizing E[C(ξ)]. So we can
concentrate on deterministic strategies only and define optimal strategies as follows.
Definition 4.2.3. An optimal strategy is a deterministic trading strategy ξ ∈ RK×N
that minimizes the cost function C(ξ), given the constraint
∑N
k=1 ξk = −X0.
4.2.3 Positive definiteness
One objective of a market impact model is the computation of optimal strategies.
Furthermore, we expect market impact to be a cost on average and not to be some-
thing profitable. These considerations lead to the following definition.
Definition 4.2.4. We call G positive definite, if C(ξ) ≥ 0 for all N ∈ N, all
ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξN ∈ RK and all 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . < tN . G is called strictly positive
definite, if additionally equality holds only for ξ1 = . . . = ξN = 0.
72 CHAPTER 4. TRANSIENT IMPACT FOR MULTIPLE ASSETS
For K = 1, this is equivalent with the usual definition found in the literature.
In the multidimensional case, i.e. K > 1, we need for equivalence of our definition
to the usual one that G(0) is symmetric or G is continuous in 0. For details see
Definition 4.5.3 and subsequent results.
For positive definite G the costs of any trading strategy are nonnegative, i.e.
there are positive expected liquidation costs as defined in section 2.2.2. If G is even
strictly positive definite, every nontrivial trading strategy has strictly positive costs.
Positive definiteness of G guarantees the existence of optimal strategies:
Proposition 4.2.5. If G is positive definite, there is an optimal strategy. If G is
strictly positive definite, there is a unique optimal strategy.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Characterization of positive definiteness
In this section, we discuss how positive definiteness can be characterized. In partic-
ular, we discuss criteria to decide whether a given function G is positive definite.
For K = 1, continuous positive definite decay kernels are characterized by
Bochner’s Theorem (Bochner (1932)) as the Fourier transform of a nonnegative
Borel measure. In the multivariate case, K > 1, we find an analogous character-
ization as Fourier transform of a complex nonnegative matrix-valued measure as
defined below. Before, we need to define nonnegative matrices.
Definition 4.3.1. We call a real matrix M ∈ Rn×n nonnegative if x>Mx ≥ 0 for
every x ∈ Rn (often this is called positive semidefinite). Furthermore, we call a
complex matrix N ∈ Cn×n nonnegative if y∗Ny ≥ 0 for every y ∈ Cn.
If furthermore x>Mx > 0 for every x 6= 0, M is called strictly positive. Analo-
gously, if y∗Ny > 0 for every y 6= 0, N is called strictly positive.
By S(K) we denote the set of all real symmetric K ×K-matrices and by S+(K)
the cone of all real nonnegative matrices in S(K).
Note that a real matrixM ∈ Rn×n is nonnegative if and only if its symmetrization
1
2
(M +M>) is nonnegative. A nonnegative complex matrix N ∈ Cn×n is necessarily
Hermitian, i.e. N = N∗ = N¯>. A real matrix M ∈ Rn×n is nonnegative as a
complex matrix, i.e. y∗My ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Cn, if and only if it is in S+(n).
Definition 4.3.2. Let B(R) be the Borel sigma-algebra on R. We call a mapping
M : B(R) → CK×K complex nonnegative matrix-valued measure, if M is a measure
(that is, M is σ-additive and M(∅) = 0) and M(E) is nonnegative for every E ∈
B(R).
Theorem 4.3.3. Let G be continuous. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) G is positive definite.
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(b) G is the Fourier transform of a complex nonnegative matrix-valued measure
M , i.e.
G(t) =
∫
R
eiγtM(dγ) for t ≥ 0. (4.2)
The proof uses the fact that G is positive definite if and only if there is a vector-
valued random field such that G is its correlation function. But due Crame´r (1940),
these correlation functions are precisely the Fourier transforms as in part (b). For
Hilbert space operator-valued function the theorem was shown by Naimark (1943).
Now, assume for a moment that G is continuous and positive definite. Thus, we
can characterize G via (4.2). The right-hand side of (4.2) is also well-defined for
t < 0. So we can define G˜ : R→ RK×K by setting
G˜(t) =
∫
R
eiγtM(dγ)
for all t ∈ R. For any t ≥ 0, we then find that
G˜(−t) =
∫
R
e−iγtM(dγ) =
∫
R
eiγtM(dγ) =
∫
R
eiγtM>(dγ) = G(t)>,
since G is real and M(E)
>
= M(E) for every E ∈ B(R), since M(E) is nonnegative.
Furthermore, for any t ≥ 0 we have G˜(t) = G(t). This observation motivates the
following definition.
Definition 4.3.4. Let G : [0,∞) → RK×K . We define the extension of G to R as
G˜ : R→ RK×K given by
G˜(t) =
{
G(−t)> for t < 0
G(t) for t ≥ 0.
Note that in one dimension (i.e. K = 1) the extension of G is simply G˜(t) =
G(|t|).
If the inverse Fourier transform of G˜ exists, then M in (4.2) is the inverse Fourier
transformation of G˜ and necessarily Hermitian. So in view of Theorem 4.3.3, if a
continuous decay kernel G is given with inverse Fourier transformation M of G˜, G
is positive definite if and only if M(E) is nonnegative for all E ∈ B(R).
With this notation, we can rewrite the cost function C in a particular simple
form.
Proposition 4.3.5. For any ξ ∈ RK×N
C(ξ) =
1
2
N∑
k,l=1
ξ>k G˜(tk − tl)ξl. (4.3)
Next, we will consider the special case of symmetric decay kernels G.
Definition 4.3.6. G is called symmetric if G(t) = G(t)> for all t ≥ 0.
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Note that for a symmetric decay kernel G we have G˜(−t) = G˜(t) for all t ∈ R.
Since the (inverse) Fourier transform of a symmetric function is real, M in (4.2) will
become a real measure, as defined in the following.
Definition 4.3.7. Let B(T ) be the Borel sigma-algebra on T ⊂ R. We call M :
B(T ) → RK×K a symmetric nonnegative matrix-valued measure on T , if M is a
measure (that is, M is σ-additive and M(∅) = 0) and M(E) ∈ S+(K) for every
E ∈ B(T ).
In the symmetric case, we can characterize positive definiteness via one-dimensional
functions gζ defined in the following.
Definition 4.3.8. For any ζ ∈ RK , we define the one-dimensional version of G
by gζ : [0,∞) → R, t 7→ ζ>G(t)ζ. Furthermore, gζ is called positive definite if it
satisfies Definition 4.2.4 with K = 1 and G = gζ .
The definition of positive definiteness for gζ is equivalent with the common def-
inition in the literature, i.e. for all N ∈ N, all 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . ≤ tN and all
x1, x2, . . . , xN ∈ R we have
∑N
k,l=1 xkxlg
ζ(|tk − tl|) ≥ 0.
The following theorem is a variant of Theorem 4.3.3 for symmetric decay kernels
G. In this case, the measure M is real symmetric instead of complex Hermitian.
Furthermore, there is a characterization via the one-dimensional functions gζ .
Theorem 4.3.9. Let G be continuous and symmetric. Then the following are equiv-
alent:
(a) G is positive definite.
(b) For all ζ ∈ RK, the function gζ is positive definite.
(c) G is the Fourier transform of a symmetric nonnegative matrix-valued measure
M on R, i.e.
G(t) =
∫
R
eiγtM(dγ).
The characterization via the one-dimensional functions gζ is due to Falb (1969),
from where we also took parts of the proof.
4.3.2 Optimal strategies for symmetric decay kernels
For symmetric decay kernels, an optimal strategy is characterized by a linear system
of equations.
Proposition 4.3.10. Let G be symmetric and (ξ1, . . . ξN) be an optimal strategy.
Then there exists λ ∈ RK such that for all p ∈ {1, . . . , N} we have
N∑
k=1
ξ>k G˜(tk − tp) = λ>. (4.4)
Futhermore, the cost of the strategy is given by C(ξ) = −1
2
λ>X0. Conversely, if G
is symmetric and positive definite and (ξ1, . . . ξN) satisfies (4.4), then (ξ1, . . . ξN) is
an optimal strategy.
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The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.11 in Gatheral et al. (2012). The
method of Lagrange multipliers yields the same result.
If G is strictly positive definite, the unique optimal strategy can also be given
explicitely. Furthermore, we find that the costs of the optimal strategy is a quadratic
form of X0. This is natural since we assume that impact is linear.
Proposition 4.3.11. Let G be symmetric and strictly positive definite. Further-
more, let
L : RK×N → RK×N ,
(ξ1, . . . ξN) 7→
(
N∑
l=1
G˜(t1 − tl)ξl,
N∑
l=1
G˜(t2 − tl)ξl, . . . ,
N∑
l=1
G˜(tN − tl)ξl
)
.
L is invertible, so we can define M : RK → RK , λ 7→ L−1(λ1>N)1N . M is also
invertible, the unique optimal strategy ξ∗ is given by ξ∗ = −L−1(1N(M−1(X0))>)
and its cost is given by C(ξ∗) = 1
2
(M−1(X0))>X0. I.e., the cost is a quadratic form
in X0.
4.3.3 Nonincreasing, nonnegative and convex decay kernels
Not every positive definite function G is a “reasonable” model of the decay of market
impact. In one dimension (K = 1), one assumes that G is nonincreasing and
nonnegative. We assume that it is nonincreasing, since the impact of a trade should
be smaller if there is more time gone since the trade was executed. It should be
nonnegative since a buy trade should move prices up over all time horizons and a
sell trade should move prices down over all time horizons. In fact, one can show
that positive definite and nonincreasing implies nonnegative, cf. Proposition 4.3.15.
Now we want to transfer these concepts to the case of more assets (K > 1).
Let two trades ξ1 and ξ2 at times t1 < t2 be given and assume that they have the
same size, i.e. ξ1 = ξ2 = ξ. Now by inspection of the cost function we observe
that the quantity ξ>G(t2 − t1)ξ is the cost of the impact incurred by the first trade
on the second trade. By the same reasoning as in the one-dimensional case, this
quantity should be nonnegative and nonincreasing in t2− t1. Recalling the notation
in Definition 4.3.8 this motivates the following definition.
Definition 4.3.12. A matrix-valued function G : [0,∞)→ RK×K is called
(a) nonincreasing, if for every ζ ∈ RK the function gζ is nonincreasing,
(b) nonnegative, if for every ζ ∈ RK and every t ∈ [0,∞) we have gζ(t) ≥ 0, i.e. if
G(t) is a nonnegative matrix for all t ∈ [0,∞),
(c) (strictly) convex, if for all ζ ∈ RK the function gζ is (strictly) convex,
Note that the properties introduced in the preceding definition depend only on
the symmetric part of G.
In Propositions 4.5.11 and 4.5.13 we give characterizations of nonincreasing and
convex functions for general functions G. If G is smooth, these results simplify to
the following statement.
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Proposition 4.3.13. (a) Let G be absolutely continuous with (component-wise)
derivative G′. G is nonincreasing if and only if −G′(t) is nonnegative for
almost all t ≥ 0.
(b) Let G be twice continuously differentiable. G is convex if and only if G′′(t) is
nonnegative for all t ≥ 0, where G′′ is the second derivative of G.
If G is nonincreasing, nonnegative, and convex, then so is the function gζ for each
ζ ∈ RK . Hence, gζ is a positive definite function due to a criterion sometimes called
“Po´lya criterion” after Po´lya (1949), although this fact is also an easy consequence
of the much older work of Young (1913). It therefore follows from Theorem 4.3.9
that the matrix-valued function G is also positive definite as soon as it is symmetric.
In fact, a stronger result is possible: G is even strictly positive definite as soon as
gζ is nonconstant for each nonzero ζ ∈ RK .
Theorem 4.3.14. Suppose that G is nonnegative, nonincreasing, convex and sym-
metric. When gζ is nonconstant for each nonzero ζ ∈ RK, then G is strictly positive
definite.
Finally, we show that G being nonnegative follows from being positive definite
and nonincreasing. In fact, this is a result for one-dimensional functions, but since
nonincreasing and nonnegative are characterized fully by one-dimensional versions
of G, the result carries over to the multi-dimensional case.
Proposition 4.3.15. If G is positive definite and nonincreasing, then G is nonneg-
ative.
4.3.4 Transformations of the decay kernel
In this section we discuss certain transformations of the decay kernel G. We are
interested whether the resulting transformed decay kernel is positive definite and
how optimal strategies change. We begin with a result on decay kernels with equal
decay speed in every component, i.e. that consist of a one-dimensional decay kernel
and a “co-impact” matrix.
Proposition 4.3.16. Let L ∈ RK×K be a symmetric and strictly positive matrix
and g : [0,∞) → R a strictly positive definite function. Then G1(t) = Lg(t) is
strictly positive definite, and the optimal strategy is also an optimal strategy for
G2(t) = L˜g(t) for any strictly positive definite symmetric L˜ ∈ RK×K, i.e. the optimal
strategy does not depend on L.
So the optimal strategy only depends on the one-dimensional decay function g
and not on the “co-impact” matrix L, i.e. the the optimal strategy can be computed
independently for every asset by observing that we can take the identity matrix for
L˜. The optimal strategy in one asset will be a multiple of the optimal strategies for
the other assets depending solely on the initial position in this asset. This implies
that cross impact does not have to be considered in this case. Cross impact is only
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relevant when decay speeds are different. Though, correlation will be relevant for
risk-averse investors.
For linear transformations of the decay kernel, there is a similar result concerning
the optimal strategies.
Proposition 4.3.17. Let 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . < tN be given, let G1 be symmetric and
strictly positive definite and ξ(1) = (ξ
(1)
1 , . . . , ξ
(1)
N ) be the associated optimal strategy.
Let L ∈ RK×K such that G2(t) = G1(t)L is symmetric and strictly positive definite.
Then the optimal strategy for G2 is ξ
(1).
Note that the assumption that G2 has to be symmetric and strictly positive
definite is very strong. For example, symmetry of G2 implies that G1(t)L = L
>G1(t)
for all t ≥ 0.
Next, a congruence transform of a positive definite decay kernel remains positive
definite, but the optimal strategy changes.
Proposition 4.3.18. Let G1 be a (strictly) positive definite decay kernel, L be an
invertible K ×K matrix, 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . < tN be given, and ξ(1) = (ξ(1)1 , . . . , ξ(1)N )
be a corresponding optimal strategy for G1 such that
∑N
k=1 ξ
(1)
k = X0. The decay
kernel G2(t) := L
>G1(t)L is also (strictly) positive definite. Moreover, ξ(2) :=
(L−1ξ(1)1 , . . . , L
−1ξ(1)N ) is an optimal strategy for G2 such that
∑N
k=1 ξ
(2)
k = L
−1X0.
Finally, the transpose of a positive definite decay kernel is positive definite and
any convex combination. In particular, the symmetrization of any positive definite
decay kernel is positive definite.
Proposition 4.3.19. If G is (strictly) positive definite, its transpose t 7→ G(t)> and
every convex combination t 7→ αG(t) + (1 − α)G(t)> (with α ∈ [0, 1]) is (strictly)
positive definite. In particular, the symmetrization t 7→ 1
2
(G(t) +G(t)>) is (strictly)
positive definite.
4.3.5 Commuting decay kernels
We will now discuss the class of decay kernels that are commuting. With this
property we discuss convergence of optimal strategies to continuous time.
Definition 4.3.20. A decay kernel G : [0,∞) → RK×K is called commuting if
G(t)G(s) = G(s)G(t) holds for all s, t ≥ 0.
If the decay kernel is commuting, it may be simultaneously diagonalized as set
out in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.21. A symmetric decay kernel G is commuting if and only if there
exists an orthogonal matrix O and functions g1, . . . , gK : [0,∞)→ R such that
G(t) = O>diag(g1(t), . . . , gK(t))O. (4.5)
The properties of G are characterized via the one-dimensional functions gi.
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Proposition 4.3.22. Let G be a symmetric and commuting decay kernel, and let
O and g1, . . . , gK be as in Lemma 4.3.21.
(a) G is (strictly) positive definite if and only if the functions t 7→ gi(t) are all
(strictly) positive definite for all i.
(b) G is nonnegative if and only if gi(t) ≥ 0 for all i and t.
(c) G is nonincreasing if and only if gi is nonincreasing for all i.
(d) G is convex if and only if gi is convex for all i.
Remark 4.3.23. The preceding proposition characterizes when a symmetric and com-
muting decay kernel admits optimal strategies. These strategies can be computed
by means of Proposition 4.3.18. More precisely, write X0 as X0 =
∑K
i=1 µivi, where
µi ∈ R and v1, . . . , vK ∈ RK are the (transposed) rows of O. That is, we have
(µ1, . . . , µk)
> = OX0. Let ξ˜i = (ξ˜i1, . . . , ξ˜
i
N) be a one-dimensional optimal strategy
for the initial position µi and the one-dimensional decay kernel gi(t) = g
vi(t), and
set
ξj := O
>(ξ˜1j , . . . , ξ˜
K
j )
>.
Then ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN) is an optimal strategy for X0 and G.
The next result is an extension of Theorem 1 in Alfonsi et al. (2012).
Proposition 4.3.24. Let G be a symmetric, nonnegative, nonincreasing, convex
and commuting decay kernel. Then there exists an orthonormal basis v1, . . . , vK of
RK such that, for given 0 = t1 < t2 < · · · < tN , each initial portfolio of the form
X0 = vi admits an optimal strategy ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN) whose components are such that
ξknξ
k
m ≥ 0 for all k, n, and m.
For K = 1, the statement simplifies to Theorem 1 in Alfonsi et al. (2012), i.e.
for any nonnegative, nonincreasing and convex decay kernel we have ξnξm ≥ 0 for
an optimal strategy ξ and every n,m. Note that in case K = 1 every decay kernel
is symmetric and commuting.
It follows from the preceding proposition that the variation of optimal strategies
is uniformly bounded independent of the number of trades N . Note that it is open
whether commuting is a necessary condition in Proposition 4.3.25.
Proposition 4.3.25 (Bounded variation for optimal strategies). If G is symmetric,
nonnegative, nonincreasing, convex and commuting, then there is a constant C > 0
independent of N ∈ N and 0 ≤ t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tN ≤ T such that for an optimal strategy
ξ we have that
∑N
n=1 ‖ξn‖1 < C.
4.3.6 Continuous-time strategies
Commuting decay kernels as in the last section are of particular interest since we
can show existence of optimal strategies in continuous time for them. Following
Gatheral et al. (2012), in continuous time we require a strategy X = (Xt)t≥0 to
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be leftcontinuous and adapted, with finite and uniformly bounded variation and we
require XT+ = 0. The price process is then given by
Pt = P
0
t +
∫
[0,t)
G(t− s) dXs
and the cost function is given by
C(X) =
∫
[0,T ]
(∫
[0,t)
G(t− s) dXs
)>
dXt +
1
2
∑
t∈[0,T ]
∆X>t G(0)∆Xt
=
1
2
∫
[0,T ]
(∫
[0,T ]
G˜(t− s) dXs
)>
dXt.
For strategies that consist only of finitely many jumps, i.e. discrete-time strategies,
it is easily seen that these definitions are equivalent to those used throughout this
chapter.
To show existence of optimal strategies in continuous time, let G satisfy the
requirements of Proposition 4.3.24 and let X0 = vi with a vi from Proposition
4.3.24. As in the proof in Theorem 2.20 in Gatheral et al. (2012) it follows that a
continuous-time optimal strategy exists. For more general X0 note that the optimal
strategy is linear in X0, so continuous-time optimal strategies exist for them as well.
4.4 Examples
4.4.1 Linear and exponential decay for two assets
In this section, we study to examples for K = 2 assets. We will discuss linear decay
of impact and exponential decay of impact. These are the two most tractable and
simple forms of impact. We allow for general forms of these impacts and check
under which conditions the decay kernel G is nonnegative, nonincreasing, convex or
positive definite. Finally we study an example with exponential decay and show an
optimal strategy.
First we study linear decay of impact. Note that the positive definiteness of
similar decay kernels is analyzed in a more general setup in Bevilacqua et al. (2012).
Proposition 4.4.1. Let
G(t) =
(
(a11 − b11t)+ (a12 − b12t)+
(a21 − b21t)+ (a22 − b22t)+
)
with a11, a12, a21, a22, b11, b12, b21, b22 > 0.
(a) G is nonnegative if and only if max{a12
b12
, a21
b21
} ≤ min{a11
b11
, a22
b22
} and 1
4
(a12 +
a21)
2 ≤ a11a22.
(b) G is nonincreasing if and only if max{a12
b12
, a21
b21
} ≤ min{a11
b11
, a22
b22
} and 1
4
(b12 +
b21)
2 ≤ b11b22.
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(c) Let max{a12
b12
, a21
b21
} ≤ min{a11
b11
, a22
b22
}. Then G is positive definite if and only if G
is symmetric (i.e. a12 = a21 and b12 = b21),
a11
b11
= a12
b12
= a22
b22
and b212 ≤ b11b22.
(d) G is nonnegative and positive definite if and only if it is symmetric, a11
b11
=
a12
b12
= a22
b22
, a212 ≤ a11a22 and b212 ≤ b11b22. In this case, G is also nonincreasing
and convex.
(e) If G is symmetric and a11
b11
= a12
b12
= a22
b22
, G is commuting if and only if a12(b11−
b22) = b12(a11 − a22).
Next, we study component-wise exponential decay of impact.
Proposition 4.4.2. Let
G(t) =
(
a11 exp(−b11t) a12 exp(−b12t)
a21 exp(−b21t) a22 exp(−b22t)
)
with a11, a12, a21, a22, b11, b12, b21, b22 > 0.
(a) G is nonnegative if and only if min{b12, b21} ≥ 12(b11 + b22) and 14(a12 +a21)2 ≤
a11a22.
(b) G is nonincreasing if and only if min{b12, b21} ≥ 12(b11 + b22) and 14(a12b12 +
a21b21)
2 ≤ a11b11a22b22.
(c) G is convex if and only if min{b12, b21} ≥ 12(b11+b22) and 14(a12b212+a21b221)2 ≤
a11b
2
11a22b
2
22.
(d) Let G be nonincreasing, a12 = a21 and b
2
11 + b
2
22 ≤ b212 + b221. Then G is positive
definite.
(e) G is commuting if and only if either b11 = b12 = b21 = b22, or b11 = b22 and
b12 = b21 and a11 = a22.
For the following simpler decay kernel, the results follow immediately from the
preceding proposition.
Corollary 4.4.3. Let ρ, κ, κ˜ > 0 and
G(t) =
(
exp(−κt) ρ exp(−κ˜t)
ρ exp(−κ˜t) exp(−κt)
)
.
(a) G is nonnegative if and only if κ
κ˜
≤ 1 and ρ ≤ 1.
(b) G is nonincreasing if and only if ρ ≤ κ
κ˜
≤ 1.
(c) G is convex if and only if ρ ≤ κ2
κ˜2
≤ κ
κ˜
≤ 1.
(d) If G is nonincreasing, G is positive definite. In this case, it is also nonnegative.
(e) G is commuting.
4.4. EXAMPLES 81
Example 4.4.4. Let G as in Corollary 4.4.3 with κ = 1, κ˜ = 1.8, ρ = 0.3. Since
ρ ≤ κ2
κ˜2
≤ 1, G is convex. In Figure 4.1 an example for an optimal strategy with this
decay kernel G is plotted. It can be seen that the optimal strategy switches from
selling to buying in between. In the one-dimensional case, in Theorem 1 in Alfonsi
et al. (2012) it is proven that for convex decay kernels there is no transaction-
triggered price manipulation, i.e. an optimal strategy does not switch between
buying and selling but is monotone. The example shows that such a result does not
hold in the multivariate case with multiple assets. However, in Proposition 4.3.25
we find a bound on the variation of the optimal strategy which excludes a behavior
as in Example 4 in Alfonsi et al. (2012).
Proposition 4.4.5. Let
G(t) =
(
exp(−t ∧ 1) 1
8
exp(−2(t ∧ 1))
1
8
exp(−3(t ∧ 1)) exp(−t ∧ 1)
)
.
G is continuous, convex, nonincreasing and nonnegative, but not positive definite.
This shows that we need symmetry in Theorem 4.3.14. Furthermore, the char-
acterization via one-dimensional functions g as in part (b) of Theorem 4.3.9 does
not hold in the nonsymmetric case.
4.4.2 Matrix functions
We are now going to discuss a special situation in which commuting decay kernels
arise in a natural manner. To this end, let g : [0,∞)→ R a function and B ∈ S+(K)
be a nonnegative symmetric matrix. Then there exists an orthogonal matrix O such
that B = O>diag(ρ1, . . . , ρK)O, where ρ1, . . . , ρK ≥ 0 are the eigenvalues of B. As
usual, the matrix g(B) ∈ S(K) is defined as g(B) := O>diag(g(ρ1), . . . , g(ρK))O;
see, e.g., Donoghue (1974). We can thus define a matrix-valued function G :
[0,∞)→ S(K) by
G(t) = g(tB) = O>diag(g(tρ1), . . . , g(tρK))O, t ≥ 0. (4.6)
Clearly, G is commuting. Moreover, it is of the form (4.5) with gi(t) = g(tρi),
and so Proposition 4.3.22 characterizes the properties of G. If g : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is
nonincreasing, convex and not constant, it follows immediately from Theorem 4.3.14
and Proposition 4.3.22 that G is strictly positive definite.
Example 4.4.6 (Matrix exponentials). Here we extend the discrete-time model of
Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) and the results of Alfonsi et al. (2008) to a multivariate
setting. For B = O>diag(ρ1, . . . , ρK)O ∈ S+(K), the matrix exponential,
G(t) = exp(−tB),
is of the form (4.6) with g(t) = e−t. It follows that G is nonnegative, nonincreasing,
and convex. In particular, G is positive definite. When B is strictly positive, as we
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Figure 4.1: Optimal strategy ξ for Example 4.4.4 with X0 = (−50, 1)>, T = 5, N =
11. Top: ξ11 , . . . ξ
1
11, bottom: ξ
2
1 , . . . , ξ
2
11.
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will assume from now on, G is even strictly positive definite. We now compute the
optimal strategy ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN) for an initial portfolio X0 ∈ RK and time points
0 = t1 < t2 < · · · < tN . To this end, we proceed as in Remark 4.3.23 and the proof
of Proposition 4.3.24 and first compute the optimal strategy (xi1, . . . , x
i
N) for the
initial position yi and for the one-dimensional decay kernel gi(t) = e
−tρi . Theorem
3.1 in Alfonsi et al. (2008) implies that, with the notations
ain := e
−(tn−tn−1)ρi and λi :=
−yi
2
1+ai2
+
∑N
n=3
1−ain
1+ain
,
the optimal strategy (xi1, . . . , x
i
N) is given by the initial market order is
xi1 =
λi
1 + ai2
, xin = λi
( 1
1 + ain
− a
i
n+1
1 + ain+1
)
for n = 2, . . . , N − 1, and xiN =
λi
1 + aiN
.
Using the recipe of Remark 4.3.23 we can now compute the optimal strategy ξ.
Consider the optimal strategy ξ˜ for the decay kernel diag(exp(−ρ1t), . . . , exp(−ρKt))
and initial position OX0. When defining
Qn = diag(exp(−ρ1(tn − tn−1)), . . . , exp(−ρK(tn − tn−1)))
and λ˜ = −
(
2(Id +Q2)
−1 +
∑N
n=3(Id−Qn)(Id +Qn)−1
)−1
OX0, the optimal strat-
egy is given by ξ˜1 = (1 + Q2)
−1λ˜, ξ˜n = (Id + Qn)−1λ − Qn+1(Id + Qn+1)−1λ for
n = 2, . . . , N − 1 and ξ˜n = (Id + QN)−1λ. By Remark 4.3.23, the optimal strategy
for G and X0 is now given by ξ = O
T ξ˜.
To remove O from these expressions, define An = e
−(tn−tn−1)B = O>QnO and
λ := −
[
2
(
Id + A2
)−1
+
N∑
i=3
(
Id− Ai
)(
Id + Ai
)−1]−1
X0.
By observing that (Id + An)
−1 = O>(Id + Qn)−1O and subsequently λ = O>λ˜,
we find that the components of the optimal stratey ξ are
ξ1 =
(
Id + A2
)−1
λ,
ξn =
(
Id + An
)−1
λ− An+1
(
Id + An+1
)−1
λ for n = 2, . . . , N − 1,
ξN =
(
Id + AN
)−1
λ.
Let us finally consider the situation of an equidistant time grid, ti =
i−1
N−1 . In this
case, all matrices Ai are equal to a single matrix A. Our formula for λ then becomes
λ = −(Id + A)
(
NId− (N − 2)A
)−1
X0
The formula for the optimal strategy thus simplifies to
ξ1 = −
(
NId− (N − 2)A
)−1
X0,
ξi = (Id− A)ξ1, for i = 2, . . . , N − 1,
ξN = ξ1.
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Example 4.4.7 (Completely monotone decay). Let µ be a Borel measure on the
set of symmetric nonnegative definite K ×K matrices. Then the function
G(t) :=
∫
e−tB µ(dB) (4.7)
can be regarded as a matrix-valued completely monotone function. It is also a
mixture of the matrix exponential functions from Example 4.4.6 and thus inherits
the properties of being symmetric, positive definite, nonincreasing, and convex. It
therefore is positive definite.
These completely monotone functions can be characterized by a generalized
Hausdorff-Bernstein-Widder Theorem, i.e. they can be represented as the Laplace
transform of a nonnegative matrix-valued measure.
Theorem 4.4.8 (Hausdorff-Bernstein-Widder Theorem for matrix-valued functions).
Let G : [0,∞)→ RK×K be symmetric. It is equivalent:
(a) G is completely monotone, i.e. continuous on [0,∞), infinitely differentiable
on (0,∞) and (−1)nG(n)(t) be nonnegative for all n = 0, 1, . . . and t > 0.
(b) There is a symmetric nonnegative matrix-valued measure M such that
G(t) =
∫ ∞
0
e−txM(dx). (4.8)
(c) There is a Borel measure µ on the set of symmetric nonnegative definite K×K
matrices such that (4.7) holds.
Remark 4.4.9. Note the difference in the representations (4.7) and (4.8). Given
a representation (4.7), we give the corresponding representation (4.8) in the fol-
lowing. Note that the (simpler) other way round is presented in the proof. Since
µ =
∫
δBµ(dB), we will restrict ourselves for simplicity to simple measures µ(dB) =
δA(dB) with A ∈ S+(K), i.e. µ(E) = 1{A∈E}A. So G(t) = e−tA = O>e−tDO with a
diagonal matrix D = diag(d1, . . . , dK). We can also write D = diag(d1, 0, . . . , 0) +
diag(0, d2, 0, . . . , 0)+ . . .+diag(0, . . . , 0, dK) and we thus easily see that the measure
M in (4.8) isM(dx) = O>diag(1, 0, . . . , 0)O δd1(dx)+O
>diag(0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)O δd2(dx)+
. . .+O>diag(0, . . . , 0, 1)O δdK (dx).
We now provide a short discussion of decay kernels that arise by applying a ma-
trix function to a nonsymmetric matrix B. For the sake of simplicity, we concentrate
on the case in which B is a 2× 2 Jordan block of the form
B =
(
b 1
0 b
)
,
where b > 0. Assume that f : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is analytic, i.e. we have f(x) =∑∞
n=0 f
(n)(0)xn. In this case we can define f(M) =
∑∞
n=0 f
(n)(0)Mn for any quadratic
matrix M , if the series converges. For t ≥ 0, we now set
G(t) := f(tB) =
(
f(tb) tf ′(tb)
0 f(tb)
)
.
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Let us suppose next that f satisfies f(t)→ 0 and f ′(t)→ 0 for t ↑ ∞. Furthermore
assume that f ′′ is integrable on [0,∞). Then
f(t) =
∫ ∞
0
(x− t)+f ′′(x) dx and f ′(t) = −
∫ ∞
t
f ′′(x) dx. (4.9)
It follows that
G˜(t) =
∫ ∞
0
(
(x− |t|b)+ −t1{0<t<x/b}
t1{0>t>−x/b} (x− |t|b)+
)
f ′′(x) dx. (4.10)
As a function of t, (x−|t|b)+ is the Fourier transform of z 7→ b
piz2
(1−cos(xz/b)); see,
e.g., Lemma 4.2 in Gatheral et al. (2012). Using the software Mathematica we found
that −t1{{0<t<x/b}} is the Fourier transform of z 7→ 1piz2 (1 − e−ixz/b(1 + ixz/b)). It
follows that it can be represented as the Fourier transform of the following function
M(z), which takes values in the set of Hermitian matrices:
M(z) =
1
piz2
∫ ∞
0
(
b(1− cos(xz/b)) 1
2
(1− e−ixz/b(1 + ixz/b))
1
2
(1− eixz/b(1− ixz/b)) b(1− cos(xz/b))
)
f ′′(x) dx.
(4.11)
This representation is quite similar to the one in Proposition 4.5.14, but there is
also a significant difference: the integrand matrix is in general not nonnegative. To
see this, it is sufficient to compute its determinant:
6b4 + 2b
(
b3 cos
(
2xz
b
)
+ (b− 4b3) cos (xz
b
)
+ xz sin
(
xz
b
))− 2b2 − x2z2
4b2
,
which is negative for sufficiently large xz.
Example 4.4.10 (Nonsymmetric matrix exponential decay). Let f(t) = e−t so that
G(t) = e−tB =
(
exp(−tb) −t exp(−tb)
0 exp(−tb).
)
G is not symmetric, not nonnegative, not nonincreasing and not convex. But G
is positive definite if and only if b ≥ 1/2. To see this, we integrate (4.11) with
f ′′(x) = e−x and get
M(z) =
1
pi
(
b
b2+z2
1
2(z−ib)2
1
2(ib+z)2
b
b2+z2
)
.
We have
detM(z) =
4b2 − 1
4(b2 + z2)2
,
so M(z) is nonnegative if and only if b ≥ 1/2.
Example 4.4.11 (Nonsymmetric power law decay). Let f(t) = (c+t)−α for c, α > 0.
Then
G(t) = f(tB) =
(
(c+ tb)−α −αt(c+ tb)−α−1
0 (c+ tb)−α
)
.
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For ζ = (ζ1, ζ2) ∈ R2 we have
gζ(t) = (c+ tb)−α
(
ζ21 + ζ
2
2 −
αt
c+ tb
ζ1ζ2
)
.
Hence, G is nonnegative if and only if α ≤ 2b, nonincreasing if and only if α ≤ 2b
and b ≥ 1
2
and convex if and only if α ≤ 2b and b ≥ 1.
4.4.3 Exponential decay in continuous time
The conditions of Proposition 4.3.24 are clearly satisfied when G(t) = e−tB as in
Example 4.4.6, and so optimal strategies exist also in continuous time for this decay
kernel. In fact, for every X0 ∈ RK the corresponding optimal strategy over the
interval [0, T ] can be given in closed form. To this end, recall first that B is assumed
to be symmetric and nonnegative, so that the matrix C := 2Id + TB is symmetric
and strictly positive definite, hence invertible. We will show below that the unique
optimal strategy is then given by
X∗t = (Id + (T − t)B)C−1X0, 0 < t < T,
which extends the main result from Obizhaeva and Wang (2013). Since X∗ satisfies
the side conditions X∗0 = X0 and X
∗
T = 0, the strategy X
∗ must have the following
initial and terminal jumps:
∆X∗0 = (Id + TB)C
−1X0 −X0 = (Id + TB − C)C−1X0 = −C−1X0
and
∆X∗T = −C−1X0.
We therefore have
dX∗t = −(Id δ0(dt) +B dt+ Id δT (dt))C−1X0. (4.12)
To check that this is indeed the unique optimal strategy, we use the fact that
d
ds
e−sB = −e−sBB and compute from (4.12) that∫
[0,T ]
e−|t−s|B dX∗s
= −
(
e−tB +
∫ t
0
e−(t−s)BB ds+
∫ T
t
e−(s−t)BB ds+ e−(T−t)B
)
C−1X0
= −2C−1X0,
independently of t ∈ [0, T ]. An analogon to Proposition 4.3.10 holds in continuous
time, see Theorem 2.11 in Gatheral et al. (2012). Thus, X∗ is indeed optimal. This
argument extends the one from Example 2.12 in Gatheral et al. (2012).
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4.5 Proofs
Proof of Prop. 4.2.2. For ε ≤ mink∈{1,...,N−1}(tk+1 − tk)
Rε = −
∫ T+ε
0
(P εt )
> dXεt
= −
∫ T+ε
0
(P 0t )
> dXεt −
N∑
k=1
∫ tk+ε
tk
(∫ t
0
G(t− s) dXεs
)>
ξk
1
ε
dt
= −
∫ T+ε
0
(P 0t )
> dXεt
−
N∑
k=1
∫ tk+ε
tk
(
k−1∑
l=1
∫ tl+ε
tl
G(t− s)ξl 1
ε
ds+
∫ t
tk
G(t− s)ξk 1
ε
ds
)>
ξk
1
ε
dt
= −
∫ T+ε
0
(P 0t )
> dXεt −
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
1
ε2
ξ>k
(∫ tk+ε
tk
∫ tl+ε
tl
G(t− s) ds dt
)
ξl
−
N∑
k=1
1
ε2
ξ>k
(∫ tk+ε
tk
∫ t
tk
G(t− s) ds dt
)
ξk.
Integration by parts yields − ∫ T+ε
0
(P 0t )
> dXεt = X
>
0 P
0
0−X>T+εP 0T+ε+
∫ T+ε
0
(Xεt )
> dP 0t .
Since XT+ε = 0 and P
0 is a martingale, we find E[− ∫ T+ε
0
(P 0t )
> dXεt ] = X
>
0 P
0
0 .
Furthermore,
lim
ε↓0
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
1
ε2
ξ>k
(∫ tk+ε
tk
∫ tl+ε
tl
G(t− s) ds dt
)
ξl =
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ>k G(tk − tl)ξl
and limε↓0
∑N
k=1
1
ε2
ξ>k
(∫ tk+ε
tk
∫ t
tk
G(t− s) ds dt
)
ξk =
1
2
ξ>k G(0)ξk, so by dominated
convergence the result follows.
Now we prepare for the proof of Proposition 4.2.5. We need to prove Proposition
4.3.5 first. Then we show a relation between positive definiteness of G and convexity
of C. Furthermore, we show that C can be represented as a quadratic form with
respect to a scalar product.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.5. We can write
C(ξ) =
1
2
N∑
k=1
k∑
l=k
ξ>k G˜(tk−tl)ξl+
1
2
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ>k G˜(tk−tl)ξl+
1
2
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=k+1
ξ>l G˜(tl−tk)ξk.
Since ξ>l G˜(tl − tk)ξk = ξ>k G˜(tl − tk)>ξl = ξ>k G˜(tk − tl)ξl, the result follows. Note
that in the last equality, we used tk− tl 6= 0 for l > k. If this would not be required,
it is sufficient to have G(0) = G(0)>, since in this case G(tl − tk)> = G(tk − tl) is
also true for tk = tl.
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Proposition 4.5.1. G is (strictly) positive definite if and only if C is (strictly)
convex.
Proof. We define the bilinear form C(ξ˜, ξˆ) := 1
2
∑N
i,j=1 ξ˜
>
i G˜(ti − tj)ξˆj, so by Propo-
sition 4.3.5 it is C(ξ) = C(ξ, ξ). G is positive definite if and only if we have
C(ξ˜ − ξˆ) = C(ξ˜) − C(ξ˜, ξˆ) − C(ξˆ, ξ˜) + C(ξˆ) ≥ 0 for all ξ˜, ξˆ. If t ∈ (0, 1), this is
equivalent to
C(tξ˜ + (1− t)ξˆ) = t2C(ξ˜) + t(1− t)C(ξ˜, ξˆ) + t(1− t)C(ξˆ, ξ˜) + (1− t)2C(ξˆ)
≤ tC(ξ˜) + (1− t)C(ξˆ),
which is the definition of convexity. Equivalence of strict convexity and strictly
positive definiteness of C follows analogously.
Remark 4.5.2. For A,B ∈ RK×N , let 〈A,B〉 = tr(A>B) = ∑Kk=1∑Nl=1 ak,lbk,l be the
Hilbert-Schmidt inner product on RK×N . We can arrange the vectors ξ1, . . . ξN ∈ RK
as a matrix ξ ∈ RK×N , where we denote by ξi the ith column of ξ. If we define the
linear operator L on RK×N by
L(ξ) =
(
N∑
l=1
G˜(t1 − tl)ξl,
N∑
l=1
G˜(t2 − tl)ξl, . . . ,
N∑
l=1
G˜(tN − tl)ξl
)
,
we have C(ξ) = 1
2
〈ξ, L(ξ)〉. Note that L is self-adjoint.
Proof of Prop. 4.2.5. By Remark 4.5.2, we can write C(ξ) = 〈ξ, L(ξ)〉. Since L
is self-adjoint, there exists an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors v1, . . . vK·N with
eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λK·N of L. If G is positive definite, then all eigenvalues are
nonnegative. Let the eigenvalues be ordered such that λ1 = . . . = λi−1 = 0 and
λi ≤ . . . ≤ λK·N . The affine space of admissible strategies is denoted by A =
{ξ ∈ RK×N |∑Nk=1 ξk = −X0}. With the representation ξ = ∑K·Nn=1 cnvn, we have
that ‖ξ‖L = 〈ξ, L(ξ)〉 =
∑K·N
n=i λnc
2
n is a seminorm, and a norm on the quotient
space RK×N/ span(v1, . . . , vi−1). Obviously a minimizer of minξ∈A ‖ξ‖L exists in
RK×N/ span(v1, . . . , vi−1), which leads also to a minimizer of the original problem.
WhenG is even strictly positive definite, C is strictly convex by Proposition 4.5.1.
This yields immediately the uniqueness of optimal strategies.
We prepare now for the proof of Theorem 4.3.3. First, we have to check under
which conditions our definition of positive definiteness is equivalent to the common
definition in the literature, which we call “complex positive definiteness”. It will
turn out that these definitions are equivalent if and only if G(0) is symmetric. But
if G is continuous and positive definite, G(0) is necessarily symmetric. So both
definitions are equivalent if G is continuous.
Definition 4.5.3. A function H : R→ CK×K is called complex positive definite, if
N∑
k,l=1
ξ∗H(tk − tl)ξl ≥ 0
for all N ∈ N, all ξ1, . . . ξN ∈ CK and all t1, . . . , tN ∈ R. We call H strictly complex
positive definite, if additionally equality holds only for ξ1 = . . . = ξN = 0.
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The next result is well known.
Proposition 4.5.4. Let H : R→ CK×K be complex positive definite. Then
(a) H(0) is positive definite.
(b) H(t) = H(−t)∗ for all t ∈ R.
Proof. (a) follows from N = 1.
To show (b), choose N = 2 and t2 = t1 + t. It follows immediately that for
every ξ1, ξ2 ∈ CK we need to have ξ∗1H(−t)ξ2 + ξ∗2H(t)ξ1 ∈ R. Let ξ1 = c1ei and
ξ2 = c2ej with c1, c2 ∈ C and i, j ∈ N. It follows that c1c2Hij(t) + c1c2Hji(t) ∈ R.
Choosing c1 = c2 = 1 yields Im(Hij(t)) = − Im(Hji(t)) and c1 = 1, c2 = i yields
Re(Hij(t)) = Re(Hji(t)). So (b) is shown.
Proposition 4.5.5. Let G : [0,∞)→ RK×K. The following are equivalent:
(a) G is (strictly) positive definite and G(0) is symmetric.
(b) G˜ is (strictly) complex positive definite.
Proof. (b)⇒(a) follows with Proposition 4.5.4(a). So it remains to show (a)⇒(b).
Let G be positive definite and G(0) be symmetric. Let furthermore N ∈ N,
ξ1, . . . , ξN ∈ CK and t1, . . . , tN ∈ R. We have
N∑
k,l=1
ξ∗kG˜(tk − tl)ξl =
=
N∑
k,l=1
(Re(ξk)− i Im(ξk))>G˜(tk − tl)(Re(ξl) + i Im(ξl))
=
N∑
k,l=1
Re(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Re(ξl) +
N∑
k,l=1
Im(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Im(ξl)
+i
(
−
N∑
k,l=1
Im(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Re(ξl) +
N∑
k,l=1
Re(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Im(ξl)
)
.
Because of the symmetry of G(0) we know that for all tk, tl ∈ R we have G˜(tk −
tl)
> = G˜(tl− tk), and thus, Re(ξk)>G˜(tk− tl) Im(ξl) = (Re(ξk)>G˜(tk− tl) Im(ξl))> =
Im(ξl)
>G˜(tk − tl)>Re(ξk) = Im(ξl)>G˜(tl − tk) Re(ξk). So
−
N∑
k,l=1
Im(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Re(ξl) +
N∑
k,l=1
Re(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Im(ξl)
= −
N∑
k,l=1
Im(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Re(ξl) +
N∑
k,l=1
Im(ξl)
>G˜(tl − tk) Re(ξk)
= −
N∑
k,l=1
Im(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Re(ξl) +
N∑
k,l=1
Im(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Re(ξl)
= 0.
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So we find that
N∑
k,l=1
ξ∗kG˜(tk − tl)ξl =
N∑
k,l=1
Re(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Re(ξl) +
N∑
k,l=1
Im(ξk)
>G˜(tk − tl) Im(ξl).
With Proposition 4.3.5 it follows that
N∑
k,l=1
ξ∗kG˜(tk − tl)ξl = 2C(Re(ξ)) + 2C(Im(ξ)).
Note that we can apply this result also if tk = tl for k 6= l due to our assumption
G(0) = G(0)>, see the proof of Proposition 4.3.5. If we can show that C(ξ) ≥ 0 for
all ξ1, . . . ξN ∈ RK , this will finish the proof (analogously C(ξ) > 0 for ξ 6= 0 if G is
strictly positive definite).
To show this, let 0 = t˜1 < t˜2 < . . . < t˜N˜ with N˜ ≤ N such that {t˜1, t˜2, . . . , t˜N˜} =
{t1, t2, . . . , tN} − mini=1,2,...,N ti. Define f : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , N˜} such that
t˜f(i) = ti − mini=1,2,...,N ti. Furthermore, let ξ˜i =
∑
j∈f−1({i}) ξj. Intuitively, we add
up trades at the same point in time to one trade. We find that
N∑
k,l=1
ξ>k G˜(tk − tl)ξl =
N˜∑
k,l=1
ξ˜kG˜(t˜k − t˜l)ξ˜l.
Since the right-hand side is nonnegative due to the positive definiteness of G, also
the left-hand side is nonnegative (resp. strictly positive for ξ 6= 0 if G is strictly
positive definite) and everything is shown.
Proposition 4.5.6. If G is positive definite and continuous in 0, then G(0) is
symmetric.
Proof. Assume that G(0) is not symmetric, i.e. there exists k, l ∈ {1, . . . , K} such
that G(0)k,l > G(0)l,k. For ε > 0, set t1 = 0, t2 = ε, t3 = 2ε and t4 = 3ε.
Furthermore, set N = 4, (ξ1)l = +1, (ξ2)k = −1, (ξ3)l = −1, (ξ4)k = +1, and
all other entries of ξ1, . . . ξ4 to zero. Then C(ξ) = (G(0)l,l − G(2ε)l,l) + (G(0)k,k −
G(2ε)k,k) + (G(3ε)k,l − 2G(ε)k,l + G(ε)l,k) → G(0)l,k − G(0)k,l < 0 for ε → 0, since
G is continuous in 0. So G is not positive definite in this case. Therefore, G(0) has
to be symmetric.
Corollary 4.5.7. If G is continuous in 0, then G is (strictly) positive definite if
and only if G˜ is (strictly) complex positive definite.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 4.5.5 and Proposition 4.5.6.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.3. By Corollary 4.5.7, G˜ is complex positive definite if and
only if G is positive definite. So by the remark after chapter IV, §1, Theorem 1 in
Gihman and Skorohod (1974) (see Chapter III, §1, pp 146f in Gihman and Skorohod
(1974) for a proof), G˜ is the matrix correlation function of a homogeneous vector-
valued random field if and only if G is positive definite. But since G is continuous,
this is equivalent with (b) due to chapter IV, §2, Theorem 5 in Gihman and Skorohod
(1974). This finishes the proof.
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We prepare now for the proof of Theorem 4.3.9.
Lemma 4.5.8 (Polarization). Let S, T ⊂ R, G : S → RK×K be symmetric and
f : S×T → C be measurable. Assume for every ξ ∈ RK there is a unique nonnegative
finite Borel measure µξ on T such that
ξ>G(t)ξ =
∫
T
f(t, x)µξ(dx) for all t ∈ S.
Then there is a symmetric nonnegative matrix-valued measure M such that
G(t) =
∫
T
f(t, x)M(dx) for all t ∈ S.
Proof. Let B(T ) be the Borel sets on T and t ∈ S. For E ∈ B(T ), let mE : RK → R
with mE(ξ) = µξ(E) and BE(ξ, ζ) =
1
4
(mE(ξ + ζ) − mE(ξ − ζ)). Furthermore
we define µξ,ζ : B(T ) → R with µξ,ζ(E) = BE(ξ, ζ). Now we show that BE is
a symmetric bilinear functional on RK , i.e. it can be represented by a symmetric
matrix. Since
(ξ1 + ξ2 + ζ)
>G(t)(ξ1 + ξ2 + ζ)− (ξ1 + ξ2 − ζ)>G(t)(ξ1 + ξ2 − ζ)
= (ξ1 + ζ)
>G(t)(ξ1 + ζ)− (ξ1 − ζ)>G(t)(ξ1 − ζ)
+(ξ2 + ζ)
>G(t)(ξ2 + ζ)− (ξ2 − ζ)>G(t)(ξ2 − ζ),
by the uniqueness of µξ for every ξ ∈ RK we know that µξ1+ξ2+ζ − µξ1+ξ2−ζ =
µξ1+ζ − µξ1−ζ + µξ2+ζ − µξ2−ζ , which leads to BE(ξ1 + ξ2, ζ) = BE(ξ1, ζ) +BE(ξ2, ζ).
Similarly, since for every λ ∈ R
(λξ + ζ)>G(t)(λξ + ζ)− (λξ − ζ)>G(t)(λξ − ζ)
= λ
(
(ξ + ζ)>G(t)(ξ + ζ)− (ξ − ζ)>G(t)(ξ − ζ)) ,
we know that µλξ+ζ−µλξ−ζ = λ(µξ+ζ−µξ−ζ), which leads to BE(λξ, ζ) = λBE(ξ, ζ).
Furthermore, we have (ξ−ζ)>G˜(t)(ξ−ζ) = (ζ−ξ)>G˜(t)(ζ−ξ) and thus, µξ−ζ = µζ−ξ.
It follows that BE(ξ, ζ) = BE(ζ, ξ). So for each E ∈ B(T ) we find a symmetric
matrix M(E) such that BE(ξ, ζ) = ξ
>M(E)ζ for all ξ, ζ ∈ RK . Since
ξ>M(E)ξ = BE(ξ, ξ) = µξ,ξ(E) = µξ(E) ≥ 0 (4.13)
for every ξ ∈ RK , we know that M(E) is nonnegative for every E ∈ B(T ).
Furthermore, M(∅) = 0 and let En be a sequence of disjoint sets in B(T ). Then
for ξ, ζ ∈ RK we have
ξ>M
( ∞⋃
n=1
En
)
ζ =
1
4
(
µξ+ζ
( ∞⋃
n=1
En
)
− µξ−ζ
( ∞⋃
n=1
En
))
=
1
4
( ∞∑
n=1
µξ+ζ(En)−
∞∑
n=1
µξ−ζ(En)
)
=
∞∑
n=1
1
4
(µξ+ζ(En)− µξ−ζ(En))
=
∞∑
n=1
ξ>M(En)ζ.
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Since this holds for every ξ, ζ ∈ RK , we have ∑∞n=1 ξ>M(En)ζ = ξ>(∑∞n=1M(En))ζ
and thus, M(
⋃∞
n=1En) =
∑∞
n=1M(En), i.e. M is a measure.
For all ξ, ζ ∈ RK we have
ξ>G(t)ζ =
1
4
((ξ + ζ)>G(t)(ξ + ζ)− (ξ − ζ)>G(t)(ξ − ζ))
=
1
4
(∫
T
f(t, x)µξ+ζ(dx)−
∫
T
f(t, x)µξ−ζ(dx)
)
=
∫
T
f(t, x)µξ,ζ(dx)
=
∫
T
f(t, x) (ξ>M(dx)ζ)
= ξ>
(∫
T
f(t, x)M(dx)
)
ζ,
where we used the symmetry of G in the first equality. So we have
G(t) =
∫
T
f(t, x)M(dx).
The following lemma shows that matrix-valued measures have a particularly
simple structure.
Lemma 4.5.9. Let M : B(R) → RK×K be a symmetric nonnegative matrix-valued
measure. Then there exists a finite (real-valued) measure µ : B(R) → [0,∞) and a
bounded measurable function Σ : R→ S+(K) such that
M(E) =
∫
E
Σ(t)µ(dt) for every E ∈ B(R). (4.14)
Proof. Define a real-valued signed measure Mij : B(R) → [0,∞) by letting Mij(E)
be the (i, j)-component of the matrix M(E). In a first step, we show that the
signed measure Mij is of finite total variation. To this end, note first that Mζ(E) :=
ζ>M(E)ζ is a real-valued and nonnegative Borel measure for each ζ ∈ R. In partic-
ular, it has the finite total variation Mζ(R) = ζ>M(R)ζ. Now polarization implies
that
Mij(E) =
1
4
(
Mei+ej(E)−Mei−ej(E)
)
,
so Mij is of finite total variation as the difference of two finite nonnegative measures.
We thus can define µij as the total variation measure of the signed measure Mij.
When defining µ :=
∑K
i,j=1 µij, then each Mij is absolutely continuous with respect
to µ and admits a Radon-Nikodym derivative Σ˜ij = dMij/dµ, which takes values in
[−1, 1]. Clearly, Σ˜ij = Σ˜ji µ-a.e., and so we can assume without loss of generality
that the matrix-valued function Σ˜(t) = (Σ˜ij(t))ij is symmetric for all t. Moreover,
(4.14) clearly holds with Σ˜ in place of Σ. In particular,
ζ>M(E)ζ =
∫
E
ζ>Σ˜(t)ζ µ(dt)
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holds for all E ∈ B(R) and all ζ ∈ RK . Thus, for every ζ ∈ RK there is a µ-nullset
Nζ such that ζ
>Σ˜(t)ζ ≥ 0 for all t /∈ Nζ . Hence, Σ˜(t) ∈ S+(K) for all t not belonging
to the µ-nullset N :=
⋂
ζ∈QK Nζ . Thus, Σ(t) defined as Σ˜(t) for t /∈ N and as 0
otherwise is as desired.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.9. (a)⇒ (b). This follows immediately by choosing ξk = xkζ.
(b) ⇒ (c). By Bochner’s Theorem, for each ξ ∈ RK there exists a unique
nonnegative finite Borel measure µξ on R such that for all t ≥ 0
ξ>G(t)ξ =
∫
R
eitγµξ(dγ). (4.15)
With Lemma 4.5.8, the result follows.
(c) ⇒ (a). Since G is symmetric, we have that G˜(−t) = G˜(t) for all t ∈ R, and
thus, we have G˜(t) =
∫
R e
itγM(dγ) for all t ∈ R. Take time points 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤
· · · ≤ tN , ξ1, . . . , ξN ∈ RK , and let Σ and µ be as in Lemma 4.5.9. Then
C(ξ) =
1
2
N∑
k,l=1
ξ>k G˜(tk − tl)ξl =
1
2
N∑
k,l=1
ξ>k
(∫
R
ei(tk−tl)γM(dγ)
)
ξl
=
1
2
N∑
k,l=1
ξ>k
(∫
R
ei(tk−tl)γΣ(γ)µ(dγ)
)
ξl
=
1
2
∫ ( N∑
k=1
eitkγξk
)>
Σ(γ)
( N∑
k=1
e−itkγξk
)
µ(dγ) (4.16)
=
1
2
∫
v(γ)>Σ(γ)v(γ)µ(dγ),
where the vector field v : R → CK is defined as v(γ) := ∑Nk=1 eitkγξk. Since
v(γ)>Σ(γ)v(γ) ≥ 0 for all γ, condition (a) follows.
For the proof of Proposition 4.3.10, we first need a lemma.
Lemma 4.5.10 (First order condition). Let G be symmetric, (ξ1, . . . ξN) be an op-
timal strategy and (ξ˜1, . . . , ξ˜N) with
∑N
k=0 ξ˜k = 0. Then
N∑
k,l=1
ξ˜>k G˜(tk − tl)ξl =
N∑
k,l=1
ξ>k G˜(tk − tl)ξ˜l = 0
Proof. Since (ξ1, . . . xN) is an optimal strategy, we have that
d
dh
∣∣∣∣
h=0
N∑
k,l=1
(ξk + hξ˜k)
>G˜(tk − tl)(ξl + hξ˜l) = 0.
It follows that
N∑
k,l=1
ξ˜>k G˜(tk − tl)ξl +
N∑
k,l=1
ξ>k G˜(tk − tl)ξ˜l = 0.
Since G is symmetric, the result follows.
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Proof of Prop. 4.3.10. Let m ∈ {1, . . . K}, q ∈ {1, . . . , N} and
(ξ˜i)j =

1, if i = p, j = m,
−1, if i = q, j = m,
0 else.
By G˜m(tk − tp) we denote the mth row of G˜(tk − tp). By Lemma 4.5.10, we know
that
0 =
N∑
k=1
ξ>k Gm(tk − tp)−
N∑
k=1
ξ>k Gm(tk − tq).
Varying q shows, that there is λm ∈ R such that
∑N
k=1 ξ
>
k Gm(tk − tp) = λm. This
shows the existence of the asserted λ.
Using Proposition 4.3.5, we find that
C(ξ) =
1
2
N∑
l=1
(
N∑
k=1
ξ>k G˜(tk − tl)
)
ξl =
1
2
λ>
N∑
l=1
ξl = −1
2
λ>X0.
Now assume that (ξ1, . . . ξN) satisfies (4.4) and let (ξ˜1, . . . ξ˜N) be any other ad-
missible strategy. Let (ζ1, . . . , ζN) = (ξ˜1− ξ1, . . . , ξ˜N − ξN). Using the notation from
the proof of Proposition 4.5.1, we find
C(ξ, ζ) = 1
2
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=1
ξ>i G˜(ti − tj)
)
ζj =
1
2
λ>
N∑
j=1
ζj = 0
and thus
C(ξ˜) = C(ξ + ζ) = C(ξ) + C(ζ) + 2C(ξ, ζ) = C(ξ) + C(ζ) ≥ C(ξ),
so ξ is optimal.
Proof of Prop. 4.3.11. By Remark 4.5.2, L is a linear map and L(ξ) = 0 implies
C(ξ) = 0. Since G is strictly positive definite, it follows that L(ξ) = 0 implies ξ = 0,
so L is invertible. Since L−1 is also linear, M is linear.
For each X0 ∈ RK , there is a unique optimal strategy ξ∗ by Proposition 4.2.5.
Proposition 4.3.10 implies that L(ξ∗) = λ1>N , i.e. ξ
∗ = L−1(λ1>N). Since ξ
∗
1N =
−X0, we have that M(λ) = −X0. Since we can find such a λ for every X0 ∈ RK , M
is onto and therefore invertible. So λ = −M−1(X0), and ξ∗ = −L−1(M−1(X0)1>N)
follows. By Proposition 4.3.10, we have that C(ξ∗) = −1
2
λ>X0 = 12(M
−1(X0))>X0.
We now prepare for the proof of Theorem 4.3.14.
Proposition 4.5.11. For a right-continuous symmetric matrix-valued function G,
the following conditions are equivalent.
(a) G is nonincreasing.
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(b) There exists a nonnegative Radon measure µ on [0,∞) and a measurable func-
tion Γ : [0,∞)→ S+(K) such that G(t) = G(0)−
∫
[0,t]
Γ(s)µ(ds).
If, moreover, G is nonincreasing and nonnegative, then Gij(∞) := limt↑∞Gij(t)
exists for all i, j, and the corresponding matrix G(∞) is symmetric and nonnega-
tive. Moreover,
∫
[0,∞) Γ(s)µ(ds) converges, and G(∞) = G(0)−
∫
[0,∞) Γ(s)µ(ds). It
follows in particular that
G(t) = G(∞) +
∫
(t,∞)
Γ(s)µ(ds). (4.17)
Remark 4.5.12. When all components Gij(t) of G are absolutely continuous func-
tions, we can take for µ the Lebesgue measure.
Proof. The implication (b)⇒(a) is obvious. To prove (a)⇒(b), we use polarization
to see that G(t) is determined by the numbers gζ(t), where ζ runs through the finite
set Z := {ei + ej | i, j = 1, . . . , K}. Here, ei denotes as usual the ith unit vector.
Since the function t 7→ gζ(t) is right-continuous and nonincreasing for each ζ, there
exists a nonnegative Radon measure µζ on [0,∞) such that gζ(t) = gζ(0)− µζ [0, t].
We set µ :=
∑
ζ∈Z µζ . Then each µζ with ζ ∈ Z is absolutely continuous with
respect to µ and has the Radon-Nikodym derivative γζ = dµζ/dµ. We set
Γ˜ij(t) :=
1
2
γei+ej(t)−
1
8
γ2ei(t)−
1
8
γ2ej(t). (4.18)
Clearly, Γ˜ij(t) = Γ˜ji(t) and Gij(t) = Gij(0) −
∫
[0,t]
Γ˜ij(s)µ(ds). It remains to show
that there exists a µ-nullset N such that the matrix (Γ˜ij(t)) is nonnegative for
t /∈ N . Once this has been established, we can set Γij(t) = Γ˜ij(t) for t /∈ N and
Γij(t) = 0 otherwise. To this end, we note that for every ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζK) ∈ QK we
have gζ(t) = gζ(0) − ∫
[0,t]
γζ(s)µ(ds), where γζ(s) :=
∑K
i,j=1 ζiζjΓ˜ij(s). Since g
ζ is
nonincreasing, we must have γζ(s) ≥ 0 for all s outside some µ-nullset Nζ . Thus,
N :=
⋂
ζ∈QK Nζ is as desired.
Now suppose that G is nonincreasing and nonnegative. Then, for each ζ ∈ RK ,
the limit gζ(∞) := limt↑∞ gζ(t) exists as a nonnegative real number. Polarization
thus implies that the limits Gij(∞) := limt↑∞Gij(t) exists for all i, j and that the
corresponding matrix G(∞) is symmetric and nonnegative. The remaing assertions
are easy to prove.
Proposition 4.5.13. For a right-continuous symmetric matrix-valued function G,
the following conditions are equivalent.
(a) G is convex.
(b) There exists a right-continuous and nonincreasing function Γ : [0,∞)→ S(K)
such that G(t) = G(0)− ∫ t
0
Γ(s) ds.
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If, moreover, G is convex, nonincreasing, and nonnegative, then there exists a non-
negative Radon measure µ on (0,∞) and a measurable function Λ : (0,∞)→ S+(K)
such that
G(t) = G(∞) +
∫
(0,∞)
(r − t)+Λ(r)µ(dr). (4.19)
Proof. The implication (b)⇒(a) is obvious. We now prove (a)⇒(b). Since each func-
tion gζ is convex, it is of the form gζ(t) = gζ(0)− ∫ t
0
γζ(s) ds for a right-continuous
and nonincreasing function γζ . When defining Γij(t) in the same way as Γ˜ij(t) is
defined in (4.18), then we have γζ(t) :=
∑K
i,j=1 ζiζjΓij(t) for all t and ζ, due to
right-continuity. It follows that Γ is as desired.
Now assume that G is convex, nonincreasing, and nonnegative. It follows that
(4.17) holds, and from (b) that µ(ds) = ds and that the corresponding function
Γ is right-continuous, nonnegative, and nonincreasing. Since
∫∞
t
Γ(s) ds is finite,
we must have Γ(∞) = 0. Applying (4.17) to Γ thus yields the existence of a
nonnegative Radon measure µ and a right-continuous, nonnegative function Λ such
that Γ(s) =
∫
(s,∞) Λ(r)µ(dr). Combining the representations for G and Γ yields
G(t) = G(∞) +
∫ ∞
t
∫
(s,∞)
Λ(r)µ(dr) ds.
Using Fubini’s theorem finally implies (4.19).
Proposition 4.5.14. When G is convex, nonincreasing, nonnegative, symmetric
and continuous, it is the Fourier transform of the symmetric nonnegative matrix-
valued measure
M(dγ) = G(∞) δ0(dγ) + Φ(γ) dγ,
where Φ : R→ S+(K) is the continuous function given by
Φ(x) =
1
pi
∫
(0,∞)
1− cosxy
x2
Λ(y)µ(dy)
for Λ and µ as in (4.19).
Proof. By Lemma 4.2 in Gatheral et al. (2012), we find that for every ξ ∈ RK the
function gξ(t) = ξ>G(t)ξ is the Fourier transform of the nonnegative Radon measure
µξ(dγ) = ξ
>(G(∞)δ0(dγ) + Φ(γ)dγ)ξ
on R. By polarization as in Lemma 4.5.8, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.14. First we argue that we can assume without loss of gen-
erality that G is continuous. To this end, let Gcont(t) = lims↓tG(s) for all t ≥ 0.
Gcont is continuous, since a convex function on [0,∞) is continuous on (0,∞). So
G(t) = Gcont(t) + δ0(t)∆G(0), where ∆G(0) denotes the jump of G in 0. So for any
ξ ∈ RK we have gξ(t) = ξ>Gcont(t)ξ + δ0(t)ξ>(∆G(0))ξ. Since gξ is convex for any
ξ, we have that ξ>(∆G(0))ξ ≥ 0 for any ξ, i.e. ∆G(0) is nonnegative. Let Ccont the
4.5. PROOFS 97
cost function corresponding to Gcont. Then C(ξ) = Ccont(ξ) + 1
2
∑N
k=1 ξ
>
k G(0)ξk ≥
Ccont(ξ). So we can restrict ourselves to the case of continuous G.
Let now M , Φ, Λ, and µ be as in Proposition 4.5.14. It follows from that
proposition and (4.16) that for ξ = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξN) ∈ RK ⊗RN and all 0 ≤ t1 < t2 <
. . . < tN
C(ξ) =
1
2
v(0)>G(∞)v(0) + 1
2
∫
v(γ)>Φ(γ)v(γ) dγ,
where v(γ) :=
∑N
k=1 e
itkγξk. We are now going to show that the integral on the right
is strictly positive unless ξ = 0. To this end, we note first that the components of
the vector field v(·) are holomorphic functions of γ ∈ C. When ξ 6= 0, at least one
of these components is nonconstant and hence vanishes only on a set which has at
most countably many elements. It follows that v(γ) 6= 0 for all but countably many
γ ∈ R. Moreover, we are going to argue next that the matrix Φ(γ) is strictly positive
for all but countably many γ ∈ R. Thus, v(γ)>Φ(γ)v(γ) > 0 for Lebesgue-almost
every γ ∈ R, and it follows that C(ξ) > 0.
So let us show now that Φ(γ) is strictly positive for all but countably many
γ ∈ R. To this end, we first note that from (4.19),
gζ(t) = ζ>G(∞)ζ +
∫
(0,∞)
(r − t)+ζ>Λ(r)ζ µ(dr).
Since Λ(r) is nonnegative, the fact that gζ is nonconstant for ζ 6= 0 implies that∫
(0,∞)
ζ>Λ(r)ζ µ(dr) > 0 for ζ 6= 0. (4.20)
Now let A be the set of all y > 0 such that µ({y}) > 0, and let
µd(E) := µ(A ∩ E) and µc(E) := µ(Ac ∩ E)
be the discrete and continuous parts of µ, respectively. Clearly,
N :=
{
x ∈ R ∣∣ cosxy = 1 for some y ∈ A} = ⋃
y∈A
{
x ∈ R ∣∣ cosxy = 1}
is at most countable. Moreover, the set {y > 0 | cosxy = 1} is a µc-nullset for
all x 6= 0. It thus follows that the measure 1−cosxy
x2
µ(dy) is equivalent to µ for all
x /∈ N ∪ {0}. Therefore (4.20) implies that
ζ>Φ(x)ζ =
1
pi
∫
(0,∞)
1− cosxy
x2
ζ>Λ(r)ζ µ(dy) > 0
for all ζ 6= 0 as long as x /∈ N ∪ {0}. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.15. Assume that G is not nonnegative, i.e. there exists ζ ∈
RK , t∗ > 0 and ε > 0 such that gζ(t∗) = −ε. Now we want to show that gζ cannot
be positive definite in this case. Set tk = k · t∗ and xk = 1 for k ∈ N. Since
|tk − tl| ≥ t∗ for k 6= l and gζ is nonincreasing, we have gζ(|tk − tl|) ≤ −ε for k 6= l.
Thus,
∑n
k,l=1 xkxlg
ζ(|tk − tl|) ≤ ngζ(0)− (n2 − n) ε. If n is large enough, the latter
expression is negative. Thus, gζ is not positive definite, and so G can not be positive
definite.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3.16. First we prove that G1 is strictly positive definite. Let
L = AA> be the Cholesky decomposition of L, so A ∈ RK×K is invertible. Let
ξ1, . . . , ξN ∈ RK such that at least one of these vectors is nonzero. Let ξ˜k = A>ξk
for k = 1, . . . , N . Since A is invertible, at least one of the vectors ξ˜1, . . . , ξ˜N is
nonzero. Since g is strictly positive definite, it follows that
C(ξ) =
1
2
N∑
k,l=1
ξ>k G˜1(tk − tl)ξl
=
1
2
N∑
k,l=1
ξ>k Ag(|tk − tl|)A>ξl
=
1
2
N∑
k,l=1
ξ˜>k g(|tk − tl|)ξ˜l
> 0.
So G1 is strictly positive definite. By Proposition 4.2.5, there exists a unique optimal
strategy ξ(1) for G1. By Proposition 4.3.10, it satisfies
∑N
k=1(ξ
(1)
k )
>G˜1(tk − tp) = λ>1
for some λ1 ∈ RK . Multiplying this equation with L−1L˜ from the right yields∑N
k=1(ξ
(1)
k )
>G˜2(tk − tp) = λ>1 L−1L˜, i.e. ξ(1) is also the unique optimal strategy for
G2 by Proposition 4.3.10.
Proof of Prop. 4.3.17. SinceG3 is symmetric and strictly positive definite, its unique
optimal strategy is characterized by
∑N
k=1(ξ
(3)
k )
>G˜3(tk − tp) = λ>3 with some λ3 ∈
RK . It follows that
∑N
k=1(ξ
(3)
k )
>G˜1(tk− tp) = λ>3 L−1. But ξ(1) is the unique solution
to the latter equation, so it follows that ξ(3) = ξ(1). Furthermore, λ3 = L
>λ1.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.18. Let Ci(ξ) denote the cost of a strategy ξ with respect
to the decay kernel Gi. From (4.3) it follows that C1(Lξ) = C2(ξ) for all strategies
ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN), where Lξ is defined componentwise, i.e., Lξ = (Lξ1, . . . , LξN). In
particular, G2 is positive definite. Since L is invertible, G2 is even strictly positive
definite when G1 is. It is also clear that C2(ξ) is minimized by ξ = ξ
(2) if C1(ξ) is
minimized by ξ = Lξ(2), which proves our formula for the optimal strategy.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.19. Let G be positive definite. First, we show that the
transpose is positive definite. That is, we have to show that for all N ∈ N, 0 ≤ t1 <
t2 < . . . tN and ξ1, . . . , ξN ∈ RK we have
1
2
N∑
k=1
ξ>k G(0)
>ξk +
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ>k G(tk − tl)>ξl ≥ 0.
For i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we define ξ˜i = ξN+1−i (so ξi = ξ˜N+1−i) and t˜i = tN − tN+1−i.
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Then we have
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ>k G(tk − tl)>ξl =
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ˜>N+1−kG(tk − tl)>ξ˜N+1−l
=
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ˜>l G(tN+1−l − tN+1−k)>ξk
=
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ˜>k G(tN+1−l − tN+1−k)ξl
=
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ˜>k G(t˜k − t˜l)ξl
The latter expression is nonnegative, since G is positive definite. Since
1
2
N∑
k=1
ξ>k G(0)
>ξk =
1
2
N∑
k=1
ξ>k G(0)ξk =
1
2
N∑
k=1
ξ˜>k G(0)ξ˜k,
we conclude that t 7→ G(t)> is positive definite.
The proof, that every convex combination t 7→ αG(t) + (1 − α)G(t)> with α ∈
[0, 1] is positive definite, is now straightforward, since the cost functional is linear
in G. For every N ∈ N, 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . tN and ξ1, . . . , ξN ∈ RK we have
1
2
N∑
k=1
ξ>k (αG(0) + (1− α)G(0)>)ξk +
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ>k (αG(tk − tl) + (1− αG(tk − tl)>)ξl
= α
(
1
2
N∑
k=1
ξ>k G(0)ξk +
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ>k G(tk − tl)ξl
)
+(1− α)
(
1
2
N∑
k=1
ξ>k G(0)
>ξk +
N∑
k=1
k−1∑
l=1
ξ>k G(tk − tl)>ξl
)
≥ 0,
since G and t 7→ G(t)> are positive definite.
Choosing α = 1
2
yields that the symmetrization is positive definite.
Finally, in case G is strictly positive definite the computations above show im-
mediately that the transpose and every convex combination are also strictly positive
definite.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.21. It is well known that two symmetric matrices commute if
and only if they can be simultaneously diagonalized. Thus, for any pair t, s ≥ 0
there exists an orthogonal matrix O and numbers gi(s), gi(t) (i = 1, . . . , K) such
that (4.5) holds for t and s. But this means that the matrices G(t) and G(s) have the
same eigenvectors. If r ≥ 0 is given, then G(r) also must have the same eigenvectors
as G(t) and, hence, as G(s). Therefore, the matrix O is in fact independent of the
choice of the pair s, t, and the result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3.22. Let vi be the i
th column of O. Then vi is the eigenvector
of Gi(t) for the eigenvalue gi(t). A given ζ ∈ RK can be written as ζ =
∑K
i=1 αivi.
Then Oζ =
∑K
i=1 αiei, where ei is the i
th unit vector. It follows from (4.5) that
gζ(t) =
∑K
i=1 α
2
i gi(t). From here, the assertions are obvious.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.24. Take O and gi as in (4.5) and let v1, . . . , vK be the col-
umn vectors of O. Then gvi(t) = gi(t). By Theorem 1 in Alfonsi et al. (2012), there
is a (one-dimensional) optimal strategy (x1, . . . , xN) corresponding to the initial po-
sition −∑Nn=1 xn = −1 and to the nonnegative, convex, and nonincreasing decay
kernel gi(t) that has only nonnegative components. But by Proposition 4.3.18, the
optimal strategy for X0 = vi is given by (ξ1, . . . , ξN) = (x1, . . . , xN)vi. This proves
the result.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.25. Let v1, . . . vK as in Proposition 4.3.24. Furthermore, let
α, . . . αK ∈ R such that X0 =
∑K
k=1 αkvk and ξ
(k) the optimal strategy to the initial
portfolio vk. The optimal strategy is linear in the initial portfolio X0, i.e. the optimal
strategy is ξ∗ =
∑K
k=1 αkξ
(k). Now
∑N
n=1 ‖ξ∗n‖1 ≤
∑N
n=1
∑K
k=1 |αk|‖ξ(k)n ‖1. With the
proof of Proposition 4.3.24, we find that
∑N
n=1 ‖ξ(k)n ‖1 = ‖vk‖1. So
∑N
n=1 ‖ξ∗n‖1 ≤∑K
k=1 |αk|‖vk‖1, which shows the result.
To study the examples for K = 2 assets, we will frequently use the following
simple lemma. While it is well-known that for Hermitian matrices to be positive
definite it is necessary and sufficient that all their eigenvalues are nonnegative, note
that for real nonsymmetric matrices it is not sufficient.
Lemma 4.5.15. (a) Let a, d ≥ 0 and b ∈ C. The Hermitian matrix
(
a b
b¯ d
)
is
positive definite if and only if |b|2 ≤ ad.
(b) Let a, b, c, d ≥ 0. The real matrix
(
a b
c d
)
is positive definite if and only if
1
4
(b+ c)2 ≤ ad.
Proof. (a): The second eigenvalue of the matrix is 1
2
(a + d −√(a− d)2 + 4|b|2).
This quantity is nonnegative if and only if |b|2 ≤ ad.
(b): The matrix M :=
(
a b
c d
)
is positive definite if and only if its symmetriza-
tion 1
2
(M +M>) is positive definite. According to (a), this is the case if and only if
(1
2
(b+ c))2 ≤ ad.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.1. (a): By Lemma 4.5.15, G is nonnegative if and only if
for every t ≥ 0
1
4
((a12 − b12t)+ + (a21 − b21t)+)2 ≤ (a11 − b11t)+(a22 − b22t)+.
Assume that G is nonnegative. Choosing t = 0 yields 1
4
(a12 + a21)
2 ≤ a11a22.
Choosing t = min{a11
b11
, a22
b22
} yields that the right-hand side of the preceding equation
is zero. So the left-hand side has to be zero which implies that max{a12
b12
, a21
b21
} ≤ t.
4.5. PROOFS 101
Conversely, assume that 1
4
(a12+a21)
2 ≤ a11a22 and max{a12b12 , a21b21 } ≤ min{a11b11 , a22b22 }.
So for any t ≥ 0, we have that max{(1− b12
a12
t)+, (1− b21
a21
t)+} ≤ min{(1− b11
a11
t)+, (1−
b22
a22
t)+}. Thus,
1
4
((a12 − b12t)+ + (a21 − b21t)+)2
=
1
4
(
a12
(
1− b12
a12
t
)+
+ a21
(
1− b21
a21
t
)+)2
≤ 1
4
(
(a12 + a21) max
{(
1− b12
a12
t
)+
,
(
1− b21
a21
t
)+})2
≤ 1
4
(
(a12 + a21) min
{(
1− b11
a11
t
)+
,
(
1− b22
a22
t
)+})2
≤ a11a22
(
min
{(
1− b11
a11
t
)+
,
(
1− b22
a22
t
)+})2
≤ a11a22
(
1− b11
a11
t
)+(
1− b22
a22
t
)+
= (a11 − b11t)+(a22 − b22t)+.
So G is nonnegative.
(b): G is absolutely continuous with derivative
G′(t) =
(−b111{t<a11
b11
} −b121{t<a12
b12
}
−b211{t<a21
b21
} −b221{t<a22
b22
}
)
By Proposition 4.3.13 and Lemma 4.5.15, G is nonincreasing if and only if for almost
all t > 0
1
4
(b121{t<a12
b12
} + b211{t<a21
b21
})
2 ≤ b111{t<a11
b11
}b221{t<a22
b22
}.
Assume G is nonincreasing. Then choosing t small enough shows 1
4
(b12 + b21)
2 ≤
b11b22. Choosing any t ≥ min{a11b11 , a22b22 } yields that the right-hand side of the
preceding equation is zero. So the left-hand-side has to be zero which implies
max{a12
b12
, a21
b21
} ≤ min{a11
b11
, a22
b22
}.
Conversely, if 1
4
(b12 + b21)
2 ≤ b11b22 and max{a12b12 , a21b21 } ≤ min{a11b11 , a22b22 }, it is
obvious that G is nonincreasing.
(c): Assume that a12 = a21. Then we have that G(t) =
∫
R e
iγtM(dγ) with
M(dγ) = 1
2piγ2
N(γ)dγ, with the Hermitian matrix
N(γ) =
(
2b11(1− cos(a11b11 γ)) b12(1− e
−ia12γ
b12 ) + b21(1− e
ia12γ
b21 )
b21(1− e
−ia12γ
b21 ) + b12(1− e
ia12γ
b12 ) 2b22(1− cos(a22b22 γ))
)
.
G is positive definite if and only if N(γ) is positive definite for every γ ∈ R. Using
Lemma 4.5.15, N(γ) is positive definite if and only if
|b12(1− e
−ia12γ
b12 ) + b21(1− e
ia12γ
b21 )|2 ≤ b11(1− cos(a11
b11
γ))b22(1− cos(a22
b22
γ)),
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i.e. if and only if(
b12(1− cos(a12
b12
γ)) + b21(1− cos(a12
b21
γ))
)2
+
(
b12 sin(
a12
b12
γ)− b21 sin(a12
b21
γ)
)2
≤ 4b11(1− cos(a11
b11
γ))b22(1− cos(a22
b22
γ)).
Assume that a12 = a21, b12 = b21,
a11
b11
= a12
b12
= a22
b22
and b212 ≤ b11b22. Since
a12
b12
= a12
b21
, the sin term vanishes in the preceding equation and it simplifies to
b12b21 ≤ b11b22. So G is positive definite.
Conversely, assume that G is positive definite. We have that a12 = a21 since G(0)
is symmetric due to Proposition 4.5.6. Assume that min{a12
b12
, a21
b21
} < max{a11
b11
, a22
b22
}.
Choose γ = 2pi(max{a11
b11
, a22
b22
})−1. So the right-hand side of the preceding display
is zero, but the left-hand side is strictly positive since 0 < min{a12
b12
, a21
b21
}γ < 2pi.
This yields that min{a12
b12
, a21
b21
} ≥ max{a11
b11
, a22
b22
} and together with the assumption
max{a12
b12
, a21
b21
} ≤ min{a11
b11
, a22
b22
} it follows that a11
b11
= a12
b12
= a21
b21
= a22
b22
. So b12 = b21, i.e.
G is symmetric. As before, the preceding display simplifies to b12b21 ≤ b11b22.
(d): The first part follows from (a) and (c). From (b) it follows that G is
nonincreasing in this case. To show convexity, note thatG′(t) =
(−b11 −b12
−b12 −b22
)
=: B
for t < a11
b11
and G′(t) = 0 for t > a11
b11
. By Proposition 4.5.13, we have to show that
G′ is nondecreasing, i.e. that B is negative definite, i.e. −B is positive definite. By
Lemma 4.5.15, this follows from b212 ≤ b11b22.
(e): Note that if either s ≥ a11
b11
or t ≥ a11
b11
, then G(t) or G(s) is the zero matrix,
so we have G(t)G(s) = G(s)G(t). If 0 ≤ s, t < a11
b11
, then
G(t)G(s)−G(s)G(t) =
(s− t)
(
0 a12(b11 − b22)− b12(a11 − a22)
−a12(b11 − b22) + b12(a11 − a22) 0
)
so G is commuting if and only if a12(b11 − b22) = b12(a11 − a22).
Proof of Proposition 4.4.2. (a): By Lemma 4.5.15, G is nonnegative if and only if
for every t ≥ 0
1
4
(a12 exp(−b12t) + a21 exp(−b21t))2 ≤ a11 exp(−b11t)a22 exp(−b22t),
i.e. if and only if
1
4
(a212 exp(−2b12t) + a12a21 exp(−(b12 + b21)t) + a221 exp(−2b21t))
≤ a11a22 exp(−(b11 + b22)t).
If G is nonnegative, taking t = 0 shows 1
4
(a12 + a21)
2 ≤ a11a22, while t →∞ shows
min{b12, b21} ≥ 12(b11 + b22). Conversely, if these inequalities hold, G is nonnegative.
(b): G is C1. By Proposition 4.3.13 G is nonincreasing if and only if for every
t ≥ 0
−G′(t) =
(
a11b11 exp(−b11t) a12b12 exp(−b12t)
a21b21 exp(−b21t) a22b22 exp(−b22t)
)
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is positive definite. Analogously to (a), the result follows.
(c): Analogously to (b), by Proposition 4.3.13 G is convex if and only if for every
≥ 0 its second derivative
G′′(t) =
(
a11b
2
11 exp(−b11t) a12b212 exp(−b12t)
a21b
2
21 exp(−b21t) a22b222 exp(−b22t)
)
is positive definite. The result follows analogously to (a).
(d): Assume that a12 = a21. We have that G(t) =
∫
R e
iγtM(dγ), where M(dγ) =
1
2pi
N(γ) dγ with the Hermitian matrix
N(γ) =
(
2 a11b11
b211+γ
2
a12
b21−iγ +
a12
b12+iγ
a12
b12−iγ +
a12
b21+iγ
2 a22b22
b222+γ
2
)
.
G is positive definite if and only if N(γ) is positive definite for all γ ∈ R. According
to Lemma 4.5.15, this is equivalent to
| a12
b21 − iγ +
a12
b12 + iγ
| ≤ 4 a11b11
b211 + γ
2
a22b22
b222 + γ
2
,
i.e.
a212(b12 + b21)
2
(b212 + γ
2)(b221 + γ
2)
≤ 4 a11b11
b211 + γ
2
a22b22
b222 + γ
2
,
i.e.
a212(b12 + b21)
2(b211 + γ
2)(b222 + γ
2) ≤ 4a11b11a22b22(b212 + γ2)(b221 + γ2).
Comparing the coefficients for γ0, γ2 and γ4, we see that it is sufficient to have
a212(b12 + b21)
2b11b22 ≤ 4a11a22b212b221 (4.21)
a212(b12 + b21)
2(b211 + b
2
22) ≤ 4a11b11a22b22(b212 + b221) (4.22)
a212(b12 + b21)
2 ≤ 4a11b11a22b22. (4.23)
Note that (4.23) follows immediately from (b), since G is nonincreasing and a12 =
a21. To show (4.21), note that
√
b11b22 ≤ 12(b11 + b22) ≤ min{b12, b21}, so b211b222 ≤
(min{b12, b21})4 ≤ b212b221. Together with (4.23) the result follows. Finally, (4.22)
follows from (4.23) and the assumption b211 + b
2
22 ≤ b212 + b221. This finishes the proof.
Note that (4.21), (4.23) and a12 = a21 are necessary for G being positive definite.
However, (4.22) is not necessary, but the necessary condition is rather lengthy.
(e): We find that the left upper entry of G(0)G(t)−G(t)G(0) is a12a21(−e−b12t+
e−b21t), so G(0)G(t) = G(t)G(0) implies b12 = b21. Given that, a direct calculation
shows that G(0)G(t) = G(t)G(0) is equivalent to a11(e
−b11t − e−b12t) + a22(e−b12t −
e−b22t) = 0. If a11 = a22, this implies b11 = b22. If a11 6= a22, by the equivalent
equation a22 − a11 = a22e−(b22−b12)t − a11e−(b11−b12)t we see that b11 = b22 and finally
b11 = b12 = b21 = b22.
Conversely, if either a11 = a22 and b12 = b21 and b11 = b22, or b11 = b12 = b21 =
b22, a direct calculation shows that G(s)G(t) = G(t)G(s) for all s, t ≥ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4.4.5. G is obviously continuous and Proposition 4.4.2 yields
that G is convex, nonincreasing and nonnegative.
To show that G is not positive definite, using Mathematica we find that G(t) =∫
R e
iγtM(dγ), where M(dγ) = CN(γ) dγ+Dδ0(dγ) with a constant C > 0, a matrix
D ∈ R2×2, the Dirac measure δ0 at 0 and the Hermitian matrix N(γ) given by(
2e2(− cos(γ)γ+eγ−sin(γ))
γ3+γ
f(γ)
f(γ) 2e
2(− cos(γ)γ+eγ−sin(γ))
γ3+γ
)
with
f(γ) =
5e3γ − ((3 + 2e)γ + 6i(−1 + e)) cos(γ) + (i(−3 + 2e)γ − 6(1 + e)) sin(γ)
8γ(γ(γ + i) + 6)
.
If G was positive definite, then all eigenvalues of N(γ) would be positive for
γ 6= 0. But using Mathematica we find that one eigenvalue of N(γ) is
1
8 (γ2 + 4) (γ2 + 9) (γ3 + γ)2
(
16e3
(
γ2 + 1
) (
γ2 + 4
) (
γ2 + 9
)
γ2
−16e2 (γ2 + 1) (γ2 + 4) (γ2 + 9) γ(sin(γ) + γ cos(γ))
−
(
γ2
(
γ2 + 1
)4 (
γ2 + 4
) (
γ2 + 9
) ( (
9 + 4e2 + 25e6
)
γ2
−10e3(3 + 2e)γ2 cos(γ) + 12e (γ2 − 6) cos(2γ)
−60eγ sin(γ) (−2 cos(γ) + e3 + e2)+ 36 (1 + e2) )) 12),
which is negative for all γ with 0 < |γ| < 0.02. So G is not positive definite.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.8. (a)⇒(b): By the standard Hausdorff-Bernstein-Widder The-
orem we know that for each ξ ∈ RK there is a nonnegative finite Borel measure µξ
such that
ξ>G(t)ξ =
∫ ∞
0
e−txµξ(dx).
Since ξ>G(t)ξ is the Laplace transform of µξ, the measure µξ is unique. So by
Lemma 4.5.8, (b) follows.
(b)⇒(c): Since M = ∫ δxM(dx), it is sufficient to consider a simple measure of
the form M(dx) = δy(dx)N for some y ∈ [0,∞) and N ∈ S+, so G(t) = e−tyN =
e−ty IdN = e−t(yId)N . Choosing µ(dB) = δyId(dB)N yields that there is a represen-
tation (4.7) for G.
(c)⇒(a): For n ≥ 0 we have that
G(n)(t) = (−1)n
∫
Bne−tB µ(dB).
Since Bn is nonnegative for all n ≥ 0 for nonnegative B, (a) follows.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Our focus was on the regularity of the models, in particular the regularity condi-
tions of no price manipulation of Huberman and Stanzl (2004) and no transaction-
triggered price manipulation of Alfonsi et al. (2012). Additionally we have proposed
the condition of positive expected liquidation costs, which is between these two con-
ditions. It is important to investigate the regularity of a market impact model, since
in irregular models optimal strategies may not exist or show unexpected behavior.
Irregularity can also be a hint for misspecification of the model. As we have shown,
regularity often depends strongly on the parameters. Since liquidity parameters
vary significantly over time (compare Westray (2010)), it is important to examine
the regularity of a model for different parameters.
In chapter 2 we have presented a model for stochastic transient impact. Stochas-
tic impact is motivated by seasonalities and by the impact generated by trading
derivatives. In the case of stochastic permanent impact the liquidity parameter has
to be a submartingale to ensure regularity. Adding temporary impact to the model
regularizes it only for small time horizons. Since the submartingale condition for
the liquidity parameter is very restrictive, we have considered stochastic transient
impact to allow for more flexible choices of the liquidity parameter.
For exponential decay of price impact with time-dependent liquidity parameter
we have given a sufficient condition for regularity. In the non-exponential case, we
have taken a specific decay kernel and discussed the behavior of optimal strategies
when modeling liquidity with a geometric Brownian motion in a numerical exam-
ple. In particular, transaction-triggered price manipulation exists in this case. If
the liquidation horizon T is large enough, one obtains unbounded expected profits.
Furthermore, even if the liquidity parameter is a martingale we have shown that it
may be beneficial to adapt the strategy to the liquidity parameter.
Stochastic impact is interesting both from a practical and a theoretical point of
view. Thus, it may be promising to explore stochastic transient impact models and
their regularity further, in particular for non-exponential decay of market impact.
Since the complexity of the computation of optimal strategies increases strongly in
the number of trading times N , it might also be interesting to investigate efficient
algorithms for the computation of optimal strategies.
In chapter 3 we have analyzed the regularity of a class of dark-pool extensions
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of an Almgren–Chriss model and found that such models admit price manipulation
strategies unless the model parameters satisfy certain restrictions. These restrictions
are satisfied for every Almgren–Chriss model when the penalty parameter β is at
least 1
2
, the cross-venue impact parameter α is 1, and there is no temporary price
impact from the exchange on dark-pool prices. With these choices, the dark-pool
extension of any Almgren–Chriss model is free of price manipulation, has positive
expected liquidation costs, and hence admits reasonable optimal order execution
strategies. In this sense, the model is then regular.
For other parameter choices we have illustrated how regularity might fail. We
found in many cases that serious problems arise. Note that the strategies in the
dark pool have been very restrictive in allowing only one order at time 0. However,
if more strategies in the dark pool were allowed, regularity would be even worse.
It should be noted, however, that the parameter values α = 1 and β ≥ 1
2
will
typically not correspond to values found in empirical analysis or calibration of real-
world dark pools. Our results can therefore provide some indication that dark pools
may create market inefficiencies and disturb the price finding mechanism of markets,
although further empirical analysis will be needed to support this conjecture. On
the other hand, it may be that not all economic costs are included the model, for
example adverse selection (i.e. dependence of P 0 and N). However, it is challenging
to extend the model while keeping tractability and simplicity of the model.
In chapter 4 we have considered transient impact for multiple assets. Such a
market impact model is regular if the matrix-valued decay kernel of market impact
is a positive definite function. We have given characterizations of such positive
definite functions as Fourier transforms of nonnegative matrix-valued measures. For
symmetric decay kernels, we have shown that an optimal strategy is a solution of a
linear system of equations.
We have discussed nonincreasing, nonnegative and convex decay kernels. If a
decay kernel is additionally symmetric, it is positive definite. Furthermore, decay
kernels remain positive definite under congruence transformations and the trans-
formation of the associated optimal strategies can be given explicitly. Using these
results, we find the optimal strategy of a nonincreasing, nonnegative, convex, sym-
metric and commuting decay kernel has bounded variation, uniformly in the number
of trading times N . This allows for convergence to continuous-time strategies.
To illustrate these theoretical results we have analyzed linear and exponential
decay for two assets in detail. Moreover, we have discussed matrix functions. For
the exponential function, i.e. a generalized Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) model, we
have given explicit solutions in discrete and continuous time.
In this chapter there are two major open questions remaining. While symmetry is
often a necessary condition for many results, as we show with counterexamples, there
are also nonsymmetric positive definite functions. For these it would be desirable
to have results which allow the computation of optimal strategies. Another open
question is whether convergence to continuous time can also be shown for decay
kernels that are not commuting. This is especially interesting since commuting is a
very strong property and seems to have no financial interpretation.
For the transient impact models in this thesis (chapter 2 and 4) we have con-
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sidered linear impact only. Since practitioners prefer nonlinear impact functions, it
would be promising to investigate nonlinear models with transient impact. How-
ever, this will complicate the mathematical analysis significantly. For example, when
modeling nonlinearity as in Gatheral (2010) decay kernels that are continuous in 0
allow for price manipulation, see Proposition 23 in Slynko (2010).
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